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FREE WORLD

LABOR'S ROLE IN POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION
ROUND TABLE

FIRST YEAR OF THE UNITED NATIONS
by Michael Straight

THE FUTILITY OF CONQUEST
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WOMAN'S COLLEGE
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

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The Sleeper

ONCE when we broke a loaf of bread
And shared the honey, Celia said:
"How simple it should be
To share existence as the interchanging dust,
To be akin and kind and to entrust
All men to one another for their good!
And why have we not always understood
And carried to the common enemy
In you and me
This ultimatum of democracy?"

ONCE you had listened, Celia, to a stream
And lain a long time, silent as a sleeper.
Then came your words: words that still seem
To have been said beyond
The body, words bending with their breath a frond
Of fern beside the stream:
"As evil is yet wider than we dream,
So good is deeper."

WITTER BYNNER

EDITORIAL

IN his historic message to the Congress of the United States on January 7, President Roosevelt splendidly expressed both the popular character and the deep humanitarian aims of the United Nations coalition in the words: "The people now have gathered their strength. They are moving forward in their might and power, and no force, no combination of forces, no trickery, deceit, or violence can stop them now. They see before them the hope of the world, a decent, secure, peaceful life for men everywhere."

In the face of this statement, how base are the attempts of those who want to minimize the role of the United Nations and, at the same time, to interfere with the effort to create a new and better humanity. Once the principle is adopted that it is our task to create a decent, peaceful, and secure life for men everywhere, the detailed programs and techniques for world reconstruction can be found. It is only for those who have not sincerely accepted these principles that a detailed program furnishes the pretext for refusal to help build this new world.

It is only with the spirit and determination voiced by the President that the United Nations will be able to win the hardest of all wars and the greatest of all victories. But the goal is so high, when compared with the past and the present, that the task must be undertaken now as a factor in the effort to increase both the fighting strength of the Allies and the power of resistance of the subjugated peoples to their Axis conquerors. This speech of the President has won, we are sure, many new friends to the United Nations' cause in distant lands because every human being who listened to it realized that the President was including all men in the great human community which is in the making.

The President's speech was preceded by another important address by Vice-President Wallace on the occasion of the anniversary of Woodrow Wilson's birthday. Mr. Wallace is gradually building the practical framework for his great humanitarian philosophy, which he first expressed in his now famous speech before the Free World Association on May 8. He rightly suggests that we cannot at present blueprint all details of future world organization, but that we have to think about some of the essential principles of the new democracy of the United Nations. These principles of international organization, of higher standards of living, of collective security, of reconstruction, of economic co-operation, and of international harmony are indeed essential to whatever type of world federation may emerge from this war. The crisis of democracy in the last twenty years was not due to a lack of machinery or techniques; it was a serious crisis of conflicting concepts and of a lack of will to implement democracy.

One thing is certain, and particularly pleasant for us to notice. The Vice-President has broken through the bars of skepticism and indifference with which many people tried to shut out his ideas; everything he says now is followed with the greatest attention, not only in this country, but all over

the world. He is emerging from this crucial conflict as an inspiring leader not only of American liberalism but of world democracy.

The utterances of Roosevelt and Wallace raise the hope that the organization of the United Nations will be pushed forward now on a much larger scale, and that it will be completed by the creation of a Supreme Council. In fact, if these statements mean what they say—and we have no doubt of that—then immediate action is necessary to convert the enthusiasm and inspiration they have evoked into concrete democratic gains in all spheres of action. (It is interesting to note that one great partner among our Allies, namely, the Republic of China, has given unqualified support to the proposal of a political council of the United Nations contained in the speech by Dr. T. V. Soong. The supreme political bodies of China, the People's Political Council in November and the Central Committee of the Kuomintang in December, have both adopted declarations supporting the above mentioned policy and have thus made them binding for China. Various private Chinese organizations and the entire Chinese press have expressed their complete approval of the program outlined by the Chinese Foreign Minister.)

We are more and more convinced that only the creation of a representative body of the United Nations can bring to an end the many difficulties which exist at present. It is bad, and very painful, to hear the whisper that the United Nations do not exist. We know that these whispers come from enemy sources and from sources unfriendly to the United Nations as a whole. They can be stopped only by actual organization of the United Nations. The creation of a Supreme Council of the United Nations will direct popular enthusiasm and loyalty toward a concrete institution at the same time that it will allay public fear of hesitation and retreat in the carrying out of our ideals; it will have a most favorable effect on the Underground movement everywhere; it will force the remaining reactionary elements in some of the United Nations governments, and particularly in the governments-in-exile, to recognize that they must sincerely accept this new order or retire from their posts. There still exists an incomprehensible and inadmissable situation when those who are so clearly responsible for the present plight of the world and who are guilty of having flirted with and encouraged the fascist forces, like the former Polish Finance Minister in New York or the former Yugoslav Foreign Minister, are in a position to oppose democratic and liberal policies of their governments as regards both international reform and a proper understanding with Russia.

The Supreme Council will put an end to such episodes as the situation in North Africa, a situation which today is a symptom of what may occur anywhere if the United Nations do not adhere to their high principles and resolutions. Had the United Nations been able to make clear from the start through its representative body that it regarded the Republic of France as its only real ally in North Africa and elsewhere, the reactionary elements in North Africa would have accepted this decision as they have had to accept the laws and principles of the French Republic in the past. Some of them would have grumbled; but those who still had some measure of patriotism left would have fought against the Germans. (Vichyites and royalists ought to be given every opportunity to fight under the United Nations command; but no more.) But because they realized that there was still an opportunity

for playing politics with the individual governments of the United Nations, they have begun their intrigues against the democratic forces which, at the very best, have a deleterious effect on public opinion, and at worst, may divide and disrupt the United Nations. How bitter it is for the adherents of the United Nations to hear that M. Peyrouton, until recently the ultra-reactionary Minister of the Interior of Vichy, and venomous foe to all democratic elements in France, has been summoned to Africa—not to take his place in the army, but in order to assume civil authority and power. We have often enough pointed out in these pages that we can appreciate the need of tactical and strategic moves for the sake of immediate expediency, but we have also indicated that there is a limit which cannot be trespassed without endangering the final aim for which we are conducting this war—and this limit is the safeguard of democracy.

In Algeria before the war there were 60,000 members in trade unions and 10,500 in Christian trade unions. In Morocco there were 24,000 trade unionists; and in Tunisia, 38,000. These figures represent a real economic and political force since they are not merely a significant proportion of the population, but also a disciplined group which has won recognition through a hard struggle in difficult circumstances. The United Nations can find strong support from such democratic and liberal elements, but these forces must feel that their help is wanted. An expression of desire for such aid on the part of the United Nations would have no adverse effects. Many responsible Frenchmen have declared—and their experience in this connection warrants serious consideration of their opinions—that the reactionary group in North Africa will accept a democratic administration if they are given to understand that the United Nations mean business.

It is well to bear in mind that in order to take significant steps in this direction, the governments of the United Nations must have unequivocal support for democratic aims and principles from the people. To achieve this expression of public opinion, it is extremely important that the liberal forces in all countries bend all their efforts to educational work. A free world will not come without fighting, without difficult and courageous daily exertion. It is vitally important to pass from the comfortable and detached discussion of a future world to active work in the interest of the United Nations. In itself, this work will create strong bonds between the Allied peoples and it will result in a mandate and platform for the United Nations which no statesman will dare to ignore.

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
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FIRST YEAR *of the* UNITED NATIONS

by

Michael Straight

THE United Nations has just celebrated its first birthday. It was founded at one of the most shattering moments of the war. Our situation was so grave then, that if all of the peoples fighting the Axis had not joined in a common organization and a new and inspired purpose, which was very much more than national administration of our war effort, we might well be on the road to defeat today.

On the other hand, because we came together on January 1, 1942, to integrate our war efforts, we are now on the road to victory. For that reason we are faced with the responsibility of deciding whether the institutions and the principles of the people's revolution, as we have expressed them in the United Nations, are to be nothing more than a wartime marriage of convenience that is broken at the sound of the armistice, or whether there is to rise from this war, in the United Nations, the world government to which all of us have chosen to devote our lives.

The first year of the United Nations has seen a swift and decisive growth in world organization that has arisen in answer to the most pressing problems of the war. If we analyze this machinery, we can see that the United Nations, as an entity, has set out to establish a will, a mind, and a body of its own.

The will of the United Nations we all know well. It lies in the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration which is based on the Charter; in the first bill of rights of the Four Freedoms and the economic commitments of the lend-lease agreements, and in the stated war aims of the United Nations leaders.

The mind of the United Nations has been built around the planning of strategy. There is, first of all, the Roosevelt-Churchill conference which meets two or three times a year to review the over-all aspects of the war and to formulate new policies with the aid of the Chinese and the Russians. In the absence of any more formal council, the authority of the President and the Prime Minister make their conference the supreme war executive. There is, secondly, the Pacific War Council which reviews each week with the President the development of the war in the Pacific and its relationship to other fronts. There is, thirdly, the Combined Chiefs of Staff group with its members of the British and American general staffs, its Russian and Chinese representatives, and its combined committees on intelligence, planning, meteorology. Beneath the group, there are the United Nations commands for our fronts which report to it. On each of these fronts now, there is something approaching a united command, in which fighters of ten or twenty nationalities are under American, British, Chinese, and Russian commands. All over the world now, we are reaching a position in which we are moving toward one world army of democracy, which does not make fundamental distinctions of nationality. That is still a germ, but it is something which we can see coming.

Lastly, there is the body of the United Nations in the administrative machinery that has been established. The most important part of this machinery is concerned

with the problems of supply: first, in determining the requirements of the armed forces and civilian populations of the United Nations; second, in meeting those requirements. Estimates of requirements are drawn up largely through the local commands and the governments which forward their estimates through their missions to the United Nations administrative centers. These requirements are met through the combined boards. The Combined Raw Materials Board brings together representatives of the raw material divisions of the British, American, and other governments. It goes after raw materials that are scarce, and it co-ordinates and allocates the raw material production available to the United Nations. The Combined Food Board directs the production of the Allied surplus of foodstuffs in accordance with an overall food strategy that is closely related to the war strategy. The Combined Shipping Adjustments Board allocates new ships among the Allies and directs the operations of a joint pool of United Nations shipping. The Combined Production and Resources Board attempts to integrate the industrial war efforts of the Allies, through standardization, specialization, and the joint scheduling of production. The last board, the Munitions Assignment Board, takes the munitions production of Britain and America as it comes off the lines and assigns it among the armed forces of the United Nations.

Beyond the combined board machinery, there is a substantial area of close co-operation which has not yet evolved into the combined board form. There is co-operation in research, which is immensely important. There is co-operation in economic warfare between the British Blacklist Committee and our own Proclaimed List Committee, in boycotting pro-Axis firms. There is the joint action of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare and our own Board of Economic Warfare on the issuing of export licenses. In the early days, for example, there used to be a race between ourselves and the Axis for obtaining vital supplies. In Turkey, there was an issue of who would get Turkish chrome and who would get Turkish opium. The Germans had missions, and still do have missions, in Turkey to corner those vital supplies, and we also had our missions there. It so happened that the British in the early days were more influential in Turkey than we were and therefore the British handled the purchasing of Turkish chrome and opium for us. Again, we were more influential in countries such as Chile than the British were and therefore we did Britain's purchasing in Chile.

There is further co-operation in political warfare through which our short-wave broadcasts and our relations with the Underground are brought together. Political warfare began with the British. It spread rapidly to us. Even before December 7, it spread in an interchange of directives. In the early days of the war, there was no political warfare which corresponded to the United Nations pattern. The Russians were saying to the peoples of Europe and Latin America that fascism was nothing more than the higher stage of capitalism; and we in turn were saying to the peoples of Europe and Latin America that totalitarianism was the main enemy, and implying that communism and fascism were one and all of the same piece. We were working against each other. As a result of the Willkie trip, which had many implications which are not known, we have established the first working agreement with the Russians, to say that from now on, in our appeals to the peoples of the world, we will determine what we have in common and we will not work against each other by criticizing each other's form of government and society.

There is, lastly, the co-operation on post-war planning. It began in London in 1941 under Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, and the inter-Allied committees, and this year, Sir Frederick came over here to establish a much more representative basis for post-war planning. Governor Lehman has now been appointed to an interim post as Director of Relief, but although this is not known and perhaps it is not supposed to be known, I think that Governor Lehman will soon become Director-General of a United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Council. That certainly has been the plan.

In any critical appraisal of the United Nations, it must be clear that the advance which we have made during this war is entirely unrelated to the war aims that we have issued. These aims, when they were

first prepared, represented a genuine advance, particularly since in the case of the Charter they were signed by a nation which was not yet committed to full participation in the struggle against the Axis. Now it must be said, that as an expression of the will of the United Nations, the Charter has become increasingly inadequate. The interpretation of the Charter, as not applying to the British Empire, finally stripped it of its essential value as an instrument in bringing about world government, since the federal principles on which world government must be based, can only be the principles of equality of peoples.

The really revolutionary advance which we have accomplished arises from our unpublished achievements in creating during this war a working world government. We have established a real world organization in the United Nations which has demonstrated that world government is possible.

II

THERE are three outstanding achievements for us, in machinery of the United Nations. First, we have succeeded, in the past year, in accomplishing the first essential prerequisite of federal world administration: the transfer of relationships between peoples away from a centralized diplomatic and on to a decentralized technical basis. So long as all the relations between peoples are centralized through foreign services, then these peoples can never unite, for the function of most foreign services is to maintain their separate identities and the identities of the nations which they are supposed to represent. Now, instead of working through men whose job is to keep us apart, the members of the United Nations work with each other on a purely technical basis. Production men deal with production men, scientists with scientists, soldiers with soldiers. When this basis of world relations is established, then one of the greatest barriers to effective world government is removed.

Secondly, the Combined Boards have set out to establish their identities as world organizations, over the national administrations which they represent. In particular, the Combined Food Board and the Combined Raw Materials Board have made it clear that they are something more than a name for conferences between national administrations. For example, the Combined Food Board receives from the armed forces and from civilian agencies such as the Middle East Supply Center, estimates of the food needs of the United Nations and neutral countries. It must provide for these needs in such a way as to use as little shipping as possible.

At the moment, Britain imports great quantities of wheat and sugar from Australia, which is ten thousand or eleven thousand miles away. She is doing that partly because it is necessary to carry other supplies to Australia in shipping which otherwise would come back in ballast. But the point is that if the German submarine campaign should become too effective and shipping should become too scarce, or if Australia should be threatened, then all of the British provisions which are met by Australia will have to be transferred from that ten-thousand-mile run to a three-thousand-mile run from America. That means that our thirty million farmers will be faced suddenly with the necessity of providing not only for our population of a hundred and thirty million, but for Great Britain's population of forty-three million also, and unless that is prepared in advance, that represents an impossible burden for the American farmers.

Therefore, the Combined Food Board must look ahead two years to see which way the war is going and to be prepared for these sudden changes of war. It must be able at all times to redirect the farm policies of America and the British Commonwealth in accordance with the changing nature of the war. Also, because the war changes so swiftly, the Board must insure itself against sudden changes by building up large reserves of vital foodstuffs. This means that the Board must be able to demand the rationing now, say of fats and oils, not because there is any present shortage, but because it is necessary to create reserves against a future emergency. So the Board must also be able to dictate policy to the Office of Price Administration and the Office of Civilian Supply, to the War Production Board, and to their counterparts in the Governments of the British

Commonwealth. In other words, it operates as an agency with its own identity over the national administrations of both countries, and the same thing can be said for all of the other Boards.

Thirdly, the Combined Boards have overcome the main stumbling block in federal government: the issue of where authority is to be placed. The boards are on the way to working out a technique of determining where the center of authority lies, which is of the utmost importance in the development of a world federation. In the last war a substantial degree of Inter-Allied co-operation was evolved in combined agencies such as the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council. This inter-Allied machinery was effective because its structure and its tasks were essentially unilateral. Its purpose was to supply one front, no more than three hundred miles long; in supplying that front, one predominant industrial nation, Britain, purchased war materials and munitions the world over, and directed their transportation to Europe. The issue of authority was never in doubt, simply because Britain was at all times the center of the economic war effort of the Allies.

The principal argument which is used against federalism as an administrative system is that it must be based upon one predominant nation if it is to work at all, but, in fact, in the last two years, we have proved that that is not true. We have faced the position where we have had two centers in this war—London and Washington—and Washington, increasingly, is representing the growth of a nation which is producing the surplus of arms for the whole world of democracy, but Britain represents a center which has the established forms of world organization in the commonwealth, and a staff which has administered world organization in the past, and therefore we have been faced throughout the war with the necessity of achieving some settlement to reconcile the fact that we have two centers instead of one.

The way in which it has been done is of great importance to us. In the Combined Chiefs of Staff, for example, we rely upon British Intelligence for Europe and for the Near East, and Britain relies on American Intelligence for Latin America and the Pacific. In economic warfare, the British Black List Committee relies upon American judgment of whether a firm is pro-Axis or anti-Axis in Latin America and the Pacific, and we rely upon British judgment as to whether a firm is pro-Axis or anti-Axis in the Middle East. In the Combined Raw Materials Board, we have divided authority according to commodity. Tea has always been handled through British sources. Therefore, tea for all of the United Nations is bought and allocated by Britain. Cocoa may be from America; rubber eventually may be from Russia because Russia has pioneered in synthetic rubber; wheat may be from Canada, and the center of the United Nations Wheat Administration may be in Ottawa because Canada is the marginal supplier of wheat. All the way through, we are getting this division of responsibility. We decide that the British know more about fighters than we do and the British agree that we have been able to produce a better light bomber than they can, and so there is this division of responsibility growing up of the greatest importance for future relations.

III

HOWEVER, precisely because the United Nations is so important, we have to analyze some of its weaknesses. Firstly, we have to understand that so far, this over-all machinery has not been related to any unified strategy. At the top level of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, there has simply not been a unified strategy behind this war. We have regarded the Pacific as an American theater in which policy is determined by the American Navy. Britain has tended to regard the defense of India and the rest of the Empire as a British concern in which America has no participation. Russia has been very reluctant to give us any review over her war effort, and so on. There has not been any combined strategy at the top level which would give meaning to a combined machinery which operates to enforce that strategy.

Secondly, the combined machinery has been almost exclusively Anglo-American machinery. All of these boards which I mentioned are Anglo-American boards. They have Russian representatives and Chinese representatives, but the fact is that

both the Russians and the Chinese are outside of this joint board system. The reason for this is perhaps logical. There is a human reason in the sense that individuals take time to learn how to encompass in their minds the vast problems of world organization, and there is a logical reason in the sense that the purpose of these Combined Boards is to supply the fronts of the United Nations, but that so far, the only people who have a surplus of arms and foodstuffs above their own needs have been America and the British Commonwealth. Russia has had no major surplus, which she can send to us, and neither has China. Therefore, there is a kind of superficial reasoning which asserts that it is perfectly logical that this combined machinery should be an Anglo-American machinery.

However, there are very grave weaknesses in that idea, because the fact is that we cannot tell in Washington or London what the Chinese need and what the Russians need, and until we have combined intelligence and combined planning and combined strategy and combined machinery with the Chinese and the Russians, we have no hope at all of making this machinery either an effective machinery for administering the war or a promising machinery for the administration of the peace.

Thirdly, the combined machinery has still not identified itself as a supranational type of organization. The authority of the Combined Boards derives from the executive order of the President and the executive order of the Prime Minister in Britain. The Combined Boards have authority because the men who meet on them are the top men in their administrations. It is a derived authority, therefore, and not an original authority; and until the Combined Boards have an original authority, an authority of their own, an identity of their own, so that their own decisions become binding in themselves and are not binding simply because it is Mr. Wickard, the Secretary of Agriculture, who agrees and therefore because he is the Secretary of Agriculture, makes it binding. This distinction is so important that until the Combined Boards become boards with original power and not derived power, they will not be federal boards in the sense that we believe in world federalism.

It is obvious that we need now to go beyond this condition. We need to establish a unified strategy by creating a Supreme Council on which Russia and China are represented. We need to bring Russia and China and India in to the combined machinery in all the Combined Boards on which they have a right to be represented. We need to establish a far larger administrative staff around the Combined Boards to really make them a power in themselves. We need to adopt the slogan, "All power to the Combined Boards," and we need in our own national reorganizations from now on, to bring our national governments into relation so that they can work together in the combined board pattern. And we need, principally, to assert as a movement that the United Nations are capable of becoming the world government of the future, by agreeing now to set up a really representative Relief and Reconstruction Council, with its regional organizations for Europe and the Far East and for Russia, which are fully representative, and which will train now a staff of United Nations citizens to administer a relief and reconstruction program when the war ends.

If we undertake these reforms now, I think it is perfectly possible to demonstrate, that the problems of relief and reconstruction and the problems of the future are so vast that if we intend this war to be a war of liberation and a war to win permanent peace, only the United Nations, only world government, can solve those problems.

IV

To live at a time of tremendous birth and awakening in the world is the greatest privilege that any men or women could ever have. All of us are so privileged. We can feel the future growing around all of us in the United Nations.

In the past it was always said to us that the world government was impossible, that it could never work. We have proved that argument to be wrong. In the United Nations we have created such a world government, and we know that from now on the only barrier to world unity and permanent world peace is no longer an administrative barrier, no longer the shibboleths of outworn arguments, but is simply our inability

to see ourselves as brothers the world over. To those who have said that democracies could never unite, we have proved they can. To those who have said that world government is administratively impossible, we have the standing answer of the United Nations. To those who have said that these United Nations can never be projected beyond the war, we have the answer of President Roosevelt.

> By combined action now, we can preserve freedom and restore peace to our peoples. By combined action we can fulfill the victory we have joined to obtain. The concept of the United Nations will not perish on the battlefields of this terrible war. It will live to lay the basis of the enduring world understanding upon which mankind depends for its peace and its freedom.

Those of us who believe in world government have got to read what the President said in a deeper sense. The President said that the concept of the United Nations would not perish. But in what sense do we know this? There is nothing certain in history that tells us that the United Nations will not perish. On the contrary, the skies are darkening around us and forces are gathering around us to destroy the United Nations and to make certain that when this war is over, this world organization we have created will again go the way of the world organizations of the past. And thus when the President said that the world organization of the United Nations "will not perish on the battlefields of this terrible war," he was speaking in our name; he was making a contract which we have to fulfill, because we, as the peoples of the United Nations, alone can give to the United Nations, and will give, the will to make it a lasting international organization.

This was the essential fact which was understood by our leader, Professor Li Yu Ying, when he called this conference of the World Confederation of International Groupments. We have been weak in the past, we have been divided and confused, and this conference was called to unite, to get rid of that confusion, and to give us now the kind of world-wide popular movement that can make the United Nations a reality for all time.

There were a great many who, when we called this movement together, said that wartime was no time to urge reform, to insist on the future which had not yet been born. There were many who urged us to wait, and we replied in the words of Sir Wilfred Laurier of forty years ago: "To those who urge upon us a policy of tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow, to those who tell us to wait, wait, wait; to those who advise us to pause, to consider, to reflect, to calculate, to inquire—our answer is no. This is not a time for deliberation; this is a time for action. The flood of tide is upon us now that leads to fortune. If we let it pass, it may never recur again. If we let it pass, the voyage of our national life, which now is so bright, may be forever bound in shallows. We cannot wait, because time itself does not wait. We cannot wait, because in this time of wonderful development, time wasted is time lost. We cannot wait, because at this moment there is a transformation taking place in the conditions of our life which would be a folly to ignore and a crime to overlook." The time is now.

A century ago we sought to find a battle hymn of the Republic. We need now to find a battle hymn of the United Nations. We need to ask, to campaign through this country, demanding the answer to what we are fighting for, what it is that can give us permanent peace, until the answer sounds above the watch-fires of a thousand circling camps, until it is built in the altar of the evening dews and damps, until it is read in a righteous spirit by the dim and flaring lamps that we are fighting for world organization and that through world organization shall we win! We need to say now that the machinery we have created will become the secretariat of the world organization in which we believe, that the armies we have brought together to fight this struggle will become one world army of democracy—that the councils we are creating will become the councils of the world organization to maintain peace forevermore. We need to say that the spirit of the United Nations and its Charter are the first brave shouts of a brave new world; that we have unloosed the floodgates to a new course of history. We need to say that these twenty-nine nations which have formed together, like our own original thirteen, will grow from now on until they become the United Nations of the World.

THE DANGERS *in the* *EUROPEAN POLICY* *of the* *UNITED NATIONS*

by Louis Dolivet

WE WILL GIVE BACK TO EUROPE ITS TASTE OF FREEDOM, SHOUTING "LONG LIVE LIBERTY," SO STRONGLY THAT THE ECHO OF OUR VOICES WILL BE HEARD ACROSS THE BORDERS. WE WILL RE-ESTABLISH THE ONLY TRADITION WHICH WILL PERMIT OUR COUNTRY TO RESUME ITS PLACE IN THE WORLD, THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY TRADITION. — *From the Manifesto of the National Fighting Front for the Independence of France, July 14, 1942.*

WHY hide it? There is a certain atmosphere of uneasiness, a sort of *malaise politique,* as it used to be called in France, about the policies of the United Nations concerning Europe. The uneasiness is born of two fears: first, that the United Nations may make some serious mistakes in understanding the political aspirations of the people of Europe and, consequently, in their direction of political warfare; secondly, that the reactionary elements in Europe may take advantage—with the help of some of the United Nations—of the present situation in order to continue their anti-democratic regimes or even to recreate anachronistic regimes from which the various peoples have already suffered greatly in the past.

Three recent events have brought into the open this uneasiness. They are: The Darlan affair, the conflict between the partisans and General Mikhailovitch, and the Otto Hapsburg case. All three cases were solved—temporarily, we assume and hope—in favor of the reactionary forces.

It is an old democratic experience that the best procedure in the case of such uneasiness is a frank discussion and a serious consideration of all elements involved. In wartime, the essential condition of such a discussion is to take very great care to preserve unity among the fighting forces and not to overlook the principal and immediate objective, which in our case is the quickest and least costly victory of the United Nations over the Axis.

It is the admitted policy of the United Nations to accept the help of all European forces that are willing to fight—for whatever reason—against the Axis. This is sound policy, and it means practically that the fighting ranks of the Allied forces are open to all convictions, from the royalists to the democrats, Socialists, and Communists. Even former puppets and collaborationists, if they are not directly responsible

for crimes against democracy and for help given to the common enemy of mankind, can be admitted under such a ruling with the necessary precaution, of course, against men who have adopted the habit of changing their allegiance too often. Such a ruling reminds one of the old Foreign Legion of France, in which few questions were asked about their past and much fighting was expected from the new recruits.

But if a fighting will is all that is necessary to be permitted to join in the action against the enemy, the situation changes completely when it comes to political leadership, even if of a temporary nature only. There the past record, the democratic sincerity, the popular standing, and the attachment to the United Nations principles in war and peace are of the utmost importance. First of all, because the United Nations are fighting a war of survival as free nations; secondly, because they are fighting a war for the survival of the democratic way of life; and thirdly, because they are fighting for the principles of the Atlantic Charter, for the Four Freedoms, and for the organization of a new world order. Those principles are the very essence of the United Nations philosophy. They are responsible for the immense moral and political strength of the Allies. They are responsible for the lessening effectiveness of the Axis propaganda; they are responsible for the unity achieved among the one billion human beings on our side. Those principles give us the right to call our war a just war, a war of liberation—a Peoples' War. Without them we would still be fighting a war against a great evil, but it would be just another sample of the old, hopeless, or expansionist wars. Political leaders approved or selected by the United Nations must stand for these principles *in toto.* We cannot have some leaders who are only ten per cent for these principles and others only one per cent or not at all for them. The leadership and the defense of democracy can only be in the hands of those who are entirely in favor of it, because democracy is an act of faith and a universal philosophy, which cannot be cut into halves or smaller parts. It is a deep conviction and an ideal of such high human standing that there can be no compromise between it and reactionary or pro-fascist sympathies. Every compromise or every form of appeasement of the reactionary forces will lead to no better results than previous territorial or political appeasement of fascism.

The greatest battles of this war have yet to be won. "The Fortress Europe," as the Nazis call it, is still to be conquered. Japan is still to be expelled from the territories it has occupied following its swift and treacherous attack against Pearl Harbor. Hundreds of millions of Europeans and more hundreds of millions of inhabitants of Asia are watching with great attention everything that is happening within the United Nations. Every event in the farthest corner of the world is of the greatest importance to the building of unlimited confidence in the Allied peace aims. In a few hours the radio brings to all parts of the world the news from all the battlefronts—military, political, and economic. Each news item is a part of political warfare, a part in the creation of that psychological atmosphere which in the end determines the fighting spirit of the soldier, the courage of the Underground fighter, and the sacrifices of the workers and farmers in all the fighting countries.

In order to obtain the maximum support from the civilian population, for the coming invasion of Europe, the United Nations have to take into account the past political orientation and psychology of the European peoples and also the present political tendencies of the Underground movement. Recent examples in Russia during the recapture of Velikie Luki have shown the immense value of the civilian population behind the enemy lines. When the Russians were storming that stronghold, the civilian population came out of the cellars and showed the way to the fortified houses and machine-gun nests, thus contributing decisively in the achievement of this most important victory of the winter campaign. On thousands of occasions the United Nations will need similar help from the European civilian population. The German resistance in Tunisia gives a foretaste of what it will mean to conquer definite strongholds on the European continent. The attitude of the civilian population will be of the utmost military importance to the Allies. A Europe in open

revolt against the Axis, attacking the enemy from the rear with the enthusiasm which only the revolutionary vision of freedom and of a better world can give, may save tens and hundreds of thousands of lives.

But this help can come fully only if there is a community of ideas and a certain basic agreement between these civilian populations, on the one hand, and the United Nations, on the other; if there is a definite conviction that the United Nations not only will destroy German fascism, but that they will also give these peoples a real opportunity to rebuild the institutions which they wanted.

II

LET us therefore, first of all, examine the political orientation of Europe.

One of the tragic aspects of the last peace was that, while the principles and the beginnings of the machinery for the application of international law were created, nothing was provided for the protection of a minimum of democratic principles in the various countries and member states of the League of Nations. It is no accident that in the whole Versailles Treaty, which had so many economic, military, and territorial provisions, the word "democracy" did not once appear. It is on this absence of a democratic policy by the Great Powers that the reactionary forces in Germany and elsewhere based their hopes.

Despite the many loud protestations against the Versailles Treaty, the only thing which was really important to the German reactionary forces was to save the military clique, the Junkers, and the existing economic and industrial forces. They knew quite well that lost territories can be reconquered, that armaments and armies can be recreated as long as the basic militaristic and industrial forces are not destroyed.

At the close of the war, the popular impetus and enthusiasm for the ideas of freedom, the influence of the Wilsonian principles, were such that in almost all European countries democratic institutions, inspired by the French and American constitutions, were adopted. Political freedom, which was the great European aspiration of the nineteenth century finally triumphed. Not only in Western Europe but in Eastern Europe and even in the Balkans, despite the illiteracy and the limited experience in political affairs and self-government of those populations, the people as a whole made remarkable progress in the administration of their newly won freedom. Far-reaching economic reforms swept away the remnants of the old feudal system, particularly through the agrarian reform which permitted distribution of vast land properties among millions of farmers. The influence of Western literature and thinking became very great, and for a short time the greatest hopes were possible for the future. If the legality of any form of government is to be judged by the freely and consciously expressed will of the people, the only legal form which existed was a democratic one, because in all the European countries the people, where they were free to express their will, did so in favor of democratic and progressive regimes.

But the reactionary forces, the representatives of that tyrannic minority which has always been the plague of Europe, did not give up. This minority is unknown in American political life because America has only one great tradition running through its whole history, whereas Europe has two traditions: the one, democratic, and the other, tyrannic and autocratic. The representatives of this minority knew that the Governments in Paris and London would not oppose their plans but, on the contrary, even help them to a certain extent. They also knew that America had become isolationist, and most important, that they could count on the anti-Soviet forces. They tried by all available means, legal and illegal, to take over power. Legally they could not succeed. In no country could they find a free majority of the people in favor of the destruction of their own liberties; and so, they had recourse to innumerable maneuvers in the various parliaments to provoke parliamentary crises until they somehow obtained exceptional legislation. Their attempts finally ended in the violent overthrow of the various democratic regimes.

The civil war in Europe between fas-

cism and democracy started long before National Socialism came into power in Germany. It was not an open civil war, but it was nevertheless going on. It started in Italy where the Italian Fascist party was entrusted with power by the King. The party had won only 35 seats out of 574 in Parliament, but this seemed sufficient to the reactionary Victor Emmanuel III to make Mussolini Premier. The era of torture and assassination began with the coming of the Fascists into power.

Very few people realized what the introduction of fascism into Italy meant to human dignity and to the security of the democratic nations. *Le Temps* of Paris stated on November 17, 1922, that "Mr. Mussolini has employed a few formulas which are very wise"; and the same paper expressed great sympathy for Mussolini's complaints in the international field. "Let us hope that he receives satisfaction." At the same time, the London *Times* wrote of Italian fascism: "Much must happen before the outside world can form a considered judgment on the triumph of fascism and of its results. All that can safely be said at present is that the Prime Minister and the government it has created have begun well." This considerate and—one cannot help writing—absurd attitude did not change until the moment when Mussolini stabbed France and the Allies in the back, in June, 1940.

The establishment of fascism in Italy had encouraged all the reactionary and semi-fascist forces in various other countries. In the following decade, every democratic regime was overthrown by violence, but never with the support of the majority of the people. Alfonso XIII and Primo de Rivera followed the pattern of Mussolini in Spain in 1926, and so did Carmona and Salazar in Portugal. On December 17, 1926, Lithuania became a dictatorship, and also in the same year Pilsudski, former Socialist, inaugurated his regime which a few years later became clearly a dictatorship. Encouraged by the green light given to adventurers and dictators, he manifested in the following years more and more his anti-democratic and anti-parliamentarian opinions, and he also showed more and more his anti-Soviet leanings, which were his principal motives in foreign policy. In Hungary the terrorist Horthy regime never dared to face a free election through universal suffrage and preferred to govern by means of the White terror.

In Yugoslavia, after the assassination of the popular Croat leader, Radich, King Alexander established a cruel dictatorship in 1929. Bulgaria and Albania adopted a similar pattern. In 1930, King Carol of Rumania established his dictatorship. Assassination, torture, dissolution of all free associations, and confiscation of their belongings, destruction of every progressive element which followed the last war—all these were insufficient to wake up the democratic governments.

A great principle when well applied, "non-interference in internal affairs," served as a magic password to all adventurers and dictators. This principle is greatly responsible for the situation of the world today. How many times did the democratic delegates from Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and other countries come to Paris and to London and vainly beg the great Democracies to stop the tyrants and to help the democratic elements which were the most faithful allies of France, and of England, and of democracy in general. Even later, when it became clear that those little tyrants were flirting with Hitler and Mussolini, the Democracies refused to act.

In Austria, too, the people refused to entrust the pro-fascist forces with power, and Dolfuss had to start a civil war in order to establish an Austrian variety of fascism. Even in Germany, where fascism had won over much larger groups of the population, Hitler never had a clear majority in free elections. As for Czechoslovakia, France, Belgium, Holland, the Scandinavian Countries, Luxemburg, and Switzerland, the pro-fascist parties never achieved more than an insignificant political representation in their respective parliaments.

In view of these historic facts, how can anyone sincerely question the democratic and social aspirations of Europe. To doubt the democratic will of the people of France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, or Czechoslovakia is like doubting the democratic will of the people of the United States or of Great Britain. Similarly, no one can sincerely believe that the horrors

of two and a half years of fascist domination have converted the people of Europe from the ideas of democracy to the ideas of fascism. It is, therefore, high time to make an end to talk about "the uncertainty" of the will of the people of Europe and to realize that they are as deeply attached to freedom as are the people of the free nations. Europe is not a new-born baby. It has an old and glorious history of heroic struggle for the acceptance and elaboration of the ideas of freedom.

III

IT is certainly not the political orientation of the Underground movement that can create doubts in this respect. Quite evidently no one can foresee at present the exact form, the nature, and the strength of the Underground at the end of the war. But there can be no doubt that in every country freed from Axis occupation the Underground and its leaders will automatically become decisive political factors. We know how much ex-service men and Legionnaires have been admired after every war, but admiration for the Underground fighters will be much greater, because the Underground movement has had to fight under more terrible conditions than the most heroic armies. Following immediately upon German occupation of countries, the Nazis selected as their puppets the only elements on which they could rely, and the only ones which they could find, namely, the extreme Rightists, pro-fascists, and fascist military and political leaders of these countries. The democrats and the Leftists (with the exception of a few leaders who even before the war had shown very strong appeasement tendencies or new conceptions of revisionist socialism, men known as neo-socialists, like Marcel Déat) had refused support to the conqueror.

Almost from the beginning, the Underground was forced to fight the foreign Fascists and their own Fascists at the same time. The native fascist authorities, being recruited in the immense majority from the extreme Right, the Underground movement was colored, naturally, by a democratic and Left orientation. But even more important for the political tendencies of the Underground is the fact that the trade unions and political labor organizations became very naturally the backbone of the Underground resistance. They were educated to struggle for their rights, and they always considered the possibility of being eventually obliged to fight under cover as normal because they had the constant examples of the fascist regimes before them which invariably and immediately suppressed every free labor activity. The labor movement had in its large organization the necessary elements to start the Underground activities.

MEMBERSHIP OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS IN THE YEARS 1937-38 (Statistics of I.L.O.)

Austria:	
Trade Unions	415,000
Christian Trade Unions	153,890
Belgium:	
Trade Unions	572,224
Christian Trade Unions	319,065
Bulgaria:	
Trade Unions	152,000
Czechoslovakia:	
Trade Unions	747,595
Denmark:	
Trade Unions	451,629
Estonia:	
Trade Unions	14,000
Finland:	
Trade Unions	64,384
France:	
Trade Unions	5,340,000
Christian Trade Unions	487,539
Great Britain:	
Trade Unions	4,450,000
Greece:	
Trade Unions	272,100
Hungary:	
Trade Unions	112,669
Christian Trade Unions	40,000
Ireland:	
Trade Unions	246,105
Luxemburg:	
Trade Unions	12,962
Christian Trade Unions	8,875
Norway:	
Trade Unions	323,156
Poland:	
Trade Unions	350,000
Christian Trade Unions	102,480
Netherlands:	
Trade Unions	296,011
Christian Trade Unions	111,469

Rumania:	
Trade Unions	60,000
Spain:	
Trade Unions	1,904,569
Sweden:	
Trade Unions	840,234
Switzerland:	
Trade Unions	222,304
Christian Trade Unions	39,500
U. S. S. R.:	
Trade Unions	22,427,000
Yugoslavia:	
Trade Unions	55,814

The Axis, being obliged to make as much use as possible of the productive capacity of the various occupied countries for its war machine, could not proceed with the same sudden brutality against the workers' organizations as it did against the old political parties or against masonic societies, etc. A characteristic example is in the dissolution of the French Confederation of Workers, which was not followed by the dissolution of the local trade unions. It was only the national union which was suppressed; the local unions remained, and this has greatly helped the Underground movement. The workers, being together in the factories, could despite surveillance find more opportunities to discuss certain political aspects and to agree on certain common plans. They could thus organize for more direct activity against the enemy than any other social group. The great majority of teachers in Europe were organized within the trade union movement in special teachers' unions, and they naturally joined in the fight. Even co-operatives, which before the war were non-political but very deeply pro-democratic, became splendid centers of resistance, particularly the agricultural co-operatives.

The trade unions, the political labor movement, socialist and communist, and the democratic forces are in the front of the battle. There are also—but next in importance—nationalist groups, and certain religious groups, particularly Protestant, which are valiantly fighting against the invaders. The Underground movement is naturally devoting most of its publications to the day by day struggle against the enemy. It has no time and no opportunity to formulate more than the general principles of its national and international political conceptions. Despite these limitations, extremely interesting examples can be cited.

The Polish Underground movement, "Freedom," as far back as October, 1939, adopted a program of which the following points are characteristic:

1. The chief aim of the struggle of the Polish working masses is the reconstruction of the full political freedom and independence of Poland, and the basing of her existence on the principles of democracy and social justice.

2. In the new Poland the decisive influence on the fate of the country must be exercised by the masses of the people: the peasants, the workers, and the intellectuals. The political constitution and the social and economic structure of Poland must once and forever preclude the possibility of the existence of privileged social groups which strive to seize political power and economic supremacy.

3. The political constitution of Poland must be based on the principles of political democracy guaranteed by: a democratic representation of the people elected on the basis of equal, secret, universal, direct, and proportional suffrage; responsibility of the Government to Parliament; independence of the Courts of Justice, extensive democratic self-government; freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, and of association; and personal immunity of the citizens.

4. All nationalities living in Poland must be guaranteed full political, economic, and cultural equality. Race doctrines and anti-Semitism must be eliminated from public life in Poland.

5. All citizens of new Poland must be guaranteed the right to work, the protection of labor and health. It is necessary to expand social insurance on the basis of democratic self-government.

6. The foreign policy of Poland must be based on full co-operation and mutual understanding with all free peoples of the world, and particularly with the nations with which Poland has to live in good neighborly relations.

There is a lot of talk today about the attitude of the Italian people against the war. Here again, it is worth while to recall the manifesto which was adopted in October, 1941, by the Committee of Action of the Union of the Italian People:

. . . The decisive fight between the forces of free humanity and fascism is undertaken on a vast front. Hitler's perfidious maneuver, aimed at dividing democratic forces on the pretext of an "anti-bolshevik crusade," failed to separate the Democracies and to mask the endless ambition of nazi domination. The victory of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States, and of the people who are their allies will be the victory of independence and democracy, the victory of Italy.

The Belgian Socialist movement, the backbone of the Underground resistance in that country, gives a great deal of thought to reconstruction after the war, demanding "nationalization, socialization, State management—the name is not important—of all the essential industries and of the banking system. The economic life will not be able to recover after the war unless the working world is guaranteed an equitable distribution of wealth by the suppression of capitalist privileges."

As for France, the Underground has demonstrated its attachment, not only to the democracy of the Third Republic but to its transformation into an economic and social democracy. On May 1, 1942, French trade unionists transmitted, through the intermediary of the Free French National Committee, an appeal to their fellow workers in other countries which reads in part as follows:

> We appeal to the workers of Britain, America, and Russia who bear the heaviest burden in the task of liberation. Brothers, we do not ask you to pity us however much our country is plundered and betrayed. It is being plundered by a merciless foe who robs us of our tools, our food, and our labor in order to carry on his war of enslavement. It is being betrayed by the most contemptible man in France, a man who long ago perfected his art of treachery at our expense. Our situation is wretched. The Germans keep wages down; they obstruct the distribution of supplies; they organize the black market. They have made social inequality the fundamental law of their exported national-socialism. Our liberties are dead. We have no more means of expression, no free trade unions, no social security. We do not ask you to pity us but we do ask you to continue to have faith in us. We are not accomplices of the betrayal of France. Those of us who work in Germany are compelled to do so by brute force, by the threat of starvation. Efforts are being made to deceive you into believing that we are in the slightest degree on the side of the invaders and their lackeys. On the contrary, Brothers, our faith lies in you who are working to free us, in you who are producing planes, tanks, ships, all the instruments of Victory. We are ready to do anything in our power to help you, in sabotaging enemy production, in enduring the justified bombardment of plants working for Germany, in following directives you will send us.

It is interesting to note the statement in the program of the communist French Underground, which declares that the application of universal suffrage "requires the full exercise of the rights of man: freedom of worship for everybody, freedom of the press, freedom of association and reunion, inviolability of the private home and correspondence, respect for human dignity, and absolute equality of every citizen before the law." Concerning agriculture, the communist program makes the following remarkable statement: "Whatever the results obtained in the U.S.S.R. by agrarian cooperation (*kolkoz*) there is no question of transferring to France the Soviet experiment."

A report about the democratic tendencies of the Underground arrived recently from Hungary. There a Front of National Independence was formed, with a program containing the following demands: "The realization of the democratic rights and liberties of the people: Universal suffrage by secret ballot, freedom of speech, press, and assembly. Democratization of the administrative apparatus. Abolition of all anti-Semitic laws. Prohibition of fascist parties and organizations. A democratic social policy and an improved standard of living for the workers."

As to the events in North Africa, while one can easily imagine the reaction of the subjugated people, there is only one document which has arrived to date. It is the expression of policy by one of the most important French Underground organizations, Liberation. Issued on November 15, eight days after the American landing in Algiers, it states:

> All those, whoever they may be and wherever they may be, who have given hos-

tages to the enemy, who have tracked down patriots, who have wounded our most sacred feelings, will have to answer for their actions. The dead of Syria, Madagascar, Morocco, and Algeria will be avenged in the very persons of those who have led them to the battle against liberation.

Liberty and the Republic will come to life again only on a basis of the sternest justice and that least tainted with opportunism. The war must be waged with all our force and by all methods. It is the people who will win, the patriotic people who have never despaired, who have always resisted, the people who keep liberty in their hearts, who discover equality again in their misfortune and who learn fraternity in hatred of the enemy. It is the people of Fighting France who will judge.

The period of conciliation of puppets has gone. Maybe in the first phase of the occupation, up to the end of 1940, reconciliation would have been possible, and the puppets could have explained that the situation was desperate and that they were collaborating with the enemy to save whatever could be saved. They could have explained that they thought that England, too, would lose the war, and that Europe, willing or not, would have to live for a long time under German domination. But after the brilliant resistance of the people of England to the *Blitz* after the entry of Soviet Russia and the entry of the United States into the war, such pretexts could no longer be accepted as an excuse. The nazi terror was too great. The victims it had made were too numerous. The horrors through which every village and every family had lived were too strong to forget.

The United Nations must not follow any other policy than that which corresponds to their own conception of life, to the political past of Europe, and to the present aspirations of the Underground movement. The United Nations observers must learn to distinguish between the apparent strength of some noisy pro-fascist group and the will of the immense majority of the people. In the past, foreign observers frequently judged the political orientation of France by the noisy groups of pro-fascist newspaper vendors on the boulevards, or by the impressive Croix de Feu gatherings in the Palais Berlitz without taking into account that a thousand times as many people gathered in the innumerable democratic and Left meetings of the country. In Brussels, at noon-time in front of the stock exchange, one could have the impression, in seeing the sensational editions of the rexist newspaper, that Belgium was under their control, but in reality they represented only a small minority of the country.

The Governments of Paris and London had to pay a very high price for having mistaken the minority for the majority in Poland, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. Those mistakes should serve as a lesson to the United Nations. There are certain dangerous symptoms that some United Nations authorities might be impressed by the arguments of fascist and royalist groups claiming large followings. The acceptance of those claims would endanger everything for which the United Nations stand and, moreover, would be entirely wrong because those groups constitute a minority only. The more the United Nations hesitate to adopt an energetic policy based on military co-operation for all and a political leadership for those who represent the majority and democratic legality, the more their problems will be complicated and the war and peace effort endangered.

Only a democratic policy will give the European countries the conviction that they are treated as equals and not as minor partners in the great alliance of freedom. Limitations of space postpone to another article the examination of the problems of civilian administration, with which the United Nations will be confronted as soon as they step foot on European soil. These problems are manifold and complicated because there are no longer any legal civilian administrations in the countries of Europe recognized or accepted by their peoples. But they can be solved if the United Nations start with the assumption that democracy is basic in the provisional administration of Europe. It is vitally important that an agreement be reached as soon as possible by the United Nations on this subject, and particularly by the United States, Great Britain, and Soviet Russia. Such an agreement, and only such an agreement, can bring constructive results in the reconstruction of Europe and in the creation of a world organization.

With Russian Guerrillas IN THE WOODS AROUND BRYANSK

by

Joseph Utkin

IN the underbrush lay the body of a German soldier. The partisans found a map on him. The region in which the guerrillas were operating was marked with a red circle. In the center of the circle the words, "50,000 guerrillas," were noted down. Thus we found living proof of that mathematics of fear which haunts the minds of the Prussian "noncoms" like a perpetual nightmare.

The incident occurred around Bryansk. The immense forests of that region have always remained inaccessible to the Nazis. In fact, they soon learned to fear them. With clock-like regularity troop and munition trains were derailed as soon as they ventured into these woods. Armed with saws and axes, thousands of nazi soldiers cut down all trees along the railroad tracks within 100 meters. Yet even such "prophylactic" measures were useless. Beaten back by that indomitable old Russian forest, the Germans were finally forced to withdraw. Vast regions, with their towns and villages, had to be yielded to the guerrillas.

Once more silence reigned in the forest, but it did not last long. The German commander knew too well that the rear of his front was dangerously exposed. He organized savage punitive expeditions against the partisans in the woods around Bryansk. Forty thousand bloodthirsty veterans fell upon those regions which they had failed to bring under control. Within a few nights they had ransacked and burned some thirty villages.

A few days later some guerrillas on a reconnaissance mission were lying on the ground, well hidden by trees and underbrush. A strange scene suddenly unrolled before them: old and young, men and women were marching Indian file through the forest. With their eyes fixed on the ground, they seemed to be searching for something. The partisans stopped the strange procession.

"What are you looking for?" they asked.

"Arms," was the answer. "We want to join the partisans, but they won't take anyone without arms."

The savage flames rising from the burning villages seemed to have kindled the fire of undying hatred in the hearts of the population. German terror is followed by German panic. Out of Bryansk's impenetrable forests, the partisans, constantly growing in numbers, relentlessly carry on the fight against the Nazis.

Last Number of a Recital

A CLEARING lightens the darkness of the dense forest. In one corner a stage, built from freshly cut trees, has been set up. All around the stage, partisans are seated in the grass. The people are sitting with their precious guns in their hands. Against the stage lean the rifles, submachine guns and machine guns of the actors. A young and jovial master of ceremonies announces the program. He is the leader of a partisan detachment.

"And now our string orchestra is going to play some variations on our famous Russian song, The Moon Is Shining." These musical variations are followed by the recital of songs and Russian poems. The program even includes a choregraphic num-



ber. Two guerrilla fighters give a lively performance of a tap dance, American style. They do it expertly and are rewarded by warm applause.

In the auditorium—if that's the word to use in the case of a clearing—the audience is enthusiastic and the atmosphere highly-charged with excitement. But the program is near its end, and the master of ceremonies, the leader of the detachment, announces: "And now, dear comrades and spectators, we are going to carry out the last number of our program!"

The performers rush from the stage, quickly seize their guns, and vanish into the forest.

Two hours later the partisans hear the crash of a violent explosion. A railroad bridge has been blown up. A German train of forty cars has plunged into the river.

The performance is over!

An Arsenal

A SMITHY. Its fires at white heat. The sound of hammer on anvil never ceases. Metal pieces of indeterminate shape are passed on from hand to hand. A small group of guerrillas who try their hand as amateur blacksmiths crowd around the anvil. Others watch them curiously. From time to time one of the spectators walks over to the blacksmiths.

"Well now, how goes it? Will you be through soon?"

"Get out of our way, comrades! Don't bother us," is the dry answer.

The questioner withdraws reluctantly. Soon another partisan comes over with the same question. A few days pass. Suddenly, one evening, the blacksmiths happily announce: "It's finished!"

In a jiffy the whole detachment gathers around the blacksmiths. Obviously moved, these step aside so that the others can see a metal object. It is a mine-thrower which the partisans have built all on their own. The men who built it have reason to feel proud. They had neither plans nor machines nor the right raw materials. They did everything with their own hands, and in every detail they had to rely on their own resourcefulness.

Now there is still the problem of testing the new weapon. Some hotheads want to try it out on "Fritz." But calmer minds decide to dedicate the first salvo to their beloved Bryansk forest. The result is rather unexpected: the mine travels in one direction, the mine-thrower in another. . . .

The builders go to work once more; the planners discuss every detail. The result is satisfactory; the second mine-thrower built in the "arsenal" of Bryansk forest passes its battle test with flying colors.

The People's Court

SOME time ago the Germans posted the following announcement on walls and fences in the villages: "All those participating actively in the fight against the partisans or giving us useful information will receive an immediate cash award or an additional piece of land." This tempting announcement was completely ineffective. The Nazis had to import some Russian-born traitors all the way from Germany.

The German police could hire only a few people from the Soviet population—greedy souls who succumbed to the promises of the invader. But the number of these Judases is subject to fluctuations over which the Germans have no control. Frequently, when these police agents come to see the "mayor" in the morning, they find his bed empty. Only the forest of Bryansk could disclose what became of these sorry traitors.

The partisans have drafted and printed an open letter addressed to the "cops and to other scoundrels who have gone over to the enemy."

Here is an excerpt:

> You police bandits, you leave innocent women and children homeless after you burn their houses. You blackguards, you steal their cattle and their last piece of bread and leave them to starve. You hangmen, you take children away from their mothers; you jackals, you seize peaceful citizens and deliver them to the execution squads of your masters, the nazi sadists. You are traitors and spies in the service of the enemy.
>
> Know that the hour of retribution is near!
>
> *Partisans, who loathe your guts!*

Hatred rejuvenates. The old can hate just as well as youth. If one hears the story of the exploits of Gerasim Z., a man 65 years old, one can't be but proud of the Russian people.

The Germans are marching on the village. Gerasim gets ready to leave. "Where are you going?" the leader of the guerrilla detachment asks him.

"With you, to the forest! I'm not too old to fight."

"Stay here! You can do more for us right here."

The old man grumbles a little, but remains behind.

He is made mayor of the village. The Germans come and go, but each of their visits is marked by some unhappy occurrence. Regularly they get themselves ambushed by the guerrillas. And so the Nazis begin to get suspicious of the mayor. They dispatch 150 men to the village as a permanent garrison. Now Kerasim realizes that he can no longer play hide-and-seek with the enemy. So he gathers a group of armed peasants and prepares a warm reception for the Nazis: fifty Germans are killed. Whereupon Gerasim rejoins his friends in the forest. Now they must let him fight; he can't stay in the village any longer.

The hatred of an entire nation has found a refuge in the old forest around Bryansk. The military commander of that section of the front has addressed the following order of the day to the guerrillas: "Thousands of German corpses are rotting in the woods around Bryansk. The entire region is strewn with pieces of iron rusting away—the weapons which you destroyed. Dozens of locomotives, hundreds of cars are lying about the wrecked railroad tracks around Bryansk. You have taught the Nazis to fear the Russian peasants. Proudly you can say: 'They hate us because they fear us Russian partisans.'"

—Translated by Andreas Dorpalen

Collective Neurosis of GERMANY

BY RAYMOND DE SAUSSURE

IN a previous article (June, 1942), I discussed the part that Hitler's neurosis plays in his success, but that factor in itself is not sufficient to explain his triumph. It is because Germany, like her Fuehrer, suffered after 1919 from a suppressed desire, and because thousands of Germans suffered during this epoch the same kind of deception in their own individual lives, that it became possible for an alien to be proclaimed chief of one of the greatest nations of Europe.

Historians explain the development of events by attributing them to general social causes. We, on the contrary, are forced to present in bold relief as the causal factors of historic events the importance of individual conflicts or of inner conflicts of special groups. It seems to us that it is easier to understand the sequence of events if one penetrates to the core of their psychological motives.

To summarize my findings in the previous article, it is sufficient to say that Hitler's success has been due to the very nature of his delirium. Hitler always visualizes a total and crushing victory over his adversary. He believes that every German is wholly and solely preoccupied with the wish to see Germany mistress of the world —and he forces them to work for that alone. The pleasures which Hitler enjoys are not those of the flesh. They are mental, and they are entirely concentrated on the delight of crushing and brutally destroying. A hundred per cent of his libido is placed in personal triumph and in battle with others.

A general whose mission it is to conquer a country faces his task, examines its various aspects as so many problems which are set for his intelligence. When he has determined his plan of campaign and given his orders, he is tired, relaxes, and waits for events. Other aspects of life occupy his thought. He will write to his people, talk to his comrades, read a newspaper or a novel. There is none of this with Hitler. He is absorbed day and night by his dream of power. There is a constant mental rumination in which he goes over the smallest details that may ensure his success. This state of mind is not the result of reflection, of an effort; it is a kind of dream which goes on constantly. It is accompanied by great satisfaction which for him takes the place of those of the senses. His thought ceaselessly anticipates victory.

At the same time Hitler is haunted by the dread of losing any smallest part of his power. He never foresees a victory won by chance, or by some heroic event; he always foresees a crushing triumph obtained by the development of tremendous means. That is why he never throws himself into action until he has created the instrument of his success. These measures are the result of carefully thought out tactics which are imposed on him by his complex of security.

The Fuehrer identifies himself entirely

with his country which has become the instrument of his power. The Reich is for him a force that replaces the phallic force of a normal man. He is a pervert, all of whose sexual activity has been transformed into dreams of power and destruction. This dream goes on from morning to night, it is always evolving new details of organization, new and more astonishing victories. His total inability to understand the thought of others obliges him to impose his way of thinking without the least compromise. It is not astonishing that a man so inflexible who, moreover, is armed with the widest power, should be feared.

II

THE hysterical aspect of Hitler's nature has allowed him to feel the despair which was deep in the German people and to use it in playing his part of Messiah. It now remains to discover why in his own country he has been considered, not as a madman but as a hero. There are at least seven important factors which have contributed to this situation.

1. A large portion of the Fuehrer's ideas are not original. He drew them from various writers of the nineteenth century and also from certain theorists of the Third Reich. "Thus," writes Albert Rivaud, in his "Le Relevement de l'Allemagne," "a complete ideology, bearing on all domains, arises little by little from the contributions of hundreds of collaborators, many of whom do not belong to Hitler's party. This sudden abundance is the sign of a fundamental agreement between German sensitivity and the new gospel. All the ideas which are dear to the Germans—the primacy of instinct; the necessity of discipline, of organization, of a hierarchy; the love of military things, an innate liking for the police system, a passion for collective enthusiasms, respect for work and production; the cult of Pan-Germanism; and a longing for the endless expansion of the material and economic authority of the Reich—all these elements have been fused into a whole still indeterminate but where certain dominant traits give an image, indistinct yet seductive, of the future order."

2. The Prussians, who have always loved war and cruelty, were delighted to find in Hitler a man ready to satisfy their tastes. Prussia is a poor country and the rigor of its climate brings a need for heavy eating. Economic conditions are, then, hard for the majority of the inhabitants. Every head of a family is called on to solve a budgetary problem which is not easy, and which is the less so in that children are numerous. To be able to face these circumstances the father is often obliged to be arbitrary, to limit the expenses of each, to exact from the children, even at an early age, effective labor. This severity, which influences all the family, leads to violent conflicts between fathers and sons. It creates a situation which we have mentioned in connection with Hitler. Although in general these men have robust natures, they experience as a result of family conflicts strong feelings of inferiority which they overcompensate by trying to shine.

As always when the authority of the parents is too heavy, the boy also tries to neutralize by affection the hostility which he feels toward his father. It is a mechanism of psychic economy which diminishes anxiety. The consequence is a stronger attachment to the father than to the mother, and from it results a latent homosexuality, that is so to say, an unconscious and repressed attraction toward other men. This component of German character is prolonged by the difficulties of life. Men gather together into corporations for the defense of their professional interests; they take pleasure in the career of arms—both which are just so many opportunities for masculine companionship.

When the rivalry between two generations is open and frank, it often allows the young to develop fine qualities of energy, but when the conflicts are too acute, when there is too much repressed hatred, the child leaves the domain of reality and consoles himself by creating new myths. He becomes a hero who dethrones authority, who overthrows the old man become too feeble to govern, who creates a cult for the Mother Country — the idealized mother. This is the origin of the Pan-German ideas. These myths become symbols, all the more vital because the following generations experience the same feelings. In the family organization of Prussia the woman, who is

used to submitting to the tyranny of her father, later becomes a docile spouse and shows her devotion to the man more by the care she takes of the home than by expressions of love or of feminine tenderness. Thus the man is not softened by his mother; it is the harshness of the father which alone forms his character. When we consider this social structure and its psychological consequences, we can better understand the success of Hitler's ideas. He was able to appear as the incarnation of a hero who in the latent mythology of the German soul was expected as a Messiah.

3. As a result of the sharpness of the conflicts between the two generations, the German never completely frees himself from the equivalent attitude of obedience and of revolt. This emotional attitude is not without influence upon his intellectual development. The scientist will not dare to rely on his own experience; he will bolster up his affirmations by all those of the same nature which he can find, from antiquity to our own days. His need of submission prevents the German from reaching a full maturity and learning from free contact with reality. He is obliged to restrict himself to minute researches in the infinitely small, or throws himself into cloudy syntheses, which become disproportionately vast. He has not got the good sense and the certainty of judgment of the man who is in direct contact with the real. This lack of measure, which is natural to them, has made the Germans less critical than other peoples would have been of Hitler's eccentricities.

4. Among Germans, collective thought plays a large part in proportion to individual thought. They do not dare to wander from tradition. (I speak of the German of before 1914.) They have a servile respect for authority, for titles, for uniforms. Now as we have seen elsewhere, civilizations where collective thought is strong develop techniques and mysticisms, but not the critical and scientific spirit.

5. Hitler has revived old mysticisms. He has driven out men of science and called upon technicians. There also he was in full harmony with the German spirit. In these two cultural manifestations we find the two poles of German emotional life; technique requires a docile submission to the instrument, a certain pedantry, whereas mysticism opens a way to explosions of passion and fury. The Prussians are divided between these two contradictory needs, to obey and to revolt. Hitler called them to revolt against their elders and at the same time preached to them total submission to his doctrine.

6. The fear of disobedience keeps the German in a constant state of anxiety; therefore he is happy to have to carry out a labor which absorbs his entire capacity of application. "The German exists less in and by himself than in what he does, in his production." He feels happier when he is in a group than alone, and in the same way his thought is never clearly detached from that of the collectivity. When he can no longer submit to his father, he obeys some rule, some scheme, some theory or idea. Rarely is his conduct the fruit of his own experience. Because of this perpetual adherence to a group, of this dependence on a chief, the German is afraid of criticizing his superior. He is afraid to see him just as he is, for that would already be the beginning of revolt. Since he does not dare to follow his thought through when weighing others, he is rarely able to know himself.

Here is a single example: Goering affirms, sincerely: "I believe that it has never been in the German nature to torment or to discredit the enemy. The love of cruelty has never existed in the German character." This quotation proves to what degree he lacks penetration and is unable to see himself as he is. This is the case with most of his compatriots.

7. The concept of liberty for the German does not correspond to the realization of individual autonomy, but to the gift, freely accepted, of himself. Many men entered the ranks of National Socialism without suffering in the least from the abdication of self. With a wholly spontaneous enthusiasm they made the sacrifice of their personality.

III

WHAT we have said of the German character helps to make it understandable that Hitler should have triumphed in his

country without having to meet the critical spirit of his fellow citizens. We must now examine those causes of Hitler's success which belong to the post-war circumstances of Germany. But first certain psychological conceptions must be explained.

Freud has distinguished three elements in personality, The id, which is the passional part of our being, the one which contains our desires, our instinctive needs, but in a crude condition. The greater part of this id is unconscious. The super-ego is the depository of civilization in our subconscious. It is formed by all the interdictions which have weighed on the child during his early years. The ego is the element which orders the id and puts it into communication with the outer world, while taking into account the exactions of the super-ego.

When education has been very severe, the super-ego becomes more imperative than the ego. It obliges the conscious portion of the personality to submit to an excessive discipline, and imposes on the individual all sorts of instinctive frustrations and restrictions. People whose ego is weak and whose super-ego is highly developed are easily hypnotized and are also inclined to be moved by the collective suggestions which emanate from a crowd. Thus German education, often made with the whip, had reinforced the super-ego and predisposed the Germans to allow themselves to be attracted by the grandiose ceremonies of the Third Reich.

The super-ego is interesting to us from another point of view. Thanks to it, in a normal society it is almost impossible for a man to kill one of his fellow men. Most of us are strongly inhibited from releasing all the brutality of our being. When an individual has reached full maturity, he acts according to his ego, which allows him to accept for a time the necessity of acting brutally during a war. He adapts himself progressively to this new situation, and he is able to return to his pacific ideal when hostilities are over.

It is otherwise with people who have not reached their full psychic maturity and whose passions are still held in leash by the unconscious reflexes of the super-ego. In battle they experience an insurmountable inhibition against firing. They only manage progressively to do so because they are under the threat of their corporals and officers. The constant fear of being punished if they do not kill the enemy creates a second super-ego, whose moral law is radically different from that of the first. This dualism disintegrates their personalities; after the war they will no longer accept the pattern of the middle-class life which was dictated to them by the super-ego of childhood.

Between 1920 and 1930, such people were very numerous in Germany, the more so that very many of them were unemployed. They resorted to prostitution, to perversions, to alcohol, to cocaine, to theft and vagabondage. This abuse of liberty and explosion of revolt among men who have been subjected to a severe discipline in their childhood was accompanied by immense suffering. It manifested itself in actual epidemics of suicide, and in all sorts of unconscious self-punishments. They were unhappy, desperate, unable of themselves to remake their lives. Their growing number made an amorphous mass in the nation. We mean by mass a crowd which is not organized, not integrated into the framework of middle-class life, whose members have no family, no profession, for whom life is lived from day to day without plan or continuity. Toward 1930, this mass represented about seven million individuals, a tenth of the Germany of that time. It was a ferment of disorder and of revolution, a permanent danger for the nation. Many of its members turned toward communism; others, less numerous, toward the church.

Adolf Hitler made of this amorphous mass an organized group, disciplined, ready to sacrifice itself for him. He directed all the discontent of these men toward the Jews and the neighbors of Germany (Versailles and the Communists). He exalted their strength, gave them back confidence by his megalomaniac visions, gave them an objective by calling on them to become a people of heroes, and calmed their hunger by promises of wealth. They were willing temporarily to give up butter for cannon. Even the unemployed found a sense of dignity. Hitler found them work, made them march in the streets, spade on shoulder, organized popular manifestations for

them, gave them back a place in society. He enrolled them in the framework of the party or of the army. These men demanded a new faith and a savior; Hitler, prisoner of his illusions of grandeur, had wanted for years to play that part. He needed to be adored and he needed a colossal army to realize his thirst for power.

IV

WHY did the rest of Germany acclaim Adolf Hitler? The Germans are highly subject to mass emotions. The propaganda of the Nazi party had gathered in the sheep of Panurge, but there was more. The capitalists of the nation, seeing that the young Fuehrer had canalized and disciplined this mass which was a permanent danger to the State, were ready to trust this new man, in spite of all his eccentricities. They put their intelligence, will, knowledge, and time at the disposal of National-Socialism. They contributed to the few years of real renaissance which did exist in Germany between 1932 and 1937.

But Hitler's rigidity, his need of working *against someone,* and not *for something* caused him to quarrel with the best elements of the nation; some were fortunate enough to be able to go into exile, others were killed, still others were sent to concentration camps. When one part of the nation became aware that it had been deceived and that Hitler was leading his people to ruin, it was too late. The Fuehrer, holding the levers of command, now had the authority to arrest or kill all who might refuse to enter the infernal dance. The whole country was prisoner to his will and his madness. An army and a police interested in keeping him in power worked for him. Thus it came about that this mediocre being, this dangerous sick man became master of Germany.

Hitler had made sure of his success by turning to the young. His faithful followers have portrayed him to the coming generation as a god. The credo of the party was: "We believe in Adolf Hitler, our Fuehrer, and we confess that National-Socialism is the only faith that can lead our people to salvation." At the popular distributions of soup of the Philanthropic Committee of National Socialism, the children recited a kind of prayer before and after the meals. This is how it was conceived.

Before the meal: "Fuehrer, my Fuehrer whom God has given me, protect and long preserve my life. Thou has saved Germany from the depths of distress, it is to thee that I owe my daily bread. Remain long with me, do not abandon me, Fuehrer, my Fuehrer! Hail to my Fuehrer!"

After the meal: "Be blessed for this food which I have taken. Protector of children, Protector of the old. Thy cares are many, I know, but thou knowest how to bear them. Day and night, I am near thee in thought. Rest thy head on my breast, thou art safe, my Fuehrer, because thou art great. Hail to my Fuehrer!"

Among the explosions of admiration which emanate from adolescence, we will quote this one, published in the German newspaper:

> Youth which is rising in Germany believes in God but considers it shameful to seek Him in a foreign and far-off land, under cypresses and palm trees, when He manifests Himself every day among us, and manifests Himself in so admirable a way. It is in our country that we find the revelation of God, in the law of the growth and death of nature, in the history of our people, in the heroic annals of the Germanic legend, in the monuments to the dead of the great war. It is in the gallery of our Marshals that God has revealed Himself to us. In our blood, in our soil, God has given us the two sources of all strength, the two sacraments in the real meaning of the word. Whoever denies the holiness of blood and soil is a denier of God. Adolf Hitler is in our eyes more than the Fuehrer. He is the redeemer of the German people, and when all seems lost we still believe in him. Adolf Hitler, thy name is our faith. This faith has allowed us to carry throughout the country the standard which has become the symbol of German immortality. Take our lives, Fuehrer, take us entirely, take our bodies, take our souls. Into thy hands we commit our destiny.

How could German youth but adore the Fuehrer? He gave it a decisive importance. He had youth march in the streets; twelve-year-old boys would have a section marching behind them and a crowd applauding them! The boys preferred this open air

and ostentatious life to that of study. If their fathers took it into their heads to bring them to order and tell them to work, they would go to the party and denounce them. The party was their liberty; the Fuehrer their hero. All these youths have been brought up far from the bourgeois ideal; they do not desire a fixed profession; they do not want to marry; they do not seek to build themselves a life. They want an existence full of adventure; they want women who will throw themselves into the arms of a hero; but they do not want to take the responsibility of a wife and a career. All has been allowed to them and they can take no interest in the normal framework of a society.

This youth fights with remarkable fervor. Not only is it better equipped and better trained than that of other countries, but it has no other desire than to fight. Civilization does not temper its reactions; it was created brutal, savage, and cynical. All passions, all unleashed instincts urge these men to battle. Add to this the faith which they have in the restoration of the old Germanic soul and it is easy to understand why these soldiers are stronger than those who simply seek to defend their hearths, but who have a horror of war. Face to face with these facts we would err in thinking that German morale is about to break down. After the gigantic hecatomb of 1914-18, France entrusted the fate of its armies to old men, but Hitler has entrusted that of Germany to impetuous and belligerent children.

He has presented himself as the Messiah of numerous groups. He has been the savior among others of the Pan-German racists. Baldur von Schirach has labored to make the doctrines of the old Pan-Germans and those of the Nazis agree. His object has been to unify German youth in a single national faith. Of this faith he has really made a national religion, as the following document shows. It is a young educator who speaks to his comrades.

> Today I have just finished reading the book of Johann von Leers, *"Altes Wissen, Neuen Glauben."* My last doubts have disappeared, my decision is taken; every consideration of personal interest must give way before the primordial duty, the struggle for the German soul, for the revivification of the Nordic soul, which a thousand years of Christianity have been unable to extirpate. I do not want a false education to make Orientals of the children in my classes. I want to fix in their hearts the principles of the German faith.

Hitler has exploited this current of thought for his own benefit. He has exploited the discontent of the beaten soldiers, of the discouraged unemployed, of the disillusioned idealists. He has exploited the ardor of youth, not to redeem the country, as he promised, but to satisfy his own frenzied vanity. He is not the Messiah who could give Germany back her place among the nations; he is the madman who rushes on, sowing misery and death on his way.

●

CARRYING out a decision of the Executive Committee of the Free World Association, a European Council of the Association has been established. It is composed of representatives of various democratic and anti-fascist movements. At the first meeting, held under the chairmanship of Alvarez del Vayo, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain and executive director of the Free World Association, the Council created various commissions to deal with the political, economic, and educational questions of European reconstruction. Following a discussion of the invitation to a forthcoming Pan-European conference received by some of its members from Count Coudenhove Kalergi, the Council decided to recommend nonparticipation in this conference on the grounds that the Free World movement is opposed to any European combination which is not based on the fullest co-operation with England and Soviet Russia. European reconstruction cannot be established on the old principle of power politics; it must, on the contrary, be carried out within the framework of a democratic world organization.

THE THIRD FRONT

BY ALFRED KANTOROWICZ

A Report on the German Underground

IN a programmatic statement shortly before the outbreak of the war, Hitler's Gestapo head, Heinrich Himmler, labeled the opposition movement within Germany the Fourth Front. It represented, he declared, a potential power which had to be reckoned with in addition to the fronts on land, at sea, and in the air. The arrest of tens of thousands of suspect Germans at the beginning of the war was part of Hitler's mobilization plan. After that, the home front became outwardly quiet. Apparently domestic opposition was no longer a noteworthy factor during the two years in which Germany was defeating the countries of Europe. Occasionally some punitive action was given some publicity so that people would realize the Gestapo still existed and "got its man"—just in case.

This situation has changed completely in recent months. For almost a year, various officials have tried to outdo each other in vociferous propaganda designed to give the phantom of domestic opposition shape and name. Their minds are the type which must have a tangible adversary they can fight. They cannot stand the strain of groping about in the dark against foes they cannot lay their hands on. Departing from Himmler's classification, Goebbels has several times recently called the German opposition the "Third Front." Together with the primary threat of the Russian front and the potential danger of the "Second Front," it is considered a concrete peril. The fact that Goebbels expressly mentioned it testifies more clearly to the existence of an internal opposition within the Reich than the occasional confused reports which come out of that hermetically sealed country.

Over all German stations listeners are subjected to an unceasing flood of insults and threats against malcontents, doubters, and cowards. "But I also say in this hour that we will destroy pitilessly every saboteur of this community. . . . No habitual criminal should think that he will be saved by a new crime. We will see to it that these individuals will not survive the war. . . . We will exterminate these persons and have exterminated them." Hitler roared this in one of his last orations, his voice breaking with fury. Who, then, are these saboteurs, these habitual criminals, these people who must be exterminated? They are the domestic enemy, the German opposition which Hitler hates and which he fears so much that his voice breaks with rage when he mentions it—just as he is breathless with hate when he mentions the name of Roosevelt.

"There are some among us," writes Goebbels in his weekly, *Das Reich,* "who assiduously forget everything we predicted correctly and remember just as assiduously only the few cases in which we were allegedly mistaken." (Here he alludes to Hitler's solemn declaration, in the fall of 1941, that the Russian armies had been "definitely" annihilated.) "Yet it is even more irritating," he continues, "that these same people accord the enemy some sort of super-justice which is entirely out of place. If one of our newspapers handles

On these pages we reproduce some of the literature distributed by the German Underground movement. The pamphlets always have innocent titles and a deceptive appearance. Thus, in the one shown on the left (The Spirit of the New State—historical documents for contemporary history—Paul Steegeman, Publisher, Berlin) there is an innocuous title page; then on page 3, the reader comes upon an ostensibly nazi address delivered to the Prussian Diet, but as that page is turned a new title appears:

THEODOR EICKE

**AUS DEM LEBEN
EINES DES GROESSTEN SADISTEN
UND MOERDER ALLER ZEITEN**

(Theodor Eicke; biographical details of one of the greatest sadists and murderers of all time)

What follows is not merely the story of one of Hitler's executioners but an exposé of what Germans have to suffer in the concentration camp. "There will come a day of freedom," the story concludes on page 14, "and then the German people will sit in judgment on this type of monster. Then the avengers will rise and Theodore Eicke will get his just deserts." On page 15, the last page, the seeming address to the Diet is again resumed with the nazi declarations about honor, freedom, and the German people sounding more false than ever.

This technique is necessary not merely to avoid and escape casual inspection by nazi agents but to enable the distributor of the pamphlet to slip out of sight of the person who receives it before the latter realizes that he has been given some Underground literature.

The illustration on the opposite page is part of a larger throw-away which purports to advertise patent remedies for the ill effects of undernourishment (a symbolical touch). On the reverse side is an address to the German people by Hubertus Prince of Löwenstein, leader of the Catholic Youth Movement, now in this country.

an enemy statesman a little roughly, the German mania for fairness is suddenly roused, and our German Michel feels moved to rush personally to that statesman's defense. . . . There are even German soldiers, I have been told, who after marching thousands of kilometers through the wastes of Russia, through scenes of terror and mental devastation, discover an atlas in some village school and, lost in their thoughts, ask themselves doubtfully whether in the end there was not something to bolshevism."

This is a remarkable confession on the part of the propaganda chief, not only confirming the fact that the home front tries to express its discontent in every possible way, but that even the men on the fighting front are thinking along lines highly dangerous to the regime. Convictions—increasing in number and severity—of Germans who listen to foreign broadcasts are the leitmotif of this campaign. The penalties range from five years in the penitentiary to death. The Overseas News Agency reported from Zurich that such sentences were passed in November by courts in Dresden, Magdeburg, Klagenfurt, Bayreuth, and Leitmeritz. In Norway, all army radio sets carry the following poster: "Listening to foreign broadcasts constitutes a crime against the national security of our people. On the Fuehrer's orders it will be punished with the most severe sentences to the penitentiary. Soldiers, remember this!"

Quite evidently neither Hitler's rage nor Goebbels' sarcasm nor the threats of the lesser leaders of the Nazis have produced satisfactory results. So now, the

mighty Goering has been placed in charge of the fighting on the Third Front. In the last days of the fateful year of 1942, he launched a new campaign in his *Essener Nationalzeitung* which might be called an appeal to opportunism or—truly an ironical nuance in the evolution of nazi ideology—a version of the lesser of the two evils policy. This campaign attempts to persuade the German people that even though many of them detest the Nazis and suffer under their rule, they would find the situation much more detestable and horrible if Germany were defeated.

No one, Goering's paper warns them, can expect to be on the "safe side," should the Allies win. "It is out of the question that any German can get away unharmed by saying: 'In my heart I was always a democrat and hated the Nazis; but I just could not show my real feelings.' In the eyes of international Jewry every German will be guilty and a victim of its hatred. The Germans will be much better off, therefore, if they stick out the war with the Nazis, whether they like them or not."

II

FOR a long time it was a fundamental rule of Goebbels' propaganda to act as though all Germans were marching peacefully and wholeheartedly behind the Fuehrer and the party. This was done to prevent the various opposition groups which were working independently from knowing that other opposition centers existed. They were thus to conclude that they were alone in their opposition to the nazi regime.

Lately, instances publicized as warning examples have increased in frequency—another indication that sabotage and opposition have reached a point which can no longer be concealed. The American press has reported a few of the more significant cases. In Mannheim, for example, 14 workers were shot. In the barracks at Gross-Lichterfelde near Berlin, 258 "Jews" were executed for attempted sabotage. A few days later the Nazis themselves admitted that some of those shot had not been Jews but Communists, i.e., German workers and intellectuals who belonged to the opposition.

Less well known are the following facts: recently it is no longer the ominous "V" which appears on the walls in many German communities—Goebbels managed to deprive that of its oppositional significance by declaring it the symbol of nazi victory—but the letter "F," the initial of the German word *Friede,* "F" and the figures, 1918, a *mene tekel* which will be understood by all Germans over thirty years old. During the public broadcast of Hitler's address (on the so-called Memorial Day *(Heldengedenktag),* women in the audience at Chemnitz, an important industrial city in Central Germany, shouted: "What did our men die for? We want peace!" A riot broke out in a movie theater at Munich when pictures of the Russian front were shown in the newsreel. Women who had lost husbands or sons began shrieking: "We want our men back." The police had to intervene; soldiers on furlough sided with the women; a free-for-all developed and continued on the street. Some of the demonstrators were shot, many were arrested. In the engine plant of Borsig, one of the most important Berlin factories, a leaflet was found which urged the workers to

HYGRO
NÄHRSCHUTZ

das biologische Mittel
gegen Ernährungsfehler
und Mangelkrankheiten

KALKARMUT

ist die Ursache unzähliger Leiden, denn Knochen- und Zahnkrankheiten, Wachstumsstörungen der Kinder (Rachitis), manche nervöse Erscheinungen, vorzeitiges Altern usw. würden in der ärztlichen Praxis viel weniger häufig auftauchen und der Volksgesundheit viel geringere Schäden zufügen, wenn unserer Nahrung nicht durch das Kochen der natürliche Kalkreichtum verloren ginge.

Kesselstein ist Kalk
der unserer Nahrung fehlt!

commit acts of sabotage; in fact, the largest rolling mill of the plant was damaged by sabotage, consequently army deliveries could not be sent out on time. A chemical factory at Düsseldorf blew up, and 192 bodies were found under the wreckage; whereupon workers in near-by plants struck. In Gotha, anti-Hitler and anti-war slogans were painted on house walls. According to the report of a Belgian miner who worked for eight months in the Ruhr district, illegal anti-fascist newspapers have reappeared there—the *Ruhr Echo* in Essen, *Der Kämpfer* (which now calls itself *Der Kämpfer für den Frieden)* in Dortmund, the *Freiheit* in Dusseldorf.

A secret German language transmitter reports that an illegal miners' committee was recently set up in the Ruhr District. It published an appeal to the German metal workers, urging them to join hands with the miners in the fight against Hitler and for peace. The press office of the Czechoslovak Government in London states that German occupation troops mutinied in Pardubitz, clamoring for better food and shouting, "We want to go home." SS detachments had to be called out to disarm the mutineers; four were shot; sixty were arrested; and the entire garrison was replaced. Four German railroad employees were court-martialed and shot, according to nazi dispatches, because they had been driven by hunger to steal a few sausages from a food transport. A strike paralyzing the aluminum works at Laute for some time had to be broken by armed force; another strike occurred in the automobile factory of Opel at Rüsselsheim. The Gestapo took a hand in the matter, and many workers were arrested.

News of a further cut in bread rations led to riots at Cologne, Düsseldorf, Chemnitz, and Hamburg. In Hamburg, women demonstrated in front of the Nazi party building, shouting "Give us bread for our children." SS squads dispersed the threatening crowd. At the Schlesischer Banhof in Berlin a large crowd which gathered when a train filled with severely wounded men arrived from the eastern front, broke through the barriers and stormed the station. When the people saw that even the severely wounded men had only paper bandages, pent-up emotions could no longer be restrained. Faced with weeping and screaming women, the police were utterly helpless.

An "enlightening" and threatening leaflet circulated by the nazi leaders in Berlin makes it very clear that many Germans lack sufficient "racial self-respect." The leaflet bears the title: Our Attitude Toward the Poles in the Reich, and admonishes the



The illustrations on this and the next page show the two sides of a folder that simulates the pamphlets published by Cook's Tours. When folded, only the map and advertising are visible; when unfolded, there appears the eloquent address delivered by Heinrich Mann at the International Conference for the Defense of Democracy, Peace, and Human Rights.



WEHRT EUCH!
Von HEINRICH MANN

WAGONS-LITS/COOK

Germans to maintain their "racial solidarity." On the other hand, disguised leaflets protesting against the war are distributed in Berlin and avidly read. At Linz, Austria, several sections of the Hermann Goering Works were destroyed by fire in rapid succession. Twenty-two-year-old Maria Nimsch was executed at Linz as a saboteur, for setting fire to a supply depot of the army. Twenty-one-year-old Eduard Haemmer, of Carinthia, Austria, set fire to a barn filled with cereal; he, too, was executed. According to a dispatch of the Overseas News Agency, a total of 1,500 men and women were executed between March and September, 1942.

III

FROM a far distant source we have been receiving testimony concerning the opposition to nazism. This evidence comes to us from the German prisoners of war in Russia—officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men. It is understandable that American correspondents have played down this testimony since at first glance it seems obvious the prisoners would try to win the favor of the Russians by attacking the nazi regime. But this explanation overlooks the fact that an entire generation of fanatics has been reared in Nazi-land who would suffer torture rather than utter a word of criticism of the Fuehrer's policies. The men who speak and thus run the risk of being branded as traitors to the Fatherland are men who have taken the long desired opportunity to disclaim publicly their allegiance to Hitler. Like Heinrich Freitag, Lieutenant of the Luftwaffe, they indicate their sentiments by deeds as well as words. Freitag landed his plane near Lozowenka, behind the Russian front, and declared to the Russian soldiers who came up: "I did not land because of engine trouble, nor did I have to come down for any other reason. I came over to the Russian side with the intention to fight on the side of the Soviet troops against Hitler."

Similarly, Major Georg Klein of the 514th Infantry surrendered with twelve of his men. "Many soldiers," he stated, "are only waiting for an opportunity to come over to the Red Army." First Lieutenant Gustav Ferman of the 9th Company, 427th Infantry, 129th Division, deserted near Kalinin, with 47 men of his regiment. Lieutenant Ristmann and 67 men of the 92nd (Berlin) Infantry – mostly workers and employees of Berlin armament plants, all older men who had not been called up until 1942—demonstrated their determination to escape the nazi terror for good by shooting three Gestapo agents, a first lieutenant and two noncommissioned officers, charged with watching them; then proceeded to meet the advancing Russian troops with a white flag and the bodies of the three Gestapo agents.

Reports from Sweden indicate that German troops in Norway are equally anxious to break with the Hitler regime. Constant desertions send a steady trickle of men

across the Swedish frontier, men who are not fleeing the fight but who seek the other side in this conflict. From Paris comes a naive piece of evidence of the manner in which German soldiers spread anti-nazi propaganda. An Army order issued by General Stülpnagel states: "It has been noted that during the last three months, communist elements distributed no less than six different leaflets among the troops. It has happened that men, instead of delivering the leaflets as they were told to do, enclosed them in their letters home with the remark, 'This is how the enemy works.' The troops concerned are to be informed that such actions will be punished according to martial law."

Back again on the home front, there is a significant letter from a miner in Essen which had been smuggled across the Swiss frontier and after many detours through various countries finally reached New York. In its report concerning the horrible living conditions, the effect of British air raids on Essen, and the heavy losses on the Eastern front, the letter corroborates the news which has trickled out of Germany. It adds, however, a significant commentary on the activities of the Third Front: "I know that foreign countries often wonder about the little opposition the masses of the German people put up. Yet who dealt an almost fatal blow in 1938-1939 to years of illegal work on the part of the German anti-Facists? Chamberlain and Daladier betrayed us. . . . People abroad fail to realize the devastating effect of the Munich Conference on the German people. Our hopes for support in our struggle by foreign countries were bitterly disappointed at that time. In addition, Hitler's subsequent victories fooled many a young worker. . . ."

This is a point well worth considering. After suffering more than five years of physical terror, the moral resistance of German people who opposed nazism was partially paralyzed by the shock of Munich. Not only Czechs, but all European anti-Facists had been sold out to Hitler by the Munich Pact. Hitler's crimes were expressly sanctioned, his foreign policy seemed justified by the successes he scored. And he was granted full authority, not only materially, but morally as well, to deal as he saw fit with those parts of Europe he dominated legally or actually.

When people danced in the streets of Paris after Munich, overjoyed because "peace" had been preserved, when Chamberlain was acclaimed as the "Lord of Peace" upon his return to London, in Germany the hopes of millions of tortured anti-Facists collapsed. Their struggle seemed lost; in fact, it seemed to have lost its purpose. Thomas Mann calls this his most terrifying experience—"this painfully slow realization, denied again and again, of the fact that we, the Germans of the physical and spiritual emigration, were not being backed by Europe—the Europe to which we had professed allegiance and of whose moral support we were certain; that this very Europe did not even want the overthrow of the National Socialist dictatorship which was repeatedly within reach."

Hounded at home, discouraged by the lack of support and understanding abroad, the German opposition to Hitler has nevertheless always existed. In order to evaluate its potential strength as an ally of the United Nations, it is necessary to recall the statistics of German political alignment before Hitler seized power. To begin with, at no time did Hitler and his party command a majority of the votes of the German people. In fact, in the last elections before that infamous deal which made Hitler Chancellor of the Reich, the Nazis got only one third of all votes cast. Moreover, Reichstag elections were held again, on March 5, 1933, about five weeks after that fateful January 30 on which von Hindenburg surrendered government and people to the bloodthirsty demagogues. They were five weeks of terror, long and thoroughly prepared. During the last week before the elections, after the signal of the Reichstag fire, nazi activity grew into a crescendo of horror unequaled in modern history. And after these five weeks of explosions arranged by a superbly organized and ruthless gang, the Germans went to the polls and gave Hitler's party only 44 per cent of all votes cast. Fifty-six per cent voted against him, and millions more preferred not to vote at all.

It is not the purpose of this article to give detailed statistics on the nazi terror

as applied to the Germans themselves. The following approximate figures, which are the result of careful investigations over many years, are merely to show that the Nazis were forced to use the same terror against the Germans as they are applying today to the peoples of the countries they have conquered since. During the first three years of the Hitler dictatorship, 225,000 men and women were sentenced to a total of 600,000 years in jail or penitentiary because of opposition activities. A much larger number of political adversaries was sent to nazi concentration camps without any court proceedings. A compilation published in 1939 by the Deutsche Volkshilfe (German People's Aid) stated that up to the end of 1938, 12,000 men and women were murdered or executed in Hitler Germany. At the end of that year, 250,000 men and women were imprisoned in jails, penitentiaries, and concentration camps. The number of men and women who had been held between 1933 and the outbreak of the war in concentration camps, jails, SA barracks, Gestapo centers, police stations, and so forth has been estimated conservatively at 1,500,000. We come closer to the real facts if we assume that about two million Germans have been maltreated by the Nazis as "enemies of the state." Those who emerged alive from these torture chambers are broken physically and morally. Those who are suspected of being able to carry on the fight against nazism do not leave the camp—or only as dead bodies.

Thus we may set down the following conclusions:

1. The opposition within Germany, which had to fight the war against Hitler virtually alone between 1933 and 1940 displays again signs of a noteworthy revival after the first setbacks of the Hitler regime at the Russian front and the entrance of the United States into the war. The nazi regime can no longer afford to ignore it and conceal its activities.

2. The acts of sabotage and other opposition activities, as well as the declarations of German deserters are no more and no less than symptoms of fermentation. Further setbacks of the Nazis and further encouragement of the German opposition will be needed to forge them into an effective support of the Allies.

3. The Allies must look out for supporters particularly among the older age groups of the Germans, among men and women who lived consciously through the pre-Hitler era, those between thirty and sixty years. The younger generation, grown up under Hitler, infected with nazi poison and nazi successes, those between eighteen and twenty-eight, are for the greater part unresponsive to the language of democracy and freedom. They understand only the language of violence, and nothing but the power of Allied arms will be able to open their eyes.

4. Our survey shows that Allied propaganda should increasingly concentrate upon, and encourage, an element which contains extraordinary possibilities — the growing war weariness of German women. After three years of war, after millions of German women and mothers are mourning dead or crippled husbands and sons, and millions more must constantly fear for their husbands and sons, the word "peace" begins once more to have its magic effect on German women. Many signs testify to this fact. The hope that this horror can be ended may soon appear more tempting than all promises of nazi propaganda and the diversionary maneuvers of the so-called woman leader, Frau Scholtz-Klink. Incredible as it may seem, her character and achievements were recently praised in a leading American periodical. The time will come when even the terror of the end, so impressively described by Goebbels, will appear to German women and mothers as the lesser evil compared to the terror without end.

5. No one should think that the "Third Front" in Germany will be "opened" before the "Second Front." But everything indicates that the "Third Front" will in due time effectively support the fighting forces of the Allies. Even today Hitler is keeping 300,000 of his most loyal and best qualified men in reserve against this eventuality. The "Third Front" can and will help speed up the end and save the lives of hundreds of thousands of Allied soldiers.

—Translated by Andreas Dorpalen

The Futility of Conquest in EUROPE

by

Gerard Swope

MUST we always have wars?

Unless we can clean up war's breeding places, the realistic, awful answer to this question must be—"Yes." It's "Yes" too, unless we can overcome the age old, misguided convictions of certain minority groups and peoples. The antiquated notion that progress and prosperity depend upon force and acquisition will always be mortally dangerous to the peace of the World. So too is the belief that small states and countries, unable to defend themselves, have no place in a great, modern world and must surrender to the presumed superiority of physically stronger states.

Prussia in Germany is the center of the disease of war in Europe and has been for over two hundred years. The Junkers, the military, ruling class of Prussia, have persisted in the gangster notion that their well-being can only be advanced by force and conquest. This pernicious doctrine is accepted by many of the people there and in a few other of the world's hotbeds.

For a clearer understanding of what has been going on in Prussia during the past two centuries, let us use our own State of Ohio for illustration. Ohio has a population of more than 6,000,000 and covers over 40,000 square miles of territory. Suppose the people of Ohio were belligerent and warlike; that they had compulsory military service, strict discipline, and a highly organized, ruling military cult. Suppose also that Ohio made war upon its neighbors and by conquest gradually took over Indiana, Kentucky, and Illinois; all in the name of more room to live, *"Lebensraum."* Suppose further that Ohio thus attained a size of 114,000 square miles and ultimately a population of almost 42,000,000 people, became our strongest State, and took effective command of the whole country. Now we have perhaps a better mental picture of Prussia in Germany.

Prussia was the aggressor under Frederick the Great in the middle of the seventeen hundreds, again under a Prussian King in 1864-1866, and 1871. In 1871, under the leadership of Prussia, the German States were united under the Prussian King as William I, Emperor of Germany. His grandson, William II, also of Prussia, started the World War I in 1914. World War II proceeds now under the dictatorship of Hitler who is not a Prussian; but the military strength and trained leadership still comes from Prussia.

When Frederick the Great died in the latter part of the eighteenth century, Prussia had already added greatly to its territory by making war on its neighbors. It had an area of about 46,000 square miles and about 4,100,000 people. By 1866, it had grown to 72,000 square miles; and after the Franco-Prussian War of 1871, to a size of

over 114,000 square miles—all by conquest. Its population increased, in this same period, to 15,000,000 in 1866, 25,000,000 in 1871, 40,000,000 before World War I, in 1914, and to 42,000,000 in 1939. The Prussian density of population was 368 per square mile in 1939. At that time, Belgium had 700 people per square mile, the Netherlands 677, and the United Kingdom 505. The other principal German States of Baden and Wurtemburg also had more people per square mile than Prussia. Saxony had 899.

Back in the minds of many of us is the disturbing question of whether the people of Prussia and Germany do not actually need more territory. If they do not have sufficient area for their population, there may be some slight justification for their disposition to war and conquest. We have already stated that Prussia has fewer people per square mile than the other principal German States of Baden, Wurtemburg, and Saxony; and fewer than Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Belgium not only has nearly twice as many people per square mile but its rate of population increase is not a great deal less than that of Germany. The Netherlands has a much higher rate of population increase and up toward double the number of Germany's population per square mile. So much for *"Lebensraum."*

Revealing, as these figures may be, they do not prove that the smaller European countries can, in comparison with the larger ones, justify their independent existence. The past century of intensive industrial development has seen tremendous strides in communication, transportation, electrical power, and the concentration of populations in large cities. It has become a serious question whether small countries could compete and survive, and offer their citizens opportunities to live contented, industrious lives.

II

BELGIUM, Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden are relatively small countries in area and population. They differ markedly in topography, national resources—such as timber, coal, iron, etc. It is interesting to compare them with three larger countries of Europe—the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Some of these nine countries have colonies, but for comparison, only the Continental areas and people are considered in all of the figures in this article.

The people of Switzerland have more than double the per capita wealth of the people of Germany—$2,612 for Switzerland and $1,249 for Germany (1939). The United Kingdom, with $2,514, also has more than double Germany's per capita wealth. Little Belgium, with $1,376, has more than Germany; so has the Netherlands, with $1,293. Both Switzerland and Denmark, with

TABLE I

DENSITY OF POPULATION AND POPULATION GROWTH

	Area in Square Miles	Population 1939	No. of People Per Sq. Mile	Per cent of Increase in 1939 over 1830
Prussia	114,000	42,000,000	368	——
Bavaria	30,000	8,300,000	275	——
Saxony	5,800	5,200,000	899	——
Wurtemburg	7,500	2,900,000	386	——
Baden	5,800	2,500,000	433	——
All of Germany	182,000	70,000,000	385	134
Belgium	12,000	8,400,000	700	121
Netherlands	13,000	8,800,000	677	240
Switzerland	16,000	4,200,000	263	111
Denmark	17,000	3,800,000	224	219
Norway	125,000	2,500,000	23	167
Sweden	173,000	6,300,000	36	126
United Kingdom	94,000	47,500,000	505	95
France	213,000	42,000,000	197	29

$1,714, have more than France or Germany. Norway has $1,067, Sweden $1,065, and France $1,653. Only Norway and Sweden have less per capita wealth than Germany.

Germany's annual per capita income is $242 (1939). Only France, with $219, and Belgium, with $175, have less than Germany. Netherlands has $323, Switzerland $348, Denmark $328, Norway $267, Sweden $262, and United Kingdom, $415.

Of all the countries in this comparison, Germany, the largest in population and second largest in territory, has the highest taxes in relation to income—22 per cent, (1939). France, with 21.2 per cent, and United Kingdom, with 20.7 per cent, the next largest, have the next highest tax rates. All of the other and smaller countries have lower taxes in relation to income—Belgium 18 per cent, Netherlands 16.8 per cent, Switzerland 12.7 per cent, Denmark 13.3 per cent, Norway 18.8 per cent, and Sweden 16.4 per cent.

There are other measures of the vitality, prosperity, and well-being of nations. The outlook for world peace is black indeed, if they indicate that force, conquest, and size make countries better, richer, or more progressive and contented. In health and sanitation the smaller countries have better records than the larger ones. The Netherlands particularly has maintained the highest standards and the best results although, as previously shown, it has close to double the number of people per square mile, as compared with Germany. Among the nine countries compared here Germany and France, the largest, are at the bottom or close to the bottom, of the list in health and sanitation, measured in infant mortality and in deaths per thousand of population (1939-40).

The national resources of these several countries vary from a large proportion of arable soil in some to very little in others and from large deposits of coal and iron in some to none in others. Agriculture, forestry and fishing are proportionately highest in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and France, and lowest in Belgium and the United Kingdom. Mining and industry are highest in Belgium, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom and lowest in Norway, Denmark, and France. Commerce, banking, transportation, and communications are highest in the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom, and lowest in France and Sweden. Size in area or population does not determine the activities of the people, and they may be active and gainfully employed, be they big or little.

III

HISTORY is not simply a collection of dates, names of battles or names of generals. Personalities are more or less accidental products of the human race. It is the current of human thought and ambition which determines the more tangible effects. Populations make history. In this group, the forms of government, the character of the people, and their institutions show great variation. Excepting Switzerland, five of the smaller countries and the United Kingdom were constitutional hereditary monarchies. Switzerland is and France was a republic. Germany, since the Empire established under the leadership of Prussia at the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, was practically an absolute monarchy. These countries vary widely in the character of their people, the frequency of war, internally and externally.

Belgium has the differences in language and customs of the Flemish and Walloons, but except for the separation from the Netherlands in 1830, has enjoyed peace from 1815 to 1914, when it was invaded by Germany, and again invaded and conquered by Germany in 1940. The Netherlands enjoyed peace from 1815 to 1940, when it was invaded and conquered by Germany.

Four different languages are spoken in different parts of the small country of Switzerland—German, French, Italian, and Romansch. It is a confederation of twenty-two cantons under a federal constitution with large local antonomy. Switzerland has been at peace with outside countries since the sixteenth century. However, the conflicting interests of the cantons continued to be an obstacle to unity which led to the Civil War of 1847. In 1848, a constitution was adopted. Ever since, Switzerland has had undisturbed peace for almost one hundred years.

Denmark was invaded in 1864 by Prussia, which took away two provinces. After that

it was at peace for almost eighty years, until invaded and conquered by Germany in 1940. Norway has enjoyed peace for upwards of one hundred years (the separation from Sweden in 1905 was effected peacefully) until it was invaded and conquered by Germany in 1940. Sweden has enjoyed peace for over one hundred years; in the first World War it remained neutral, and so far in this war it has been able to remain neutral.

The United Kingdom has not been invaded since 1066, has had no internal wars since the seventeenth century, but has been at war externally in every century. France has had a varied career, with incessant wars, internal and external. It was an absolute monarchy up to the French Revolution in 1789—then came Napoleon, and after that it had various limited monarchies and republics. It was invaded and conquered in 1870 by Prussia, then invaded by Germany in 1914—but not conquered—and invaded and conquered again by Germany in 1940.

Many times the various states now comprising the German Reich attempted to unite. One such attempt was made on the liberal lines promulgated in the turbulent days of 1848 but failed mainly because Prussia opposed the formation along such democratic lines. The union of the German States was accomplished in 1871 after the Franco-Prussian War, under the leadership and domination of Prussia. There have been incessant wars among the different states and externally in almost every century since the fall of Rome. Great differences exist in the people, from the Prussians in the North – Protestant and military; Saxons in the Center—Protestant (the cradle of the Reformation in the sixteenth century), commercial, and industrial; Bavarians in the South—Catholic, artistic, and agricultural.

All of the six small countries and the United Kingdom have had general adult suffrage, male and female. France, and Germany to 1933, had adult male suffrage. Religious worship was entirely free in all of the countries. In Germany this freedom, as well as others, ceased with Hitler in 1933. Some of the countries are predominantly Protestant, some predominantly Catholic. Some of the countries have a state religion, others not—France predominantly Catholic, recognized no state religion, and until recently tolerated all.

All of them, with the single exception of the United Kingdom, had compulsory military service. The United Kingdom, until the recent wars, had a voluntary military service. In both World Wars I and II, a selective draft system was adopted. In the small countries compulsory military service was solely for defense. France, as a result of her oft repeated experience and as clearly evident in the attitude of her people in the last few years, had built up her army solely for defense—only in Germany was compulsory service dominated by training and leadership for aggression and conquest.

Elementary education is supported by the state and is obligatory in every one of the nine countries. School attendance and literacy are not determined by the size of the countries; all are more or less equal.

In the consumption of sugar, a delicacy, the highest per capita is Denmark; the

TABLE II

MINUTES OF WORK REQUIRED TO BUY THE FOLLOWING ARTICLES (1937)

	Milk per litre	Eggs per piece	Bread Wheat per kg.	Potatoes per kg.	Beef per kg.	Butter per kg.	Total
Belgium	15.0	8.5	21.8	6.2	107.2	206.3	365.0
Netherlands	11.8	4.9	19.6	4.9	92.2	163.7	297.1
Switzerland	11.3	4.4	13.1	6.5	107.3	173.1	315.7
Denmark	12.1	4.4	34.1	5.9	50.2	100.4	207.1
Norway	12.2	4.9	35.1	4.5	68.2	86.1	211.0
Sweden	10.7	6.0	38.6	5.6	74.4	126.0	261.3
United Kingdom	22.7	6.8	17.4	7.2	54.2	141.4	249.7
France	11.3	7.5	17.9	6.9	73.3	149.2	266.1
Germany	17.7	9.2	54.6	6.2	126.9	238.5	453.1

United Kingdom is second. Each one of the other five countries is higher than France, and Germany is the lowest of all (1924-33). The Netherlands is highest in coffee consumption, per capita, The United Kingdom is second. Each one of the other five countries is higher than France, and Germany is the lowest of all. In the number of telephones per capita, Denmark is first, Sweden second. Four of the small countries stand higher than the best of the larger countries. Germany is fifth. In the number of pieces of mail handled, per capita, Switzerland is first, Belgium second, and Germany third. In industrial relations, and social security, such as health and unemployment insurance and contributory old age pensions, the smaller countries compare most favorably with the larger.

One of the very best tests of the standards and levels attained by a country is the amount of work in hours or minutes required to secure the means for essential necessities. The more work required, the more backward or burdened the country; and the less work required, the more advanced or less burdened the country.

To purchase one unit each of all these articles of food requires a total of 207 minutes work equivalent in Denmark and 211 minutes in Norway; the maximum is in Germany, where 453 minutes are required.

IV

PEACE should be our ultimate aim, not revenge. Judging from experience, we cannot have both. The better qualities in a people must be given opportunities to develop and co-operate in permanent peace. But the leaders of the nations who brought this awful disaster upon the world must be punished. They should be treated as common criminals and murderers, regardless of position. There is no moral distinction.

We have already pledged ourselves "to restore sovereign rights and self-government to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." These now include the Belgians, Dutch, Norwegians, French, Danes, Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Czechs, Poles, Slovaks, Slovenes, Luxemburgers, Persians, Koreans, Siamese, and Filipinos.

One certain condition of ultimate peace must be the acceptance of the principle of representative government by the enemy states. Representative government may not in itself be a guarantee of peace. But the history of the past century amply demonstrates that the will to peace thrives best in the soil of representative government. Dictatorships and imperialisms have inevitably led to war.

We should like to believe that Germany could safely be left undivided and taught and encouraged in the ways of peace. But it has not worked out that way in the past. Germany should be broken up into approximately the same states, except Prussia, as they existed prior to coming together to form the German Empire in 1871. These separate states would then be comparable with peaceful countries like Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland and Denmark, in size and population. The strong disposition for unity within Germany has been largely dictated by Prussian leadership, Prussia succeeded in effecting unity by force. The least that can be done safely is to separate Prussia and break up the military class.

Other German States may also be separated. As we have shown in this article, it is not necessary to be big in order to have healthy, contented citizens. Under peaceful conditions small countries may grow in population at as great a rate of increase as large countries, and be happy, prosperous and constructive. After a period of years, if the people of the separated German States should decide to unite in a federated state, there need be no objection.



HOW

The Plague came to Cagnac

by

PAUL L. BOWEN

For reasons that will become obvious to the reader, all names in this true story have been disguised.

—EDITOR'S NOTE

THE deceased must have been dearly beloved, for more than a hundred mourners escorted the coffin to the tiny burial ground of the village of Cagnac in Northern France. And Cagnac numbers but 735 souls, not counting the dead that lie beneath the sod. The priest, too, eloquently praised the departed, dwelling upon his outstanding contributions to the community. Nevertheless, as soon as the funeral service was over, the mourners dispersed quickly. They seemed to vanish from the scene in the autumn haze.

There was nothing untoward about the funeral. Nor did anyone comment on the fact that six more funerals followed in quick succession during the next three weeks. It was a damp and rainy fall—the year was 1940, to be precise—and in the fall, the ague seizes even the sturdy people of this harsh country.

"If you will pardon me, sir, who were the deceased, that they should merit such an outpouring of mourners?" asked the traveling salesman of the doctor who had driven over from the neighboring village of Mandrague—for Cagnac itself supported no doctor. The salesman traveled out of Paris with a line of ladies' underwear, woven of ersatz fiber (made in Germany). According to his story, this salesman merely happened to come to Cagnac just in time to witness two more funerals on successive days. Despite the cold weather—for it was now December—a large crowd had followed the hearse each time.

The doctor cleared his throat importantly and told the stranger the sad story. An aged farmer in his seventies had been so beloved by his young wife of seventeen that the girl had been unable to bear his death,

taking her own life the following day. *"Paul et Virginie,"* the old doctor nodded sagely, tears in his eyes. "Love is stronger than death!" To the salesman Paul and Virginie meant no more than the name of a rival underwear firm. He let it go at that.

But this was only the beginning. On Christmas Eve, three funerals were held at once. Again at least a hundred weeping mourners escorted the three coffins. Many of them seemed to come from other villages in the neighborhood. The mourners must have returned home that same night, for none remained in Cagnac. At the same time, word went around that more funerals would be held at sunrise of Christmas Day, for another traveling salesman—in tomato extract and powdered eggs (made in Germany)—had been asking too many pointed questions.

•

The plague still seemed to be gaining ground. Twenty-seven times during January the curé's orotund voice rang out into deepening dusk, in eulogy of the departed's high standing in the community or the dead girl's surpassing virtue. Again and again, the doctor from Mandrague came trotting over in his buggy and was seen deep in conversation with Cagnac's Mayor—the biggest and richest man in the village—as well as with the curé and the sexton. Clearly, space in the little burial ground of Cagnac must have been getting crowded, but evidently a solution must have been found, for the funerals continued in a steady stream throughout February and early March. They were always held in the late afternoon, when the shadows began to deepen. Larger and larger grew the crowds that saw the good countrymen of Cagnac to their last resting-place. Yet the mourners seemed to bear their grief with singular self-control. One seldom saw anybody weep; yet they were all serious enough in mien.

These were hasty and rather ghastly funerals that took place there in the little graveyard of the village. Frequently they lasted till almost midnight, as in times of plague, or like the funerals of miners in some countries. Strangely enough, few of the mourners left the cemetery by the main gate after the sad ceremonies were over. They just seemed to fade away into the shadows. The priest would get home worn out and pale, a gruesome and diabolical grin on his plump face which, thank the Lord, no one could see. Strangers could find no explanation for these doings.

•

But for the indiscretion of still another traveling salesman—salad oil from pulverized whalebone (made in Germany)—the dead might have continued on their well-beaten course in Cagnac. On March 20, however, a small provincial paper printed a brief story about the mysterious plague that had afflicted the village. The Paris press (made in Germany) picked up the story, and one editorial characterized the epidemic as a scandal.

Many more virtuous women and law-abiding men had been put to rest in the Cagnac graveyard, escorted by crowds of weeping mourners, when one day in April a venerable old professor from the Sorbonne arrived in Cagnac on a mission of inquiry, putting up for a single night in the only available guest room over the little *bistro*—a room he shared with seven spiders and two hundred and twenty-three cockroaches.

The professor arrived on a Wednesday evening by the 7:10 train from Paris. Later that night he was seen successively in earnest conversation, first with the towering Mayor, next with the curé, and finally with the sexton. The next morning, when he hurried from the *bistro* to catch the 8:28 back to Paris, he was accompanied to the little railway station by the whole village, including old men, children, and even the village idiot, for some mysterious reason called Jacques the Soap Eater.

The little train arrived shrilling its whistle, and the famous professor smilingly waved his umbrella from the window. Everyone cheered, Jacques the Soap Eater tossed his old felt hat in the air and the train disappeared around a bend. . . .

Three days later, on Saturday—there had been four more funerals in Cagnac in the meantime—the old professor forwarded a document to the German Occupation Authorities. "A Report on the Plague Now Raging in the Village of Cagnac," ran

the title. It was a long statement, but its chief findings were as follows:

The inquiry extended over a period of more than one week, during which more than two hundred (200) patients and other individuals were examined.

The results point unquestionably to an outbreak of a very rare epidemic disease of a highly contagious character, which I would identify as a curious compound of *Cemeteria eterna major* and *Fraudulosia perniciosa*. Since medical science knows very little about this plague (which, however, seems to have become much more widespread since the war), I have been unable to do more than dispatch to Cagnac a large quantity of medicaments that seem indicated.

In brief, I prescribed that injections should be administered consisting of *trimethylaminopyrazolonesulfate*, combined with 4′ *diaminosulfoazobenzol* and *metanyturecophysostygminobenzol ester*. Of course, I also suggested the use of lozenges of *trickogene*, the well known salt of 2′ *salycylate* of *stygmobenzodythylmalanyturеon*.

I am convinced that this simple treatment will succeed in the swift arrest of this terrible plague, curiously confined to the village of Cagnac.

Pierre François Delarue, M.D.,
Professor at the Sorbonne,
Chevalier of the Legion of Honor,
Member of the French Academy.

At the very hour the venerable professor was dispatching his report, the hulking Mayor of Cagnac, M. Augustin Bernès, was sitting at his desk over an ancient ledger, drawing up a balance sheet. He wrote:

April 16, 1941—This day the 200th funeral was held.

Shipments between the Occupied and Unoccupied Zones made through the cemetery of Cagnac, which lies exactly on the demarcation line, since September 6, 1940:

From the Occupied to the Unoccupied Zone, 2,657 persons, at 100 francs per person	265,700 francs
From the Unoccupied to the Occupied Zone, 1,609 persons, at 50 francs per person....	80,450 francs
246 additional persons wanted by the political police, transported in coffins, at 500 francs per person....	123,000 francs
Total	469,150 francs

Costs:

To Professor Delarue.....	10,000 francs
246 veneer wood coffins.....	2,460 francs
Total	12,460 francs
Clear profit, used for the purchase of two tractors, a new church bell, and a new fire engine for the village.....	456,690 francs

And now, the plague of Cagnac is over.

—Translated by Heinz and Ruth Norden

Labor's Role in the Post-War World

ROUND TABLE No 13

ONE of the great question marks in the consideration of post-war reconstruction is the position and attitude of labor. Are American workers, as individuals, and the American labor movement, as a body, interested in the specific program for world reconstruction, and what measures are they taking to see that their views are represented in the establishment of a future world order? The answer to this general question is eagerly awaited by labor and democratic forces everywhere.

FREE WORLD has therefore called together a group of representative thinkers in the labor field under the chairmanship of Eleanor G. Coit, Director of the American Labor Education Service and of the Summer School for Office Workers, author of "Government Support of Workers' Education," to consider this and other questions concerning labor's attitude. The following participated in the discussion: Paul F. Brissenden, Associate Professor of Economics at Columbia University, author of many books on labor topics, and member of Regional War Labor Board; Len De Caux, Editor of the CIO News and Publicity Director of the Congress of Industrial Organizations; Louis Dolivet, who as Secretary-General of I.P.C. was in close touch with the labor organizations of Europe and who has reported international conferences of the co-operative and trade union movements; J. B. S. Hardman, Editor of Advance, organ of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America and President of the American Labor Press Association; Mark Starr, Educational Director of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union and author of "A Worker Looks at History"; Robert J. Watt, Member of our International Editorial Board and International Representative of the American Federation of Labor, who is chairman of the Labor Advisory Committee of the Board of War Communications; and Theresa Wolfson, Professor of Economics at Brooklyn College, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Summer School for Office Workers, and author of "The Woman Worker and the Trade Unions."

ELEANOR G. COIT—We have submitted to you several questions, the most important of which is, obviously, the one on international affairs. Let us then consider first American labor's interest in world reconstruction, and which aspects of world reconstruction—collective security, political democracy, conversion of industry, social security, and a new League of Nations, etc.—are being considered both by the leaders and the rank and file of the labor movement. Will you open the discussion, Mr. Starr?

MARK STARR—Well, there is no reason to think there is a lack of interest. Take labor's participation in the war and its realization of the issues that are at stake. I should say, although I don't claim to have a complete over-all view, that labor unions in the United States were as much alive, and I think in many instances more alive, to the danger of facism to the community welfare than other sections of the community. Outside of one or two individual exceptions, there is no labor leader of note who has in any way, specifically or by his attitude or by inferences, led anyone to believe that labor was not alive and

awake to the import of what is going on.

When you come to consider what is going to happen after the war, the A. F. of L. Executive Report (I am quite sure the CIO has similar documents) which was probably accepted without any alterations, contains several pages definitely devoted to peace objectives. It states exactly what kind of peace the leaders of the A. F. of L. want. It enthusiastically recommends greater support of the International Labor Office, which, incidentally, was founded very largely under the inspiration of Gompers and which did survive many of the other sections of the League of Nations. The ILO went through, and despite the fact that America later repudiated Wilson, the labor movement never did repudiate the ILO, but always had its participants there.

Therefore, I would say, in reply to your question, that the leadership of the movement is specifically interested in what is going to come out of the peace. I would say that its objectives are more clearly defined in the heads of the leaders than they are among the individual units of the movement. For example, let me quote the A. F. of L. Executive Report. They ask specifically that in all world conferences and agencies, labor shall have representation, equal representation. They talk about the peace treaty—

COIT—May we ask immediately what you would recommend on this demand for equal representation? For example, let's say that a peace conference meets somewhere; how would you see that labor is represented?

STARR—It might range all the way from sending a peace delegation in which labor is officially represented to actual participation on the advisory staff of the Secretary of State or some other government official. Then he would carry along a labor advisor as an integral part of his staff, just as he would carry along somebody nominated to represent business. There would be, as I say, equal representation, either by direct delegation or by sharing in representation in an advisory council. But I would say that both the CIO and A. F. of L. would presume that in the peace settlement the International Labor Office would be given added jurisdiction with a view to establishing better international reg-

ESSENTIAL FINDINGS

1

American labor, conscious of the importance of its task in world reconstruction and of its influence on the international labor movement, is determined to assume all its responsibilities in connection with post-war problems.

2

It will demand adequate representation at the peace table and in the world organization to be created by the peace conference. This demand will be a test of the extent to which democracy has triumphed in this war.

3

The rank and file of labor, as well as its leaders, are increasingly aware of the international implications of domestic problems. They approve the democratic principles and ideals enunciated by the United Nations.

4

A tremendous educational task still remains to be done, however, to awaken the American workers to the need of implementing these idealistic principles and of protecting their own interests as well as the interests of all peoples by the establishment of collective security and of international political and economic democracy.

ulation. You see, here is a concrete point—

J. B. S. HARDMAN—What does "equal" mean? Equal with whom?

STARR—Equal with the representatives of industry.

PAUL F. BRISSENDEN—If I may comment on that, I don't think that "equal" is meant too literally here. My feeling about it has been that it was a word intended to express desire for fair representation. Inasmuch as employer groups and labor groups presumably will not be the only groups which will sit in and participate in the councils of the peace table, I should suppose that it would be difficult to formulate a scheme of representation which might provide equal representation. There would be a question about the criteria of equality, but I would say that the most that could be definitely urged now, anyhow, whatever is meant by the word, would be to ask for fair representation. I think that is what the word means.

LOUIS DOLIVET—What about those sections of the peace conference which do not deal specifically with labor problems? What will be the position and the attitude of labor in considering, for example, the problem of international democracy? I understand that the American labor movement stands for the expansion of the democratic regime as far as possible all over the world.

STARR—Yes, that's right.

DOLIVET—Do you think that the American labor movement stands for collective security, as a system of collective sanctions against whatever aggression occurs?

ROBERT J. WATT—The American Federation of Labor will demand constructive statesmanship in domestic and international affairs as we approach the issue of world relationships. The workers of this nation will have invested too much blood and sweat and tears in the cause of democracy to surrender their victory to outworn systems which produced the rise of a Hitler. In the next two years it will become necessary for our political democracy to establish an economic democracy and create a pattern of economic equity which will prove to the American people the utter necessity of its need and function.

To face that challenge and accomplish the proof is a big task. The very scope of the effort required will test the mettle of statesmanship. I believe that President Roosevelt can and will respond to the challenge with the zeal and resourcefulness which have ranked him already as one of the great American statesmen. It is my belief that President Roosevelt is determined that our economic democracy at home must be the foundation for international peace. I fear we have too often resorted too much to the machinery of politics to accomplish the process, although political machinery is unsuited to economic democracy.

To have economic democracy, the representative machinery of organized labor and industry and agriculture must be given the sanction of law but subjected to but little of the inflexibility of law. To have peace among nations there must be economic equity within and among nations. That was the thesis upon which the workers' representatives at Versailles evolved the philosophy of the International Labor Organization. They were in advance of the times but not ahead of the need. As the political institution of the League of Nations floundered as an outgrowth of the chicanery of international exploitation, emergence of the International Labor Organization was like a rainbow in the distance.

LEN DECAUX—May I say a word on this? I may say that in our convention of the CIO, just concluded, there was revealed a very high degree of interest in international labor affairs, but it was confined primarily to international action to win the war. That, in the votes and speeches and everything else, was the one issue that was discussed. When it comes to post-war problems, the interest is there, but it is much more vague and much less informed.

We have a committee appointed to work with the Labor Department on post-war economic problems, consisting of three CIO leaders. But post-war issues did not come much before the convention. They were still pushed off as something secondary. The other phrases that you mention, like post-war collective security and international democracy, are still rather vague ideas which we support, but on which we do not have a very clearly defined policy as yet. I think there is a great deal more

educational work necessary on those subjects. I think Mr. Willkie is doing some of that education. But from within the labor movement, I have not seen a great deal done along those lines.

Just a word on that matter of equal representation: I think when we say equal representation, we have in mind that we will not be satisfied with a token representation on some advisory committee or something of that classification. We want to be represented directly in such matters as you mentioned, not just in regard to labor affairs or on committees that will be called in for their advice on labor affairs. We should have representation on wider issues than that, on matters which some people may consider do not directly concern labor. And we mean equal representation in the sense of the authority with which our representatives can speak and the attention that will be given to their representations.

THERESA WOLFSON—I cannot speak for American Labor but if I could I should want to speak for a *unified* labor movement. The war has accomplished much in unifying the rank and file of the A. F. of L. and the CIO. There must be even greater unity in terms of the structure, philosophy, and leadership of the labor movement before it can become powerful enough to present a program at the Peace Conference table. American labor has seen that it is capable of producing one hundred billion dollars worth of goods and services during this year, if there is a full utilization of our man-power resources, our factories, and our managerial ability. It will be sure to ask why such production is not possible in an era of peace as well as war.

American labor is interested in world reconstruction. It is true that at the present moment the interest is focused on ten million microcosms—the special needs and desires of each individual worker in his particular community and industry. He wants economic security, economic adequacy, and democratic participation in the economic as well as the political and social institutions of which he is a part. Just as the airplane has brought the world closer together, so can these microcosms spread their horizons to encompass the world. It is a problem of education, power, will.

COIT—I want to ask Mr. DeCaux and Mr. Hardman how far they feel that the education on post-war problems is being carried on in the labor press? Mr. Hardman smiles, since perhaps *Advance* and *Justice* and a few of the other periodicals are now publishing much of the material. I ran through some copies of the labor press before I came over here and I was very much impressed that the subject of post-war planning was in the press in such a way that I should think the whole educational program was well begun. You have a comment, Mr. Hardman?

II

HARDMAN—Has anybody any conception of the kind of international conference that may be held?

DOLIVET—You probably will have after this war, a United Nations Council, or perhaps even during the war, which will comprise representatives of certain governments. Those governments will have a large number of advisers in the labor field. I agree with Mr. Starr that you will have an immense number of experts in the different fields who will have a decided influence on the outcome of the conference.

This conference can be one of the classical peace conferences, in which the defeated peoples will have to pay a certain number of war damages; some frontiers and borders will be changed; and then we will have some formal agreement, for example, like the League of Nations after the Versailles Conference. Then we can expect, in twenty or thirty years, or perhaps sooner, another world war. Or, on the other hand, it may be that this conference will be decisive and will create an international organization with provisions for collective security, for international economic co-operation, which may make war unlikely. In that event, the participation of the American labor movement, its influence on the labor movements of the rest of the world, will be of decisive importance, and its weight on the American Government, on its decisions, will also be very important.

However, the emphasis as far as the A. F. of L. Resolution is concerned, isn't it true, Mark, is on protection of unions and their

Eleanor G. Coit

right to organize in a democratic way? As Mr. DeCaux pointed out, we have not come close to the questions concerning the post-war world in any labor program.

STARR—I don't think anybody in this room would be opposed to thinking in a bold, new way of setting up a world organization. The various mechanics of working that out are something that would have to be left to further study than we can give. I have been anxious to find out to what extent the official groups express a recognition of what has been regarded in the past as the utopian dream, and here is the A. F. of L.'s own official statement, which—after general statements about the necessity for not letting the hatreds and the passions of the war write themselves into the peace treaty—goes on and talks about the administration of the countries and so forth, and then it says: "Proposals to isolate countries, to set up buffer states, balance powers off against each other, belong to the past." In other words, you are not going to have another balance of power treaty.

You have got to see the thing as a whole. "Technical progress which eliminates space also eliminates isolation." And here, they set down the basis of peace, in a general fashion: "The principle that must be basic in that peace is, 'governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.'" Presumably, that would rule out a fascist-dominated state coming into that international organization of nations. "The kind of government which other countries may choose may differ widely from the institutions of the United States, because the genius and character of one nation differs from another. The important thing is that the government shall have the approval of the governed, and that there shall be no type of aggression."

COIT—In addition to broad and more general concepts which should serve as the basis for world organization, is a plan for collective security specifically provided for?

STARR—There is a sentence which might come under that. "There must be a world agency to decide policies in which all the countries are concerned, definite provisions to make decisions effective, and a world court." Now, collective security might come in under that, for a world government is envisaged, and a world court of appeal as a part of your peace set-up.

DOLIVET—You had it after the last war, but it didn't work.

STARR—All right.

BRISSENDEN—Well, Mr. Starr, does that statement of policy imply that the labor movement, at least so far as the A. F. of L. is concerned, is committed to insistence upon democratic rights and paramountcy of the will of the people even in fascist countries, and despite the possible disinclination of those peoples to subscribe to the democratic form of government?

STARR—As far as that statement goes, it does. It does not say how it would be worked out. Maybe they will say, "Well, we will continue pressure for security in a given area," but it certainly sets it down as the final objective. You see, it goes on to state the possibility of regionalism within the world set-up, because it talks about a Pan-American union and co-operation with the United States; it talks about co-opera-

tion with the British Commonwealth, and in parentheses it puts "(not Empire)" which is, again, a healthy sign, in line with its opposition to aggression and domination, because in India and other places, surely, you do not have government by the consent of the governed.

COIT—But, Professor Brissenden, do you know where people have freely voted for a fascist regime or dictatorship?

BRISSENDEN—I don't know, frankly, and perhaps there never has been and perhaps never will be such a people. I confess that I wasn't thinking so much of fascist countries, where I think very possibly plebiscites would go democratic, if free—I mean, if uninterfered with—as I was of a country like India. I have heard it said by Indians that the tradition and the temperament of at least that sector of the Oriental world are not consonant with the democratic form of government; that if it came to plebiscites there, it might be very much questioned as to whether they would go democratic.

What does self-determination of peoples mean? Or, perhaps better, what does the labor movement conceive self-determination of peoples to mean? Does it mean the right of peoples to determine their own form of government, whatever the form may be, even though it might be a benevolent dictatorship, or does it mean the right of all peoples to determine their form of government provided that it is the conventional democratic form?

STARR—Even if you said Yes to that, you would not answer your problem, because you will have to define the territorial scope of what self-determination would be.

COIT—Would not a convention be necessary to determine the attitude of your board on such issues before the international conference?

DECAUX—I don't think there is any question about the fact that American labor, whether in the A. F. of L. or CIO, is very much interested in, if not committed to international arrangements after this war, which you may term international democracy, collective security, or some form of world organization, that will prevent a recurrence of recent events. I think they share that opinion with the rest of the American people. But when it comes to the character of that arrangement, the thinking is still very unclear.

WATT—The responsibility of the workers in the post-war world will not be that of a special group divided from the rest of the community. Their responsibility will be no different from that which every good American should have. The role of labor is distinctive only because the masses of working people have most to gain from the preservation of our free institutions. It is distinctive only because the masses of working people, both now and after the war, must be the first line of democracy's defense, from within as well as without.

It is labor's responsibility not only to make our nation the arsenal of the free peoples of the world but to keep and strengthen the fiber of our own democracy at home. We must continue our effort to make the machinery of government a democratic structure not only in the political but in the economic field. The representative machinery of labor and industry and agriculture must be given the responsibility and authority which is necessary for the preservation of economic freedom.

The sort of post-war world which we must seek cannot be selfish. It must rep-

Paul F. Brissenden

resent the essence of individual well-being within the framework of general welfare. It must dictate that the right of the individual is limited by the needs of the community and that the welfare of the community necessitates the existence of individual rights.

We cannot hope to build a durable and just peace unless we construct machinery to deal with major problems. Law and order must be established upon agreements which derive their sanction from a fundamental acceptance by all parties. International armies will not succeed if they are not sustained by the conviction of the people that they are the agents of justice. The old order has passed. Undiluted nationalism cannot meet the problems of our modern economic world. We must build a representative international agency with police powers and equipment for the maintenance of international peace.

DeCaux—I think that the first step that is really necessary is for labor to clarify its thinking is through some form of international labor unity. At the CIO convention we devoted a great deal of our time to an attempt to bring together the labor movements of all the United Nations through some international conference or some international arrangement. At such a conference this question would be bound to arise and could be threshed out, so that there could be some clarification of attitude between the different labor movements and some general principles agreed upon, because it is not just a matter of what American labor or British labor may want; it is the United Nations' war, and there are the peoples of all these different countries to be considered. Therefore, the first step, it seems to me, is to get together labor internationally to clarify its ideas and to work out some kind of program.

Wolfson—Organized labor will be represented at the peace table if it is unified, articulate, and wants to be there; if it has a blue print of immediate and long-term aims, and if it represents the interests of all of the workers throughout the world in some or all of these aims. Undoubtedly political and military events will shape our destiny. If this is a prolonged war, and the reactionary forces of our country and other countries call the halt; if Russia is bled white, and lies prostrate unable to appear at the Peace Conference with any degree of strength—then it may be that the United States as the youngest and most virile of the capitalist countries—with its industrial capacities still intact and powerful—will dictate the peace terms. These terms, I fear, will have no room for an international program for labor. At this point we can take a page from the last war. The token representation of labor in the ante-antechambers at Zurich does not mean representation or participation in the formulation of a lasting peace.

Dolivet—And would you understand that in this conference, you would have the representatives of the labor unions only? Would you include the co-operative movement?

DeCaux—Specifically, our proposal is for the labor movement, having in mind the trade union movements. I don't know. What do you think, J. B.? In those discussions, would there be any objection to the co-operatives also coming in? I think political representation would be barred as such; I mean, Labor parties and Socialist parties, and the like.

Hardman—I suppose that the resolutions adopted by both the A. F. of L. and the CIO would confine representation to labor unions.

Starr—Well, your ideal arrangement, if you could fix things up, would be if the A. F. of L. and the CIO had a working unity; certainly, if it were an organizational unity, then America would send to the International Federation of Trade Unions its delegation and be represented therein, and the Soviet Union would presumably send their representatives and they would be taken in from their central headquarters. That would be the ideal, if you could get it that way.

DeCaux—As a matter of fact, I haven't even heard that question raised before, because America has relatively few co-operatives and because there isn't any labor political party taken for granted. Usually in America when you speak of the labor movement, you mean the trade union labor movement.

Dolivet—Yes. I raised this question because the most successful congress held on matters of international policy was the

one called by the International Federation of Trade Unions in 1922, at which all the trade unions were represented, and the co-operatives were invited as well as other organizations that stood for international understanding and peace. At that conference, the unions had a decisive, leading role, but the other organizations, outside of labor policy, were in favor of disarmament, in favor of collective security, in favor of a world court acting effectively in all fields of labor organization.

The first thing is to know for which principles the American labor movement stands in international affairs. We started a discussion of that. Then we tried to see how the American labor movement would have a chance to make its voice heard, and in this connection, Mr. DeCaux put up the very interesting problem of international labor unity as being the precise form in which those ideas could be best presented.

DeCaux—When this war started, we didn't try to decide once and for all which one body spoke for American labor. Attempts were made, without success, to secure the organization of labor, but the fact that that was not secured did not hamper a united effort to win the war. The Government itself approached the thing in a broad spirit, calling in all representatives of labor without regard to what movement they belonged or represented, and in that way, a functioning unity was achieved. Well, similarly, in the international field, I think you will have to have the same broad approach of bringing in labor movements of all the United Nations, simply on the grounds that they are all engaged in fighting this war regardless of their ideological differences. The sensible thing to do, when you are allied, is to do just what our governments and our armies are doing—work together and approach the thing in a broad spirit of winning the war and winning the peace.

Coit—I was just going to say that one measure of labor's constructive contribution to reconstruction, to world peace, and so forth, ought to be in terms of labor's contribution to the war.

Dolivet—Yes. First of all, the most important thing to determine is how labor can discuss those problems internationally. Mr. DeCaux suggests that the best thing would be to have a sort of conference of all labor movements for the specific purpose of world organization.

Coit—Well, since the British trade union movement and the trade unions of the USSR have begun that process of co-operating, isn't it an extension of that which may be a perfectly natural step to take?

DeCaux—If it can be accomplished, Miss Coit, it would be ideal. If it runs into too many difficulties, as it has run in the past, it might be better if the initiative came from somebody outside of labor, even, say, President Roosevelt.

Coit—I think Mr. Addes in the *Automobile Worker* not so long ago made that suggestion.

DeCaux—Yes, the suggestion has definitely been made, and I know that plenty of people are interested in it—simply to call together, in a broad spirit of winning the war, the representatives of all organized labor in all countries, to get together and see if they can work anything out.

III

Coit—We have here a very concrete proposal. Mr. DeCaux suggested that President Roosevelt, for example, or some other prominent United Nations leader, should take the initiative in calling for a special conference of labor all over the world, for the specific purpose of defining the ultimate—

DeCaux—I am not referring to the matter of organic unity within the United States or within any other country. I am only referring to the matter of international action on the part of labor, some get-together on the part of labor in all the United Nations, ragardless of their differences, either before or after organic unity may be achieved, and without specific regard to that.

Starr—I don't think you would do any harm and possibly much good might result from such a conference. The difficulty might be that if in any way, various groups had to go in a sort of huddle to decide whether they should or should not participate, it would be a diversion of attention and energy. I don't think they would. If somebody big enough called together the labor groups within the United Nations,

to pool their ideas on how to win the war, they might go on to say, "What will we do with the peace from our angle?" That might arise, but priority "A" would be, of course, winning the war first. I mean, before you make your rabbit pie, catch the rabbit. As I see it, there are at least three jobs. There are more than that, but neither the leadership nor certainly the rank and file of the labor movement have given enough serious thought to the problems that peace will bring. International government—what does it mean? What do you give up in national sovereignty to make this world peace that you want? How do you set up an international police force to make any international decision hold and to keep aggression down? And also, the change in the ideological content of our thinking. Are we citizens of the world or are we citizens of our own locality, let alone of our own nation? In other words, there is a broad stream of educational work, discussion work, pamphleteering, using our movies, all the techniques that you can summon, there.

Len De Caux *J. B. S. Hardman*

We have a tremendous job to do in education, and it is not only educating the leaders but educating the rank and file. We all need to participate in it. One without the other would be no good. If you can get international thinking implemented, it can go ahead in two ways: through such overall groups as the International Labor Office, and through such specialized groups as an expanded, enlarged trade union group, call it the International Federation of Trade Unions, or what have you.

COIT—I should like to supplement Mr. Starr's statement on the educational program. It seems to me that we ought to recognize the fact that the discussion of present practices in terms of price control, control of spending, social insurance, and conversion of wartime industry to peacetime needs is surely a major part of this post-war planning that is our job in education.

WOLFSON—If organized labor has a platform of short-time aims as well as long-time aims, it may not become embroiled in the minutia of the demobilization of the armed forces, and lose sight of the importance of international democracy and collective security. It will know that it must be prepared to fight for both sets of aims. A long dragged out war may result in a returning army of men ready to follow any panacea —a disillusioned army ready to burro into any job that comes along and hide its head from world demands. If organized labor can push for an immediate program of careful planning for industrial and military demobilization—it will also be able to keep its eye on the ball of world economic organization. Then it will have achieved a maturity and fulfillment of its responsibilities.

DECAUX—Miss Coit, I want to throw into consideration a very serious danger in this matter, that explains one of the reasons why in the CIO, for instance, we have not given so much consideration to post-war problems as might have been expected. That is, if at this stage you get into too many discussions of post-war problems, of the character of British imperialism, shall we say, of what kind of Europe there will be after the war, of a lot of other subjects of that character, you may create a lot of dissension among your allies. Instead of having unity and concentration above all

on winning the war, you may get people arguing and concerned and worried and friction arising between all the different political elements you have in this war.

That, I think, is a very serious danger, and I think it can be met by the effort to concentrate primarily on winning the war, and in the course of that effort, establishing a little closer sympathy and understanding between all the peoples and the labor movements involved in this United Nations war effort. When you have met together on something on which you were all in agreement and have established working arrangements on that basis, then you are in a better position to approach the other problems, whereas if the emphasis comes first on the post-war problems, you are in danger of creating friction and trouble. I think that is a very important consideration.

WATT—There are still people who believe that any discussion of post-war aims and plans is premature until the war is won. But when we examine the character of the people who use this argument, we find that it does not merit serious consideration. I can fully appreciate that point of view, particularly among those who opposed our nation's preparing for war and particularly among those who are in large measure responsible for us losing the last peace. However, I'd be willing to agree that there is some merit to that opinion, if I believed for one moment that a discussion of this problem would divert any of our energies from the immediate task of winning the war.

But I see no such consequence. Planning to achieve economic stability does not detract attention or effort from the war to destroy fascism. Instead, I believe that this program is one of the profound intangibles peculiar to a democracy which strengthen the peace-loving peoples of the world in their determination to destroy those who would enslave us. The end of fighting is not the end of responsibility. Peace will not come by winning the war. Victory will prepare the way only if we are ready and understand what must be done.

DOLIVET—Exactly. I think that if you do not prepare now the thinking and the decisions which you probably will have to make, you won't accomplish it after the war, and I am afraid that the end of the war might surprise you and not give you a chance, really, to organize internationally. I agree with you on the danger, but I don't think that the danger is so great, for the following reasons: because we assume now, according to all the reports we have from the underground movements in the various countries, from the British labor movement, from the Chinese people themselves, from everywhere—we assume that on the principles of a democratic world organization there is general agreement now. People are terribly tired of war and tyranny, and I think that there is a chance now—while there is also danger of certain dissensions—to have on the other side such an increase in the war effort by defining fascism and by defining all the positive aspects opposed to it, that in the long run your war effort will gain and not lose through this discussion. Do you agree with this conception, Mr. Starr?

STARR—Yes, I can see that there is a frightful danger that we would just be having pipe dreams about the peace and would forget that it is not yet here. We would thus dodge the ugly present by taking refuge in a Never-Never Land or a land that exists only in wishful thinking. I think that is a tremendous danger and we should always be aware of it. On the other hand, if, even while we are fighting, we do not do thinking and planning, we will find that the other people have done the thinking. I am sure that DeCaux would agree, and I think we all here would agree, that a statement jointly by the A. F. of L. and the CIO or jointly by individual leaders, signed conjointly, let us say, with British trade union leaders, protesting such a statement as that made by Winston Churchill, that "what we have, we are going to hold" sort of thing, and explaining in a dignified way as activists both in the American labor movement and the British labor movement who are actually participating in the war, and not just sort of armchair theorists or perfectionists—if we were to say, "Well, that is not our interpretation of how this war is going to end," I think that would be an educational factor. I think that in many ways it would rally people who now can say, "Oh, oh, the war is for British im-

perialism after all," and cite Mr. Churchill as proof of it.

COIT—Does this agree with your thought, Mr. DeCaux, that the first thing would be, as it already exists, a complete agreement by labor on a hundred per cent all-out effort to win the war. Would you consider it important, also, that we, as a democratic people increase our understanding of the purposes of the war and the future that is to come? Do you think that might offset the dangers?

DECAUX—I certainly wouldn't say that we should not discuss and plan to cope with post-war organization. I think we should, very definitely. The only point I am raising is the question of emphasis, that we should stress, first of all, our unity on winning the war and proceed from that basis, and bring in the post-war problems as following on that primary consideration. I am not barring it out, by any means, but simply calling attention to the danger so that the emphasis should always be placed rather on our immediate task and unity for that purpose, and bringing clarity on the other question out of that agreement as much as we can and as early as we can and as quickly as we can. For there is the gravest danger that if we don't do that, as Mr. Starr says, a lot of reactionary elements will be doing it and we will be caught short at the end of the war.

WATT—If we are to succeed in establishing a peace in a world in which all people will have the right to enjoy political liberty, economic equity, freedom of religion, and the integrity of the free man's home, we must decide now if we are ready to sacrifice old prejudices in the face of the terrible demonstration of their consequence. We must decide if we will play our part in building the post-war world on a firm foundation of decency and progress.

If we have learned that men and women of every nation have the right to decent standards of living, the future offers a world of progress for humanity, and the war shall not have been fought in vain. The men and women of labor—the common men and women of every nation—join with all peace-loving people in sharing the responsibility for the designing of a post-war world in which peace and economic security will destroy the exploitation which causes war. The American Federation of Labor will do its utmost to make that post-war world one worth fighting for.

STARR—Isn't there also a psychological weapon here? I think that if you had such a conference as DeCaux suggested just now, and if it said, "This is the world we are fighting to make come true: we want to smash fascism and all its dangerous philosophies, and these are our hopes," and then that were sent to the occupied countries, it seems to me that it might have the effect of Wilson's Fourteen Points.

HARDMAN—Labor has a job here, the enormousness of which is not appreciated by labor itself. I think that most people have never given thought to what "winning the peace" means. To most people this seems to mean, "Let's not make the failure we made last time," but still they do not know what failure we made except that war came about again.

The leaders of labor in this country are primarily acting as representatives of organizations rather than representatives of a movement. They think more concretely and more clearly in terms of what will benefit their respective organizations than what may do good for the general movement. Not that they do not care for the fate of the movement, but they are primarily concerned with the fate of their organizations, and therefore they think piecemeal rather than whole.

We are in the war all right but not everybody seems to realize it fully. We are going to be much more in the war, and somebody will know it before long. Only then will formulation of basic policies begin. The American labor movement hates to think theoretically. Theory, that is, generalized experience, is considered taboo. But somehow or other, we will have to draw a picture of what kind of world we really want, without flying up into the clouds, of course—standing on firm ground and yet thinking ahead. If the International Federation of Trade Unions or any other organization is willing to work it out, well and good. If not, some other organization will have to do it.

There is value in Mr. DeCaux's idea that at some point, some outstanding personality, like President Roosevelt, should take the initiative and say, "Let's clear the

decks! Come on, let's talk of tomorrow in terms of tomorrow rather than talk of tomorrow in terms of the day before yesterday." The outcome will depend upon whether the people in the respective units of labor are prepared for it. If they are not, Mr. Roosevelt will make a beautiful speech, as he always does, and leave it to the boys to fight it out, and the boys will pay their respects to Mr. Roosevelt and continue doing business in the old way.

That brings us to the educational job, which has got to be a dynamic job, an explosive job, a job which will in effect appeal to Messrs. Murray, Green, and others: "Look, you are president of a union or a federation. You say you are primarily concerned with their special interests as organizations. But this is a time of changing the face of the earth, and therefore your organization should not be your basic and only concern. Can we have labor unity and action to suit the needs of this crisis?" The central point is not to secure a maximum of unity. I don't think that the abstract principle of unity is sacrosanct, it is the operation of unity that matters, the operation of the principle toward the need of achieving the results sought. Let a workable unity be sought, not an abstract, unattainable maximum.

The people in the labor movement have given genuine thought to winning the war in so far as the production effort and all that goes with it is concerned. But it is important to impress upon the mind of labor the idea that in the war and in the peace to follow not only is the union at stake, but we ourselves, all of us, our hopes and ideas, are at stake.

BRISSENDEN—That is perfectly true, Mr. Hardman, but what is the end to which unions, presumably, are the means? I suppose it is something like Mr. Wallace's right to "drink a quart of milk every day" —steady jobs and health and decent incomes for all workers. Labor's interest in the war and the peace, I should think, must be to finish the one and establish the other in such a way as to bring the world's workers —or, if you like, the world's peoples— measurably nearer to that end. Everything else: vested union and other institutional interests, claims of empire, the white man's burden, all these ought to go into the discard. The labor unions, if they are conscious of themselves as instruments for forging the good life, will sink their rivalries and concentrate all their energies upon the business of spelling out war and means for assuring to the peoples of the world full employment and full production.



Mark Starr

WOLFSON—Organized labor may not feel that it has a responsibility for providing a pint of milk for the Hottentot child when the land of the Hottentots is nothing but a pink blob on the map. But when a postwar world brings with it the industrial development of "backward" nations and the possible competition of the Hottentot, then the American worker must erect another Chinese wall of tariff—which will lead but to another wall—*or* he must insist on the pint of milk for the Hottentot in order to preserve his own standards.

DECAUX—Mr. Starr mentioned President Wilson's Fourteen Points, and I can remember very well the tremendous enthusiasm created at the end of the last war that here from America was a new power coming to bring international amity and agreement and so forth, and the general applause with which those points were greeted by all progressive elements in Europe. And then I can remember, too, the terrific disillu-

sionment that followed when the peace table became a scramble between rival imperialisms, and we had the kind of hard-boiled peace that we did have. I think that in this war, for instance, we have had many very splendid statements. We have had Wallace's the Century of the Common Man speech; we have had the Atlantic Charter. We have had fairly good statements of war aims, but accompanying them we have had a lot of skepticism about whether this is just plain talk, and the skepticism has been accentuated by Winston Churchill's recent remark to which Mark Starr referred.

It is in reference to this that labor has a very important duty to perform. I think the only guarantee that a lot of these fine statements of war aims are going to be more than pieces of paper is the pressure that will come from the organized labor movements in the different countries. In the last war, as you remember, the Second International, with its professions of internationalism, broke down, with each section supporting its particular government. If in this war we can develop some international labor unity, through the educational work of which Mr. Hardman has spoken in each country, and make the labor movement in every country much more alert, a little better organized internationally, we shall then have the pressure of tens of millions of plain working people brought to bear on their respective governments, to make sure that these expressions of war aims are not just pious expressions without content or practical result.

DOLIVET—I think, Mr. DeCaux, even if we do have very clear statements, but if we don't organize the peace and we don't win the peace, the disillusionment after this war will be exactly the same. I mean, the statements are not a danger in themselves, but the real danger is in disillusionment. I don't see any real difference between disillusionment without statements or disillusionment with statements.

The real problem is that you have in Europe three hundred million people under the Hitler regime. They are the counterpart of fifteen to twenty thousand military divisions. Now, I think that despite the success in Africa, the problem of invading Europe will be an extremely tough problem from a military point of view, and much will depend on America's capacity to convince the peoples of Europe that it is worth while risking again their lives for an organized resistance in order to help the Allied armies much more actively than they would do. Naturally, they would help anyhow, since they are opposed to fascism —it is so terrible that everybody is opposed to it. But, you see, there are degrees of resistance, and this positive resistance, this extremely active resistance that we need, can come only through a positive belief that this time the United Nations and the United States in particular are determined to build a world organization which will not have the weakness of the last. Your first problem is collective security.

I received a letter from a friend in England who is one of the leaders of the labor movement, and he said that now, the prospects for future support of collective security in England are less good than they were one year ago, because now they are no longer convinced that America will really participate in an international organization. They are convinced that America will fully participate in winning the war, but they are not convinced of the rest. They say, "Where is the proof? What proofs can you give that America has really decided this time to participate fully?" That has repercussions. Each country looks to the other and says, "The others are not doing anything."

Therefore, I would agree with Mr. Hardman that the educational job is most important in some of these specific aspects. I think Mr. Starr made a very good résumé of them, of the specific questions. The first and most important problem that you have to answer is: Is American labor going to be enlightened enough to stand for full participation of the United States in an international police force with all that involves in the way of responsibilities as well as of rights? Let me illustrate this by a hypothetical example. There is every likelihood that after this war, a war will break out between Rumania and Hungary. If a world court legally decided that such a war is a matter of international concern and that the international police force must intervene to bring this war to an end

and to see that the sanctions of international law are applied to these countries, will American participation in such an international police force uphold the legal decisions of the World Court, even though it is not directly threatened by such a war?

The second question is: Is the American labor movement determined to help, to impress upon the Government of the United States that people must not be abandoned in their fight against their own fascist dictatorships? I attach an immense importance to teaching people, first of all, to fight against their dictators. Of course, they are the first ones to have to do the job, but sometimes they cannot do it without international help. I will give you an example.

Dictatorships grew up inside many central European countries like Poland, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, which had been created by the Allies, after the first World War. These dictatorships were frequently backed by immense financial support from outside. The peoples of these countries were absolutely powerless to do anything about it. In Poland, for instance, you had Colonel Beck in power up to 1940. He represented a fascist regime that was a very clear violation of the rules of democracy, of the promises the Polish Government had made in becoming a member of the League of Nations, but the League was organized in such a way that it could do nothing about it. No one seemed to be able to help the people of Poland.

These are vital points in what must be clarified if the American labor movement is to understand just what is expected of it. All other things will follow. I agree with Miss Coit on the importance of defending democratic rights on the home front; but that is what we did in France; that is what we did in every country. We defended them so well that if we had said, in 1936, to the one million people who were marching in the streets of Paris and to the other six million marching in all the other cities, that three years later all of them or all of their leaders would be in concentration camps or dead or tortured, they would just have laughed. That is precisely because we limited our activities to the defense of our home front, which is very important, and we didn't see that we lost democracy in all those countries.

COIT—I did not think of it as a method of isolating ourselves. I thought of it because it is important to practice the kind of thing you are trying to work out and get the spirit of the kind of thing that you want. That must go on in countries where it is still possible, in order to contribute to the whole. That was my idea.

WATT—That is why labor believes the Atlantic Charter can mean only one kind of action—the building of economic equity in all areas of the world. Labor has learned that there can be no barrier which is adequate to safeguard standards of decent living against human beings who are producing goods under serf-like conditions. Labor knows that there is a brotherhood of man. It may be partly hidden in normal times by the veneer of superficial rivalries, but when bombs burst, the veneer cracks off, men and women find their common humanity is a tie which binds civilized people and enables them to find the unity which is needed to beat back and overthrow the foe.

WOLFSON—Organized labor has a stake in the post-war world. Like many other organized groups it has established post-war planning groups to study the role of labor in the post-war world. This is indeed a step forward, since labor up to the present time has thrown itself into the prosecution of the war, and the production of goods for the war, with such vigor and singleness of purpose, that the labor press would hardly brook discussion of the future—lest it divert the minds of the rank and file from the immediate job of winning the war! Organized labor seems to have learned a few things from the war: that the American worker cannot have prosperity or security while the rest of the world is starving or insecure; that the American trade unions cannot be free while the trade unions of the rest of the world are enslaved or in concentration camps; that America cannot be at peace while the rest of the world is at war!

HARDMAN—Wouldn't you think it advisable that there be created some kind of lay organization of people who are related to the labor field, but who do not necessarily hold office, competent people to constitute a commission to examine the organization and the details of peace from the

Theresa Wolfson

viewpoint of labor as a whole? Wouldn't such an effort eventually cause formal representatives of labor to say, "Well, this has got to be done."

The American people will have to pay the cost of a real peace and, of course, of the transition period. If temporary governments in a lot of countries will have to be maintained over a long time, that will cost a good deal. Well, I wonder whether steel workers, or miners, or clothing workers will be enthusiastic about paying taxes because we have got to support the Jugoslavs' national aspirations or support democracy in China. These things are important. A world of education is needed here. A study of these problems by people who are free from formal responsibility to organizations, who are completely dedicated to essential world objectives, the objectives of labor, is part of the educational job now needed. Such educational work is not being done by educational departments. A new effort is in order.

DeCaux—Of course, you are getting into a rather debatable field there, J. B. If they are not going to be representatives of organizations, well, they are not going to carry the weight of authority that they might otherwise carry. I wanted to pick up Miss Coit's point in relation to what Mr. Dolivet said. I think that is a very basic, important thing. I am thinking particularly of an issue like the poll tax in this country. Mr. Dolivet mentioned the doubts in other countries as to whether America will really stick after the war or return to isolationism, and so forth. Well, one of the guarantees of our good faith is how we behave within our own country; how do we treat the Negro people? Is democracy really functioning here? The same applies to the British labor movement. I think it has a tremendous international duty at the present time to separate itself publicly and actively from the point of view of Tory imperialism, and make very clear that the British labor movement subscribes genuinely to documents like the Atlantic Charter, and it is not going to allow them to be distorted to further imperialistic aims, because in this country, of course, there are very strong isolationist elements. They are simply keeping quiet at the present time, but as the war draws to a close, you are going to have an attempt to return to political normalcy and a political movement of some character saying, "Well, we were dragged into this war, and now let's get out of it and keep out and let every country look after itself. We can't take responsibility for the whole world," and so forth.

Well, I don't know whether there won't be in labor certain elements that will share that point of view. I think it is an issue that is going to have to be fought out within the labor movement. I know quite a number of labor leaders who take this attitude: that this is a national war we are fighting solely because America has been attacked and that is our only concern in it; all these issues of fascism and so on are so much hog wash with which we don't have to concern ourselves much. There is a big educational job that has to be done by those who want to see the kind of postwar organization that we have spoken of here.

Wolfson—All of our thinking has been affected by too many memories of the past and not enough vision for the future. We remember the fiasco of the last peace table but we do not seem to have the courage to strike out boldly in the plans for the next one. Organized labor as representative

of the majority of the articulate workers wants economic security, economic adequacy, and democratic participation in the reorganization of their world and their industry. Will an international federation of unions the world over be the avenue through which these wants will be realized? Will a world federation of political states be the answer? Those are but a few of the questions that a unified labor movement must answer for itself.

IV

DOLIVET—I think that this discussion shows the magnitude of this educational job to be done. There is one issue which I would like to bring into the discussion before we adjourn, and that is about the labor representation in the technical secretariat and in the political leadership of the United Nations. If you have some kind of international organization, you probably will have at least ten thousand members of an international world staff, in the political departments of the United Nations, in the economic departments, and in the various sections, and so on. How is labor going to be represented there? That is of extreme importance.

In the League of Nations, the secretariat of some two thousand persons was composed of many reactionary elements, nominated by their Governments, who went in, not as internationally-minded individuals, but as representatives of their own state departments. Everyone was thinking of what his state department was thinking about him, instead of thinking what the people of the world were thinking about him.

Here you have a very concrete aspect. The United Nations will have to build their machinery. They have already started it on a small scale, but it will become much larger as soon as military prospects for the United Nations become better. Don't you think that labor should prepare specialists in the various fields of economic organizations for the protection of labor's rights and everything else, for this international administration? There will be a question of power, for instance, and what kind of loyalties exist there.

STARR—If you want representation by labor, you will have to do it not so much by men who have been voted by popular acclaim but by those who have been technically prepared. The research activities of the various organizations, both centrally and through their individual unions, are only in their inception, but I think that it would be fair to say that labor is using training, preparing more brains than hitherto, and out of that research staff, out of the people who are assisting labor in the various countries, I think you would be able to draw on particular individuals who would have the big point of view.

COIT—Both political and technical training, you would say?

STARR—Yes, I think so.

COIT—Would you give a figure of what you estimate or what American labor proposes as the number of candidates for such international functions?

STARR—No, but at the present time there are very few universities that do not have at least two or three people in whom labor could trust, even if they were not actually paid executives on the staff. You take all the people that have been developed under the National Labor Relations Board—law-

Robert J. Watt

yers, statisticians, research people. They may not be equal to the task and, of course, I would be all in favor of giving them more training and help, but there is the potentiality there. If the people of the United States wanted to participate in an international government, I don't think lack of technical skill would be the obstacle.

COIT—The whole program at the present time is contingent on that. Does everybody agree to that?

DECAUX—Yes; I think when you speak of labor representation in government or internationally or in any other way, the elected official will be the representative, and he will have technical experts from his own organization or drawn from outside to implement the general policy of his organization. I don't think, as Mr. Starr said, that there is any lack of such expert people within labor or associated closely with it.

DECAUX—Yes. I think when you speak experience which is operating. For example, when the People's Front took over the power in France, one of the biggest problems of the new Government was that it did not find in the ranks of labor trained people to take over the different essential jobs.

STARR—Well, I think the difference between the older countries like England and France would be that your Civil Service technical group had settled down, was much more stratified than here. I think there is a greater interchange of status and personnel between government departments and outside groups. The Civil Service is not such a lifelong career or profession. You can jump the barriers a little easier.

HARDMAN—I have this thought in mind. We stand a better chance of developing an advanced attitude toward the solution of the problem if not labor alone takes part in the effort. Let us not overlook the progressive forces outside the labor field. The people surrounding Roosevelt in the formative stages of the New Deal demonstrated the fact that labor has no monopoly on intelligence. A group selected, at that time, from American labor ranks would have done worse. Sure, labor's grown since that time.

STARR—My suggestion is that the universities should call for the people who are sympathetic in their general attitude.

COIT—Isn't it true that the CIO, as well as the A. F. of L., in the several years of its experience, has used people from all kinds of professions and technical groups?

HARDMAN—Yes. To the extent that labor makes substantial intellectual advance it attracts to itself a group likewise advanced. I have no doubt about the ability of labor to cope with the problem but I am afraid of the particular "organizational" approach of labor, which is primarily a narrow "shop" approach. This is far less than the national view that is required by the present emergency.

DOLIVET—Mr. Hardman, I think you are obliged to count primarily on the force and the position of labor as a whole, if you want those liberal groups really to stick to their jobs. You know, liberals are splendid for two or three years, but your big danger is, if you do not have labor strongly educated in the international field, that many of these people have their feet in two camps. They are committed to labor, and at the same time, they are committed to their professional skill.

WATT—Labor unions must become—for the safety of our political democracy and our free institutions—the established representatives of wage earners. This is one of the objectives of the American Federation of Labor in a post-war world. Labor believes now is the time for all war agencies effecting economic affairs to establish real policy committees with responsible representatives designated by their respective organizations.

American workers are fighting because they are determined to be free during and after the war, however much they must delegate authority now. It is a tremendous task they face, but the stakes for which they fight are even higher. They must fight against foes who seek to enslave them. They must be vigilant in their fight for victory lest they surrender themselves into economic slavery from within. The manner in which they have responded to the defense of international decency and to secure the acquisition of the Four Freedoms for all the world proves that American labor is not blind to the spiritual significance of the war nor is it negligent of the future.

WHAT the British Think about AMERICA

by

Chester S. Williams

HITLER wants to confuse and divide Britain and America. He knows that the two Governments are linked together by unbreakable bonds of realistic policy. He knows he cannot fool President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. They understood his tactics long before his invasion of Poland. But these men are leaders of democracies. Their decisions and strategy are necessarily weighted by the opinion and feelings of the masses of people. The two Governments can only strike effectively when the two peoples are united in their support of the common strategy.

Hitler and his Axis partners know this. Therefore, they aim their propaganda at existing popular attitudes, prejudices, fears, and distrust as they find these makings of dissension in the public mind of Britain and America. Because the Governments are geting on so harmoniously, some leaders in both countries seem to discount the potential influences for disruption down at the grass roots. Hitler is no doubt hoping that these leaders will do nothing effective to counter his campaign with the masses. For he knows that the best plans of governments can be garbled and frustrated if enough popular dissension can be whipped up at the right moment.

American attitudes toward Britain which can be exploited to weaken the striking power of these two partners have come in for a good deal of discussion. But so far little has been written about British attitudes toward the United States. Many people seem to assume that no unfavorable attitudes get living space in British heads. This is partly due to the superiority complex of Americans. They cannot conceive of anybody, least of all the British, not liking everything American. Yet, if we can afford the low-brow luxury of anti-British sentiments at a time when America's future depends on a United Nations' victory, why shouldn't the British reciprocate with a little anti-American feeling? Or are they supposed to be smarter and to be able to see their own self-interest more clearly than we do?

Fortunately, British attitudes are not "anti-American," either in kind or intensity. But there is a good deal of ignorance, prejudice, and latent antagonism lying around loose in Britain which could be poked up and ignited if events handed Hitler an issue. In any case, both favorable and unfavorable attitudes in Britain ought to be understood if something positive is to be done jointly by American and British leadership to stop the "divide and conquer" campaign in its tracks. Even a little success for this strategy is dangerous to our cause.

What influences contribute toward British attitudes and what are these attitudes and prejudices really like?

Hollywood movies create the picture of American life that most Britons carry around in their heads. Attitudes, favorable and unfavorable, are based to a considerable degree on the movie version of "our way of life." The impressions they get from many films sum up about like this: cities ruled by gangsters, general lawlessness, pampered and aimless women-folk, divorce on the flip of a coin, individualism and free enterprise equal the right of the strong to satisfy their greed at the expense of the nation, cheap Babbitts of a moneyed aristocracy, riotous waste of men and materials, even the serious business of war presented as a field day for the stunt artists and publicity seekers.

I saw a picture in a newsreel cinema in London showing Miami bathing beauties going through drills for coastal defense—an obvious publicity stunt originally designed to lure tourists to the Florida playground. Imagine the reaction of a British factory girl whose husband stands guard before the White Cliffs of Dover! Another picture which shows how America is rolling up its sleeves and wading into the war for all it is worth portrays wealthy "playboys" being intrigued into buying War Bonds by chorus girls. Some such stunt as stripping a girl of her War Bond costume demonstrates to the British that we can combine the war effort with cultural interests.

But now turn the coin over and see the other side of the Hollywood medium of exchange. "Is 'Grapes of Wrath' a true picture?" That is a frequent question. The movie made a striking impression on British minds. It stood in bleak contrast to the satin softness of the penthouse pictures. The apparent lawlessness and brutality of the police and vigilantes shocked the British. But they feel that there must be something in between the beaten-down, hopeless Joads and the vapid ladies and gentlemen, dashing about in sleek motor cars and chasing each other from one ornate bedroom to another. Good or bad, true or false, the movies interpret America more vividly than the press, radio, or any other influence with the possible exception of the arriving American soldiers and airmen. The impressions created by Hollywood cannot be corrected or overcome by the speeches of Roosevelt or the good work of Ambassador Winant.

It would be naïve to expect the moving pictures to present the humdrum existence of the average American. Drama is not made of such stuff; nor would the British public pay its good money to see such films if they were made. However, it is possible to show pictures of America that contain both drama and the essence of truth. This type of film is needed as much in the United States as in England.

Books constitute another source of information. The British are especially familiar with our debunking novels. Sinclair Lewis, Upton Sinclair, Theodore Dreiser, and John Steinbeck—the realists who deal with "what's wrong with America" are the chief literary interpreters. But the limited reading public also knows Mark Twain, O. Henry, and Jack London. The point is that books like movies instead of giving a balanced picture of America have introduced distortions. But books are of minor influence in affecting British attitudes now. The acute paper shortage makes publication of American books in Britain most difficult and the shipping shortage makes direct transport of bound books well-nigh impossible. The National Central Library, with its superb methods for circulating books throughout the British Isles, is prepared to buy $100,000 worth of American books. This demonstrates an eagerness to provide a balanced literary diet on the United States, but the scheme may hit the snag of transport.

The British press—newspapers and magazines—offer another medium for influencing attitudes. Due to the paper shortage, there is little space for general and human interest news about the U.S.A. The daily and weekly papers are held down to four or six page editions. The limited space naturally goes to the people who are doing the toughest fighting. Press relations people are not needed to get stories of American war achievements into the British papers. They are needed to help the British get a true perspective on stories about labor, social legislation, and politics—stories which are so often slanted and garbled by the American press.

Because the British press has reflected the distortions in the American press, the casual readers have a very confused picture of the New Deal—at best a very sketchy impression. Hence, when our leaders speak of a "New Deal for mankind," there is little in British heads to respond intelligently. Nine out of ten people I queried about old age and unemployment insurance to see what they knew about American progress in this field were quite sure we made no provisions at all for the aged and unemployed. A good example of the role of the British Press, reflecting the American news slant, is the handling of the 40-hour week controversy. People were given the impression in Britain—as they were in the United States—that labor was refusing to work more than 40 hours per week. They were not told that American labor was actually working 45 to 55 hours per week—willing to work long hours—and were merely trying to retain what British workers have, namely, time-and-a-half pay for overtime after a basic 40-hour week. To British workers the "slanted stories" made it appear that American labor was not willing "to play the game." And this impression was hardly designed to cement a comradeship of the common people. Lord Haw-Haw, the nazi broadcaster, made the most of this misrepresentation.

A good press service in London would help the short-handed British papers to get their stories straight, but it should not be expected to play a major role in correcting false images of our country. The press is simply too restricted in scope to carry much of this load. It would help if capable American commentators and news analysts could become guest writers for British periodicals as British writers are regular contributors to American magazines of opinion. That would do more good than any number of news releases and handouts.

Radio is still another builder of attitudes in Britain. The British Broadcasting Corporation does feature an American commentary after the 9 P. M. news occasionally. Raymond Gram Swing is the most popular radio voice; Dorothy Thompson and Edward Murrow also have large British audiences. Special dramatic programs about American history, spot interviews with the American troops, and general news are gaining steadily on the B.B.C. schedule. One has just been added, called "Answering You"—a sort of "Information Please" prepared by the Office of War Information. Short-wave to Britain is practically useless as a means of telling our story. However, if popular British broadcasters would do regular commentaries from U.S.A., as our reporters do from London, the radio as a means for enlightenment about our country would loom more important.

II

BESIDES the influence of movies, books, press, and radio, British attitudes are affected by firsthand contacts between Britons and Americans. About 39 per cent of all classes reported in a recent survey that they knew *some* Americans personally. In many cases this meant relatives in America. Six per cent claimed they had visited America. The small upper class counted 17 per cent of its number as visitors. This leaven within the loaf of British society has helped to make people skeptical about the pictures of America drawn by movies, books, and press. Yet, the tourists contribute little toward drawing a positive and balanced picture. They do not ordinarily return from their trips abroad and set forth on speaking tours to share their views with their fellow countrymen. Many people from the working classes who returned to Britain were not very successful or happy in America—else they would have stayed. The people who did stay would do a better job of interpreting us.

Perhaps the best American "propaganda" in Britain is the wordless kind—humanitarian action. Opening American homes to British children, entertaining RAF and navy men, and "Bundles for Britain" have done more to put a crimp in Herr Goebbels' campaign on the "Uncle Sam Shylock" theme than any words or pictures ever could. Clothes from America for the victims of nazi bombing are veritable shields against the "divide and conquer" strategy. Hundreds of thousands of people know from personal experience that America cares. That has holding power in a crisis.

There is yet another way by which firsthand contacts can be built into understanding attitudes. American speakers have been

going directly to British audiences. American interpreters are appearing before groups and audiences of all types. This is a rather new approach. The lecture "business" as developed in the United States had no counterpart in Britain before the war. But now people are gathering in auditoriums, theaters, Guild Halls, factory canteens, army barracks, and libraries to hear lectures, ask questions, and talk up in discussion. They are meeting leading personalities from Poland, Fighting France, Norway, Greece, Jugoslavia, China, Soviet Russia, and the United States. Popular British speakers have been sent to the U.S.A., Soviet Russia, and China to bring back firsthand pictures of these countries at war. Sometimes short documentary films are shown at these lecture meetings—films about various United Nations. Our films are poor by comparison, usually showing "what's wrong with America." One wonders after watching an American documentary film showing denuded forests, dust belts, floods, and general havoc why the British audience should not believe nazi propaganda which tells them that America cannot get going. It is a curious thing that the nation with the greatest technical skill in making films cannot seem to tell the simple truth about itself to foreign allies by this medium. Speakers who follow the films now available have two strikes against them at the start.

The last and most important influence on British attitudes toward America is the American soldier. Much of the prejudice and distrust of today is traceable to the failure to achieve a comradeship in arms in 1917-18. The British and American soldiers simply did not get on well. They were not prepared to understand each other. But then there was plenty of room for snobbishness, prejudice, and misunderstanding. The enemy was already gagging as the cord of the British blockade tightened about his throat. He did not understand what to do with prejudice as Hitler understands so well. Today nothing is more important than a true comradeship in arms. That is even more important than technical training; for men with the "know how" can be crippled in the use of it by prejudice and bad blood. The whole purpose of winning the war is at stake too. Comradeship in arms lies at the very foundation of the United Nations concept of a future world of freedom.

The most serious obstacle to be overcome is the pay differential between American and British soldiers. It is much greater than in 1917. American soldiers are getting roughly five times as much money as their British comrades. That puts a dangerous gulf between the boys. It is bound to create bad feelings if something practical is not done about it. The natural generosity of the American soldier is likely to be interpreted as "lording it over" his low-paid British comrades. And it is likely that the gravitation of girls to American purchasing power will increase that irritation. Already instances have occurred of people leaving their pubs when a bunch of Americans enter. This is at once considered by the Yanks an exhibit of British aloofness. And so the natural interplay of psychological forces—the rankling feeling of inferiority and the subtle feeling of superiority—offers a ready weapon to the enemy.

Moreover, in a strictly rationed country the sudden increase of money in the market place either forces more goods on to the ration lists or threatens uncontrolled inflation. This is something that boys from the cornucopian environment cannot readily understand. Will they understand how housewives feel when there is a run on unrationed goods accompanied by exhibitions of American habits of waste?

Racial prejudice is another source of misunderstanding. Having practically no race problem in the British Isles (this is left to the Colonial Office), the British people have little race prejudice. When Americans attempt to apply Jim Crow methods —white soldiers turning colored soldiers out of public places—the British hosts are resentful. When the colored person involved happens to be a West Indian or a Moslem or a native prince, the issue is more than academic. It takes only a little glib talk about British rule in India after that to translate tempers into bitter wrangles — even fights. Besides, all this strengthens the propaganda arm of the Japs who are desperately trying to turn this into a race war.

This question is very important: Are we going to win on the soldier friendship

front? If we lose on this front, no amount of diplomacy or heady public relations can rescue us from a dangerous position.

III

WHATEVER is done by movies, books, press, radio, personal contacts, speakers, or American soldiers to counteract the Axis effort to exploit prejudice, we must take into account what the British attitudes are now. What they *like* and *dislike* about us has been revealed in a recent survey.

They like:

—the resourceful, efficient, go-ahead character of our country;
—our free and easy, direct personal approach;
—our relative absence of class distinctions;
—our contributions to the common struggle;
—the way we enjoy ourselves, our capacity for having fun;
—our way of building houses, hotels, and conveniences;
—our climate and expanse of countryside;
—our films, though this is also in the *dislike* list);
—our educational system and its offer of opportunities;
—our President.

They dislike: (or, as they put it, "like less well")

—our tendency to brag, our cocksureness;
—gangsters, graft, police corruption;
—our money emphasis, competitiveness, monopolies;
—our way of speaking the King's English;
—our unpreparedness and isolationism;
—our lack of social legislation or unemployment insurance;
—our jazz and films;
—our mixture of nationalities;
—our easy divorce;
—our attitude toward race problems and treatment of Negroes.

This listing of favorable and unfavorable attitudes is not given with the notion that we should mend our ways to please British tastes. We have got to be ourselves. We will go on speaking the King's English with a Southern drawl or a Western twang. And we'll reserve the right to dislike the affected accents of some Englishmen or to prefer the Scotch or Welch coloring of the spoken language. We will go on being the great exhibit of how people of mixed nationalities, religions, and races can live peacefully and productively together. We will have as much social legislation—and the kind—as we decide through democratic processes best suit our needs and wishes. And we'll dance to swing music and flock to gangster thrillers.

But we owe it to ourselves to make these peculiarities of ours understood if not appreciated. Few British people, for example, have stopped to think why it was that we brought up the rear of the procession on social and labor legislation. They think it is because we are backward. They do not realize that we have had two kinds of labor bargaining and social insurance in our brief history—the frontier and that provided by latter-day legislation. Until the turn of the century, the employer had to set wages and conditions in conference with a silent but powerful competitor—free land, cheap land, the frontier. Likewise, old age insurance consisted of the place by the farm family fireside and old people's work to do. Explaining ourselves and "how we got this way" is part of a positive program to frustrate the Axis strategy. Playing down the caricature of ourselves is another.

IV

PEARL HARBOR surprised and shocked the average British subject. He gasped at the apparent unpreparedness and inefficiency of his "American cousins." "Are the Soviets the only ones who know how to fight this war?" he lamented. "Can't America even look out for herself against a weak adversary in the Pacific?" For this British fellow thought as we did that Japs who failed to crush China could not stand up to a first-class power more than sixty days.

At first blush this reaction appeared to be antagonistic and pessimistic. Not so. It was the beginning of a new comradeship. The little people could feel that the "cocksure Americans" miscalculated too and would have to improvise and "muddle through," even as the much maligned British. Pearl Harbor put us on a common ground. From that point on we could fight together, they hoped, in humble recog-

nition of our shared shortcomings. At least we were in the fight together. Still, the newspaper readers were perplexed by the cautious handling of Fifth Columnists, Bundists, and native Fascists.

Two months after America was "pushed into the war," only 55 per cent of the British felt that the American war effort was up to capacity. They were asking, "Where is all this output promised by the statistics?"

While the British were outraged by the fall of Singapore and other reverses of their arms, they resented deeply the criticism and anti-British sentiments expressed in the U. S. A.—reported to them by a sensitive press. The same applies to the Libyan disaster. They felt, however, that American performance did not warrant a superiority attitude. Moreover, the story on all fronts might have been different if America had delivered the goods to the actual battle-fronts from its arsenal of democracy.

American criticism which sometimes indicted the whole British people—the fighting qualities of the soldiers and the work of the common people—was profoundly resented. Their own railings against the Government for failing to weed out incompetent officials and to elevate men of boldness and imagination to positions of leadership is considered in a different category. They expect Americans to prune their own orchards. Yet, at bottom there is a feeling that British-American collaboration, based on a common democratic heritage, is the only hope of some degree of personal liberty in the post-war world. One survey showed that 93 per cent were in favor of co-operating with the U. S. A. after the war. What this means is still a little vague. There is some cynicism about such pronouncements as the Atlantic Charter and the ideal of a "new deal for mankind." The British wonder whether the Americans really mean to take responsibility and "play the game." They can still hear the hopeful Wilsonian phrases ringing through the world.

Most Britons give evidence of being cured of the "empire complex." The Victorian age is over. The British realize that and are ready for the next step. They want to take that step as equals with their partners of the United Nations. But they wonder whether the powerful vested interests, monopolies, and big business on both sides of the Atlantic—particularly in America—will permit a realistic effort to build a kindlier world order. A few British diehards are disturbed by pronouncements of American leaders on the people's war and the people's century. But many who call themselves conservatives welcome these conceptions, believing that the new world must put new emphasis on equality of opportunity and social welfare.

Breathless conceptions like the Four Freedoms must be brought down to earth if they are to inspire British confidence. They look closely to see whether these high principles dominate war planning. Their testing formula is found in the phrase, "equality of sacrifice." They believe that this equality is a reality in Russia, but only partly achieved in Britain. America seems to be too tolerant of "racketeering-as-usual." While the British have great respect for the Russians and profound interest in certain social ideals in the Soviet Union, they are not in any sense pro-communist. The very idea of communal living violates the British character. They are as individualistic as any people on earth. Their fondest dreams picture a cottage and a garden neatly fenced in. Socialism seems to be conceived as a mixture of "go-ahead enterprise" and "don't bite off more than you can chew" control.

In a people's war the common people must understand one another. And so the overwhelming British wish is for a true picture of the ordinary man. How he lives. How he feels about things. What he does with his holidays and week-ends. What the Four Freedoms mean in his daily life. The British have seen enough of the side-shows—the gangsters, butter-and-egg men, "playboys" and cowboys, Joads and "Dead End Kids." They do not doubt that these things exist. But they need now to be invited into the big tent to see the real American show—the ordinary home and family. What the British think of us depends on how vividly they see who we really are. The new diplomacy by films, speakers, books, press, radio, and soldiers must contrive to introduce farmers to farmers, mechanics to mechanics, teachers to teachers. This is the public relations pattern for a people's century.

ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION in Wartime China

by

Lin Lin

***Victory will be determined seventy per cent by economic factors and only thirty per cent by purely military ones.* — Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.**

DURING the past five years and five months in their struggle for life, freedom, and justice, Chinese people have amply demonstrated their courageous, persistent, and indomitable spirit on the economic front as well as on the battlefield. Speaking of the Chinese armies, Dr. Owen Lattimore once stated that they were never routed, never in a panic, never encircled, and that they were so far the only United Nations armies (until America's recent offensive against the Solomon Islands) which were able to retake lost territories from the Japanese. Moreover, as pointed out by Mme. Meiling Soong Chiang (Mme. Chiang Kai-shek) during the past five years, there has been no instance of Chinese soldiers surrendering to the enemy. Such is the spirit of the Chinese soldiers; the Chinese people have shown the same spirit.

Upon the ruins brought about by Japan's invasion several new and modern industrial bases have been built up in the interior partly with equipment and materials salvaged from the coastal cities. Abandoning their homes and farms, millions of Chinese farmers had trekked thousands of miles westward in order to settle down in the inland provinces and to give the nation an adequate supply of foodstuffs. Thousands of Chinese workers and engineers braved the air raids and bombardments to build hundreds of miles of new railroads. Though lacking modern tools and machinery, they built thousands of miles of new highways, including the famous Burma Road which is the engineering feat of our time. Moreover, in spite of the fact that her entire coast has been blockaded by the enemy, China still is able to continue to communicate with the outside world and to continue to carry on her trade with friendly nations. Rediscovering their innate ability of resilience and self-reliance the common people as well as the soldiers in China are determined to carry out the nation's dual program of "Resistance and Reconstruction."

It was correctly said that an army fights on its stomach. Adequate supply of foodstuffs is the first requisite for ultimate victory. The Chinese Government has therefore exerted every effort to increase China's food production. It has, moreover, taken definite steps to put into practice the agrarian reform program of Kuomintang, the ruling party. First, liberal loans have been granted to the farmers. Through the four government banks—the Farmers' Bank of China, the Bank of China, the Bank of Communications, and the Central Trust (subsidiary of the Central Bank of China) —it has extended loans on liberal terms to farmers for the purposes of increasing food production, financing irrigation projects, promoting rural handicraft industries, and developing reclamation projects. In 1941, a total of 498,555,000 yuan was granted and, by the end of December, 465,306,000 yuan of the loans remained outstanding.

Secondly, scientific measures have been applied for increasing production. The

following measures, among others, may be mentioned. Increase of cultivated acreage, increase of rice production by reducing the production of wine-making glutenous rice, increase of wheat production by winter plowing, use of improved seeds, reclamation of waste land, disease and insect control, use of better fertilizers, development of irrigation, and protection of domestic animals. These measures have shown good results. Food production in fifteen provinces in Free China was increased by 89,704,305 piculs (one picul equals 110 lbs.) in 1941 while the acreage of cultivated land increased by 45,952,046 mow (a mow equals one-sixth of an acre). For the current year expected increase in cereal production amount to 45,063,500 piculs in the nineteen provinces, with Szechwan as the leading producer.

Thirdly, Dr. Sun Yat-sen's agrarian reform program is being put into effect. Under the Farmers' Bank of China Land Bonds Act of March, 1942, fifty to one hundred million yuan worth of land bonds will be issued in the fiscal year 1942. These bonds will be used by the Government to purchase land from the owners if the declared value of the land for assessment is deemed too low, and to enable the tenant farmers to buy the land they till. This measure will be first enforced in Szechwan, Kwangsi, and Hunan where in some cases tenant farmers need urgent relief from high rents. This is one of the important features of Dr. Sun's principle of people's livelihood.

Due to shortage of supplies in general, lack of capital goods, difficulties in transportation, blockade of the coast, hoarding and profiteering, and an increase in currency circulation, China is now facing acute inflation. Prices have gone up as high as ten to forty times the pre-war level in different parts of the country. Wartime inflation has, of course, affected the economic life of every group in China. Each has experienced hardships and privations in varied degrees, however. Relatively speaking, the fixed income groups have suffered the most and the landlords and industrialists the least; while the workers and the farmers have, on the contrary, become the major beneficiaries. The farmers' purchasing power began to rise in 1940 when food prices started to increase. By 1941, farmers had more money than in the pre-war days. For instance, the index number of purchasing power of farmers in Kanhsien, Kiangsi, increased from 83 per cent in 1939 to 108 per cent in 1940 and 158 per cent in 1941; and that of farmers in Jungchang, Szechwan, from 55 per cent in 1939 to 65 per cent in 1940 and 115 per cent in 1941. In 1942, the balance in income and expenditure still favored the farmers. Wartime inflation has, in a sense, been a leveling agency, bringing all groups of the Chinese people closer and closer to the same economic status.

Facing this dangerous inflation, the National Government endeavors to adjust the demand and supply of certain key commodities. A sum of 450,000,000 yuan has recently been allocated for the purpose of stabilizing prices. The production and distribution of iron, steel, cement, cotton yarn, cotton piece goods, oil, fuel, and paper have been placed under government control. Six articles of daily use—salt, sugar, tobacco, matches, tea, and liquor—have been put on the monopoly list. For the benefit of government employees and their families, who are among the hardest hit by the inflation, such daily necessities as rice, coal, vegetable oil, salt, and cloth are sold to them by the government bureaus at lower than market prices.

In regulating the supply and demand of foodstuffs two important measures have been adopted since last August, namely, the collection of the land tax in kind and the compulsory purchase of surplus foodstuffs. In 1941, approximately 60,000,000 piculs of rice and wheat were collected and purchased. In 1942, the land tax collection will include 35,200,000 piculs of unhusked rice and 8,600,000 piculs of wheat, while the compulsory purchase will be 29,300,000 piculs of unhusked rice and 7,400,000 piculs of wheat.* In view of the success last year and the readiness of the people to pay and help, the final outcome is expected to exceed the estimated amount of 80,500,000 piculs. This will be more than sufficient to meet the need of the army, which is estimated at 40,000,000 piculs a year; and the rest will be made available for government

*Payment for the compulsory purchase is made partly in cash (30 per cent), and partly in food debentures (70 per cent).

employees and civilian consumption. So long as each soldier and citizen has his daily ration of 24 ounces of rice or 26 ounces of flour, China can keep on fighting indefinitely. These two measures not only help to insure a constant supply of foodstuffs but prove to be effective means to check hoarding and profiteering and to lower prices.

After food the most important item of people's livelihood is clothing. The production and supply of clothing materials are now under the control of the Commodity Administration within the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The Administration has started the regulation of cotton yarn and cotton piece goods as well as cotton production. Cotton production in Free China for 1942 is estimated at 2,600,000 piculs. Coal as household fuel is also under the Commodity Administration's control. Certain standards for coal production have been set, and financial and technical assistance is given to coal producers in Szechwan. Plans have been made to control the production and consumption of vegetable oil and paper. Purchasing contracts have been signed between the Administration's Price Stabilization Bureau and producers of cotton piece goods, candles, shirts, towels, silk, and other articles for the delivery of their products for sale at regulated prices. Private producers of those six commodities on the government monopoly list are required to sell their stock to the government monopoly bureaus at wholesale prices fixed by the Ministry of Finance. Besides increasing the revenue, this measure will bring about a more rational supply and demand of these articles and thus prevent further price increase.

II

BEFORE the war, China had practically no national industries. Those modern industries developed along the eastern coast and along the Yangtze Valley were controlled by foreign interests which enjoyed the protection of unequal treaties and by foreign-dominated Chinese private interests. They could only be called "industries in China." They were not China's industries. In fact, the very existence of these quasi-colonial industries had more or less hindered China's own industrial development. These quasi-colonial industries in China were almost completely destroyed by Japan's overwhelming and ruthless invasion. Thus, foreign capital was no longer available to exploit the potentialities of the interior; similarly, the private Chinese capitalists were either unable or unwilling to participate in the development of new industries in Free China.

The need for carrying the war of resistance through to ultimate victory has forced China to develop her own natural resources with unusual speed. Incidentally, the existence of the state of war has given China's young industries a protection from destructive foreign competition. It has also given the Chinese Government an opportunity to put into practice Dr. Sun Yat-sen's principle of regulation of capital. Under that principle the Government should (1) encourage private enterprises by giving them financial and technical assistance; (2) develop state capital by undertaking those industries which are either monopolistic in character or beyond the capacity of private individuals to develop.

In addition to the old ones and those migrated from the East, hundreds of new private factories have been built in Free China during the past five years. Metallurgical factories have been increased from 4 to 87; machine works from 37 to 376 units; electrical appliance factories from 1 to 44; chemical works from 78 to 380; and spinning and weaving factories from 102 to 273. There are now 3 cement plants operating and 3 more under construction. Alcohol factories now number 133. Modern paper mills have increased from 3 to 17. For oil refinery, the interior provinces have now 22 producing synthetic gasoline, 15 producing Diesel oil, and 5 producing lubricating oil. There are now 1,629 units of coal mines and 122 units of iron mines in operation.

The National Resources Commission is responsible for the development of the nation's heavy industries. In 1936—the year before the war began—the Commission mapped out a three-year program. The concrete steps that it took were the nationalization of tungsten, iron, and antimony; the construction of two big steel plants; the opening of two coal seams; the establish-

ment of three copper refineries and several machine shops, electrical plants, water works, and chemical factories.

Soon after the war broke out the Commission decided to establish numerous new industrial centers in interior China—a policy of decentralization is being pursued. By the end of 1941, it had built 71 industrial units: 29 factories, 22 mines, and 20 power plants. The recent progress has been unusually rapid. Up to the present, the number of factories operated by the Commission has increased to 41, of mines 43, and of power stations 24—a total of 108 units. Many of these factories have been constructed underground so that work may be carried on as usual without interruption even during an enemy air raid.

For the purpose of exploiting provincial resources and assisting local industries fourteen provincial development corporations have been established, with capitalization, ranging from 5,000,000 to 70,000,000 yuan. Under these development corporations many industries have been founded. The development of the textile industry, for example, is most encouraging. Before July 1937, China's textile industry was largely controlled by foreign interests. Today China is able to develop her own textile industry on a large scale. Before the war, we had only 17,000 spindles in the interior, but at present we have more than 170,000 spindles installed and more will be put to work in the near future. Other industrial developments include the existence of "portable" workshops in the occupied areas, the rapid development of industrial co-operatives, the establishment of relief industries, intensified training of industrial personnel, and better industrial research.

The Chinese have not in the midst of the war lost sight of the importance of planning for the future development of China. According to a recent report, the National Resources Commission is now studying a post-war five-year plan of industrialization. The plan has two main objectives—the raising of the people's standard of living and the strengthening of national defense so that China may not again become a victim of aggression. With Dr. Sun Yat-sen's "The International Development of China" as supreme guidance and with the recently signed American-Chinese Mutual Aid Agreement in force, the Chinese are looking forward to future industrial co-operation with the Americans on the basis of equality and mutual benefits.

III

ONE of Japan's favorite military tactics is known as encirclement. When applied in the China theater of war, it means the occupation of all Chinese important ports, the naval blockade of the entire Chinese coast, the peaceful penetration of French Indo-China and Thailand, and finally the military occupation of Hong Kong, the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, Dutch East Indies, and Burma. But there is something called the "air" which Japan never will be able to control. Today China is breathing the air freely and flying high in the sky. Japan's encirclement tactics have failed utterly. On the contrary, it is Japan herself who is now being encircled by China's fighting allies on all sides.

Civil aviation has played one of the most important roles for war service in China. Without aviation China might have long been strangled to death by the Japanese encirclement. Prior to the war there were 11,593 kilometers of domestic air lines operated by the China National Aviation Corporation and the Eurasia Aviation Corporation. The latter was a joint enterprise of Chinese and German interests but after September, 1939, it was owned and operated by Chinese alone. The former is a Sino-American joint enterprise. In December, 1939, a new line was inaugurated by the Sino-Soviet Aviation Company running from Lanchow (Kansu) to Alma Ata via Hami (Sinkiang), the total distance being 2,750 kilometers. Besides serving all the important cities in Free China, flight schedules of these three companies were extended at one time or another to Hanoi, to Alma Ata, to Hong Kong, to Lashio and Rangoon, and to Calcutta. With the international routes included, the total distance of China airlines since the war has increased almost 50 per cent.

Up to the Japanese invasion of her northeastern provinces (Manchuria) in 1931, China (including Manchuria) had 14,000 kilometers of railroads. They were mostly

located in the north and along the coast. The threat of war and the actual hostilities since 1937 became an effective stimulant for an unprecedented railway expansion westward to the interior. Work was rushed feverishly throughout the troubled years. A total distance of 1,259 kilometers of new lines was completed just before the outbreak of the hostilities. Soon after the war began, a major portion of China's railways went to the enemy. However, China was able to construct and operate over 1,065 kilometers of railroads with rails and materials salvaged from the old lines in occupied areas. Special mention must be made on the Henyang-Kweilin section of the Hunan-Kwangsi railway. The total distance of 360 kilometers was completed in 360 days from October, 1937, to September, 1938, a record unsurpassed in China's railroad building history. And the new railway from Liuchow (Kwangsi) northward has reached a distance of 167 kilometers. The Kunming-Suifu railway has been extended a distance of 162 kilometers.

Highways came to assume a more important role as more railways fell under the enemy occupation. Construction of new roads and the maintenance of the old were carried on simultaneously. Over 10,000 kilometers of highways have been added.

Postal, telephone, and telegraph services, instead of being hampered as a result of blockades and enemy interferences, have been actually increased. Then there is the radio. China now has 11 major circuits and 248 smaller stations for radio communications. Besides enjoying perfect co-operation with all principal cities of the United Nations, China's radio service has distinguished itself by operating one of the best air raid alarm systems in the world.

IV

CHINA'S wartime foreign trade policy is, in the main, twofold: (1) To increase the export of agricultural products and minerals needed by friendly nations and recent allies, but to prevent such exports from going to the enemy; and (2) to increase the import of war materials, military supplies, and other essential goods such as tools and machinery but to prohibit or restrict the import of luxuries and non-essentials. The control of the nation's exports and imports has been in charge of the Foreign Trade Commission under the Ministry of Finance. The Commission has the exclusive control of the export of wood oil, tea, and bristles. It exercises control over foreign exchange realized from some thirteen categories of specified exports and supervises the regulations governing the imports. It also acts as the Government's purchasing and importing agent.

The Commission has three affiliated trading institutions. The Foo Shing Trading Corporation was established in April, 1939, to purchase and export wood oil to the United States. The Fu Hua Trading Corporation was set up in June, 1940, to purchase and export bristles to Great Britain. Its operation also covers wool, raw silk, skins and hides, furs, and fochia (black brick tea) for barter trade with the U.S.S.R. These two corporations were merged in February, 1942. The National Tea Corporation was created in January, 1940, acting as the sole purchaser of tea for export to the United States, Great Britain, as well as the Soviet Union. Since the commencement of the war against Japan, China has obtained three barter credits from the Soviet Government, totalling approximately $250,000,000; four commodity credits (wood oil, tin, tungsten, and metal loans) from the United States totalling $120,00,000; and two commercial loans from Great Britain amounting to £13,000,000 or $52,000,000. The first American credit—the wood oil loan—was liquidated ahead of schedule. Within the short period of three years, instead of five, China delivered to America a total of 52,854.15 (short) tons of wood oil valued at $27,230,721.49. From May, 1938, to September, 1941, China delivered to the U.S.S.R. a total of $24,441,382 worth of agricultural products. And the goods shipped to Great Britain from March, 1939, to September, 1941, were worth £78,400, or $313,600.

Although the Burma Road is now cut off, small quantities of Chinese products like tea, silk, wood oil, hides, and minerals still find their ways to the Allies in every conceivable form of transport, from transport plane to elephant back. It is hoped that new land routes will soon be opened to traffic and more transport planes will be

assigned by the United Nations for services between China and her Allies.

No national budget has been published during these war years. It is, therefore, difficult to know at this time the estimates of the receipts and expenditures of the National Government since the beginning of the war. Information on the various means the Chinese Government has employed to finance the war is not lacking, however.

Before 1937, the chief sources of revenue were the customs, the salt revenue, and the internal tax revenue. After the war started, most of these revenues were gradually lost. With the country suffering so severely from the Japanese invasion, it was necessary for the Government to be very careful in adding to the burden of the people. Nevertheless, it has been possible gradually to increase the revenue. Especially since 1941, gratifying progress has been made with the unification of national and provincial finances, the adoption of the land tax in kind, increased revenue from the salt monopoly, the development of the consumption tax, the increase of direct taxes (inheritance, income, and profits). In 1942, more than one-third of the budget is likely to be covered by tax revenue.

Since the war China has issued ten series of domestic bonds in four different currencies. In aggregate, there are 3,430,000,000 yuan bonds, 100,000,000 customs gold unit bonds, £20,000,000 pound sterling bonds, and $300,000,000 United States dollar bonds. Converted into the Chinese legal tender at the current rate, they amount to 11,000,000,000 yuan. At the same time, China has incurred a total of foreign debts amounting to approximately $1,200,000,000. From the United States she has obtained a total of $670,000,000; from Britain, £68,000,000 or $272,000,000; from U.S.S.R., $250,000,000. She also received a small amount in loans from France, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia. In terms of Chinese currency it amounts to something like 21,600,000,000 yuan. More than half of these loans is not yet used. Besides this, China expects to obtain a revenue of 1,530,000,000 yuan from the monopoly sales for the current year. And finally, the Chinese people in general and the overseas Chinese in particular have contributed hundreds of millions of yuan to China's war chest during these years. The fall of Malaya, Singapore, and Dutch East Indies, however, will greatly reduce this year's contribution from the overseas Chinese.

Before the summer of 1940, China had refrained from the use of bank credits as a means of war financing. There was no sign of currency inflation but a mild increase of circulation. Then came the closing of the Burma Road. That alone more than anything else has started the vicious spiral of inflation in China. The Chinese Government was then—only then—forced to resort to the increase of bank notes in order to meet the swollen expenditures caused by the inflated prices. In order to remedy the situation, it has put into force, as pointed out above, various control measures. These measures will minimize the need for further increase of note issues. On the other hand, the issuance of the Allied Victory Bonds and the Savings Certificates in terms of $100,000,000 each to be secured by the $500,000,000 American "financial" loan will help to reduce the amount of currency outstanding.

The spread of Japanese aggression in the Pacific and the Allied reverses in southeastern Asia has placed China in a very critical position, for the time being at least. To further strengthen her own power of resistance, China has recently (May 5, 1942) put into force the National General Mobilization Act, which provides the machinery for a systematic control of the nation's material and financial resources as well as man power. The people are asked to bestir themselves "to restrict consumption and intensify production," and to put all their "resources of labor, skill and knowledge at the disposal of the nation and the war." For, in the words of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, "Supplies for the front must be assured and the livelihood of the people in the rear stabilized if we are to keep up our effort until the final victory is attained."

Five years of China's bitter struggle against Axis aggression have profusely demonstrated the fact that the Chinese people, on the economic front as well as on the battlefield, will continue to do their utmost and to sacrifice what they must for the protection of their "national freedom" and the "freedom of humanity."

The Gulf AND The Bridge

by GABRIELA MISTRAL

WHEN Saxon historians document "Spanish America's historic distrust of the United States" and Saxon sociologists evolve their ponderous reams on the "struggle between democracy and feudalism in Latin America," they demonstrate by the very pattern of their thinking the unfathomed gulf that lies between the peoples of North and South America. To be sure, the most explicit and resonant clashes between the two Americas have been the economic-political ones. To be sure, the complicated and interwoven relationships of Castilian, Indian, and oriental heritages in Latin America have made for confused and often undemocratic culture patterns. But to complain of these and to find them the key difficulties between the Americas is to judge Latin America by North American standards, and to put the burden of improved relations upon the Latin Americas.

To understand fully the mother causes at work in the conflicts between the two Americas requires a deeper knowledge of the Latin American's basic heritages. And without such a knowledge no bridging of the gulf is possible and no meeting on the common ground of mutual and sympathetic understanding can be accomplished. For there are violent differences in race and culture between the two continental peoples, differences whose extent cannot be minimized, differences disheartening to North American optimism, differences which make more than traditionally difficult the task of joining and consolidating two tremendous and opposite metals. To Americans North and South this is the exact truth, bitter and medicinal as quinine.

One difference working to hinder a union of the Americas is a difference of racial types, yet both North and Latin Americans see it as a difference rather than as a barrier to inter-Americanism. That great paganistic and collective evil, racial superstition, the idolatry of the skin, exists both within and between the Americas, and makes for a complicated pattern of conflicts. Yet when we saw it before this war, we made ourselves willfully blind to it lest "it disturb Pan-American affairs."

No one denies the concept tacitly and explicitly accepted by the North American and the white Creole in the South that the Indian and the Mestizo of Indian blood are peoples essentially inferior and problematically less capable of receiving and assimilating culture. Here is a little racial viper, not yet ready to hiss or strike, which has lived among us in safe comfort. If anyone—theologian or philosopher—had said that the racial preachings of Gobineau or H. S. Chamberlin could destroy our continent, he would have been laughed at. Hitler and Europe have made us realize what a powerful tool for discord here lies ready at the hand of any evil man; and what significance the simple affirmation of the "rights of Japheth over Shem" entails.

And now we know. It is not alone enough to know. Theologians in their wooden dialectics emphasize that "rectification must immediately follow contrition." On the smouldering embers of this war we must begin our *mea culpa:* extensive and subtle reform of our attitudes and our actions toward the racial question in the Americas. The difference in races separates not only the two Americas, but also the inhabitants within each of our countries, and in our

common effort to surmount the problem we can find real common ground among common men.

For common ground among common men is basically necessary to inter-American interdependence. Between North and South America the common ground of a sympathetic culture is lacking. Essentially, of course, a difference in cultures is not in itself an evil. The evil of the difference of culture on our continent is that the average North American, the most important person in the Democracies of the Americas, does not believe the average man in Latin America has a cultural rank equal to his own. The North American does this through neither malice nor conceit. It is simply that at the mention of "culture," he thinks of "civilization." For him a country is cultured when it possesses industries; when its cities have sewage disposal plants, reservoirs, and garbage collectors; when its citizens do not live in poverty, much less in destitution. The possibility that essential human dignity, feeling, and wisdom can exist side by side with a medieval way of life, that culture and bad living conditions can so exist, culture and poor food, never even slightly penetrates his understanding. A European might feel a kinship with the culture of his fellow men in the other nations of his continent, were they Hellenists and Latinists, physicists and biologists; yet the average North American demands of the Creole peoples of the South, before he admits them to his own cultural rank, a life that begins in a porcelain bathtub, proceeds to a good table and good doctors, and ends in an automobile accident. Perhaps he actually demands less than our European, but applied to our poor countries, it is a demand less possible to satisfy, and a naïve demand as well, one which confuses the standard of culture with the standard of salaries.

Such a judgment hurts or angers the cultured Latin American, for he has inherited and stubbornly upholds the old Mediterranean concept of culture. The Italian from Campania may appreciate a good house and good food, yet he never associates comfort with culture. The sensitive and ultra-poor descendent of the Portugese race does not consider such words as "prosperity and knowledge," "humanities and economy" of equivalent value. The Creole is the son of the old Spaniard, and never wedded wealth with breeding. These three Latin men do not feel plebeian, hungry or no, for they know their lives to be akin to their Greek grandfathers—thinking their thoughts and eating their handful of olives, raisins, or figs. And even though the South American is at long last beginning to take municipal hygiene seriously, to decrease the death rate in his cities, to improve his standards of instructions and the scope of his schools, he will never make the alloy, so rational to the American, of culture and these physical achievements. It is serious for friends or brothers to differ so in their conceptions of life, as an animal differs from a plant.

Yet in the latest generation many signs of Americanization are being seen. Happiness is becoming more of a material matter and less of a spiritual one. The breach between the two cultures is still wide, but it is far from irreparable. Even the most fanatic advocates of the classical pattern of life in these Latin countries feel the need of scientific training for our youth, and this we can learn from the United States, and profit in the learning. Today the gap still exists, and our Creole universities have no "science courses" of the type they profess to admire, nor, indeed, have they any of those utilitarian subjects which the universities of the United States prefer. There is an immense and disconcerting lack of scientific life in Latin America. Yet correction must be made by slow steps; it cannot be achieved at a gallop.

When Latin Americans begin to fill out their scientific lacks, then those North American professors who teach their students the intellectual and material values of the civilization adopted in the United States should also teach them what for two centuries has been called "culture," that fabulous and mixed heritage of the oriental and Mediterranean countries. And let those Northern teachers explain to the high school boys who will be the average North Americans of tomorrow that the dark complected peoples did not value, and do not value today, wealth as an instrument of happiness. Let them also explain that this mode of thinking brought no unhappiness to the Greeks or to the Romans. For until

the new North American generations receive more of the Greco-Roman culture in the high schools and colleges than they at present do, the gap between our cultures must exist, and with it the gulf between our sympathies.

I write emphatically. I write as an old teacher who knows something of their language and what they bear in their hearts when I write that the Indian and the old Spaniard are, even now, a living part of Netzahualcoyotl, the poet and philosopher, or of Alfonso the Wise. And I write as a prophet when I say that the century of the common man will be built in the Americas only on common ground in education, regardless of race, creed, or language.

Much peace, much real harmony, and much honor will be born on this continent on the day when two legal languages cease to be spoken; when Protestants and Catholics better understand each other; when economists do not recognize two problems of hunger, the white man's to be remedied, and the Indian's and Negro's to be postponed; when the ministries of education do not consider two illiteracies, the white man's, which urges them to educate the cities, and the native's, which has always existed and "gives them happiness." And all these problems are indissolubly bound up, in North and Latin America, with the problem of a common background, a common understanding, and a common education to make common ground for all common men. Here alone is the bridge for the gulf of our differences.

—Translated by Janet Brassert

A FEDERAL LANGUAGE FOR A WORLD COMMONWEALTH

By Albert Guérard

A LANGUAGE for international relations is not a utopian dream; it is an immediate and constant problem. Whenever the representatives of several countries assemble, the question cannot be shirked. It is met in various ways. The commonest is the use of three or four major languages, into which all speeches and documents have to be translated. This method was cumbrous even when English, French, and German alone were in the field. It has broken down beyond repair. For the privilege of the "Big Three" is no longer recognized. Spanish, the most genuinely international of all, since it is official in a score of countries, had already claimed the same rights. Russian cannot be ignored. Italian, Portuguese, Polish will not be satisfied with a back seat. And one of the inevitable results of this war will be to secure full equality of status for Asiatic nations and cultures. As every group and every province seeks to evolve a speech of its own; as Ukrainian insists on being different from Great Russian, and Slovak from

Czech; as even in Norway the *Landsmaal* strove to assert itself against the *Rigsmaal;* as in South Africa the Boers are promoting Dutch—and Cape Dutch at that—at the expense of English; as Eire breathes new life into its half-forgotten idioms and the Zionists into Hebrew, the curse of Babel grows heavier upon us.

Language differences, language conflicts are not merely material obstacles to friendly intercourse. Worse even than blood or economic interests, they seem to concentrate and embitter the pride and jealousy of men. What Hitler sought in Czechoslovakia and in Poland was to create a sharp hierarchy of languages: the tongue of the *Herrenvolk,* with a monopoly of administration and culture, and the despised patois of the lesser breeds. The sentimental, the passionate aspect, of language is a fact which should never be overlooked.

Of this fact the English-speaking world is serenely oblivious. We do not ignore the international language problem, but it does not worry us in the least, for the inescapable solution is perfectly clear in our minds. Of course there must be a language for international intercourse, and that language is already English. Any attempt to evade that ineluctable development is merely the pathetic struggle of petty provincialism. Those men of English speech who believe themselves to be world-citizens, like H. G. Wells, or refined philosophers, like I. A. Richards and C. K. Ogden, are on this question in full accord with the average politician or business man.

This is not obtuseness, but the result of experience. We know how eager immigrants are to adopt our language (all too often, their children are ashamed of their parents' tongues). If before the war we traveled over the world, everywhere the inscription *English spoken* met our eyes—provided we kept to the beaten Anglo-Saxon track. Nor was this limited to hotel, curio shop, or tourist agency. If we wanted to meet the "natives," naturally those who could speak English came to the fore. Their knowledge of the language was an achievement they were only too anxious to display. Thus English spread a tenuous but undeniable net from pole to pole.

The war emphasized this predominance. Until 1939, the Western Democracies stood as the hope of mankind against brutal tyranny; and France, even more than England, was the haven of all free minds. With the collapse of France, the English-speaking nations remained alone as the refuge and the hope of liberty. But for Britain's magnificent resistance, but for America's formidable resources, three continents would be subjected to irremediable serfdom.

Certainly this is not the moment for refugees to begrudge our leadership. On this point, many exiles vigorously endorse Anglo-Saxon claims. Good Europeans, like Thomas Mann or Coudenhove-Kalergi, accept English as the federal language of a free world. Washington is paying the pipers and calling the tune. We have no information about the enormous mass of international activities which now have their center in President Roosevelt, but it is a safe surmise that in overwhelming proportion they are conducted in English. The same conditions are bound to prevail at the Peace Conference. China and Russia are bearing the brunt of the fighting; but their forces are gradually depleted while ours are growing. Neither Chinese nor Russian is widely known outside of its own country. French, Italian, and German will have no standing; they represent defeat. The Spanish world is divided, and will remain a minor partner. If victory is ours, there is nothing that can prevent English from being the sole official language of the peace conference, and by an almost inevitable extension, the federal language of the World Commonwealth.

Nothing—except our own moderation and sense of fairness. To these I would appeal, for the adoption of English as the federal language would be a severe handicap for the new Commonwealth of Nations.

For one thing, it would come with victory, and to the defeated, it would remain the hated badge of defeat. Yes, millions will bless us, in France, in Italy, even in Germany, when we have finally exorcized the incubus. But millions also will mourn their vanished dream, and rebel at the thought that world supremacy should pass into other hands. We do not mean to give offense, but nationalistic pride is desperately sensitive and gratitude often is an unbearable burden. When normal life is restored, the feeling will be: "So that cru-

sade for liberty was a tussle for the mastery of the world? It did not abolish, as it promised, the noxious conception of a *Herrenvolk* and a *Herrensprache;* it merely decided that English, not German, would prevail." In such a state of mind, the World Commonwealth, with its Anglo-Saxon stamp, will be not welcome but resented. Every group that feels itself dispossessed and humbled will try to limit, not to extend, the scope of international activities. It will be "patriotic" to unlearn English. English could grow before the war, on a free and unofficial basis, just as German and French, in other spheres, were growing also. But official predominance is a challenge.

A second moral danger is that the triumph of English would almost inevitably be ascribed—by us and by the rest of the world—to the wrong reason. Even today, we meet cultured and gentle men who unconsciously advance the most vulgar arguments. "Our speech is prevailing, and must prevail, because we are bigger and richer than any one else on earth. We have more automobiles, more telephones, more bathtubs than the rest of the world combined. We make more gorgeous and more fabulously expensive movies." Brutal as this is, this claim is perhaps less objectionable than self-righteousness: "We are the natural overlords, because of our moral rectitude. We have saved the world, and deserve to rule it." No one dares, and no one cares, to challenge our pretensions now. But when the crisis is over, these pretensions will be examined, and not in a submissive spirit. It will then be remembered that as world leaders we had shown ourselves singularly remiss between 1919 and 1939. It was our sacred egoism that caused world organization to fail. If we are right today, then we were wrong during those two decades; and our utmost efforts are only a belated atonement.

The sin of the best intentioned among us has been to be so unquestioningly right in their own eyes. We refused to think in any terms except those of Anglo-Saxon experience—and Anglo-Saxon interests. We never understood that the Washington Conference, inspired by the purest motives, was an offense and a challenge to the non-Anglo-Saxons. Our representatives could never see the merits of Europe's stand on the debt question. Even today, we are apt to identify the Anglo-Saxon constitutional pattern with the very concept of liberty. Even today, we find it hard to look at India's problems except through English spectacles. The official adoption of English would make our spiritual insularity impregnable. What we need, on the contrary, is to meet the rest of the world without fear or favor, on a common level.

These things are not popular. Most of us, pardonably, never think about them at all: Anglo-Saxon supremacy is the very air we breathe. Our foreign friends cannot tell us. I am free to speak: I am an American citizen and a veteran of the other war. But I was brought up in Europe, and have been a determined internationalist ever since I was conscious of thought. This is not antagonistic to American loyalty; I prefer the tradition of George Washington, who called himself "a citizen of the great Republic of Humanity at large," to that of Stephen Decatur. William Lloyd Garrison said: "My country is the world." To this ideal we must remain true, if we are to liberate mankind. And this means the renunciation of every privilege of race, class, caste, nation, or language.

(A minor argument seriously adduced is that "Anglo-Saxons" would never learn any language but their own, because they could not. I know that American journalists can spend a decade or so in the Latin Quarter without learning French: still I believe that our congenital dumbness in this respect has been greatly exaggerated. It might well be a convenient alibi for laziness and pride.)

II

THE language we need, therefore, must be one which does not stand for victory, power, wealth, pride, but for brotherhood; one that can be used by the World Police, the World Court, the World Airways, without any fear that the strong and the rich will be made stronger and richer thereby; one that will respect the essential equality of all cultures, and give the least of the tribes a fair chance to co-operate in the world's welfare; *a language, in short, that will be the symbol as well as the instrument of the international spirit.* Because

of the very might and wealth of the Anglo-Saxon world, English is barred out. What other solution could be adopted?

Here we must distinguish between a provisional solution, valid only for the armistice conference, and a permanent solution for the World Commonwealth of the future. A provisional solution must be immediately available, rather than perfect in theory, but its provisional character must be made manifest. To meet these conditions, we suggest a return to the bilingualism of the League of Nations, English and French. There are innumerable diplomats and technicians throughout the world who know both these languages; there are few who do not know at least one of them. The use of French in diplomacy for two centuries has imparted to the language a precision which even English cannot match. In the very effort of preparing a text in two different languages, all ambiguities would be exposed to the sharpest scrutiny. But the great advantage of this historical solution, in our eyes, is that it would be unquestionably a makeshift. There is not the slightest possibility that German, Italian, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, or Hindustani would permanently accept an Anglo-French condominium. The adjunction of French would simply be an indication that English had no thought of entrenching itself in power.

As a long-range solution, a major national language other than English—say French, Spanish, or Italian—would also rouse the legitimate jealousy of the others. A minor language, like Malay or Swahili, would not be open to this objection. But it would have to be fitted to the complexities of modern civilization; it would lack the tradition which, in many fields, is a condition of definiteness; it could not rely upon a large international body of men already familiar with its elements. These objections apply with even greater force to a language which, for the sake of perfect neutrality, should be absolutely artificial.

A language that is neutral, non-national, yet with a tradition; a language that is known to some extent by a large number of men in all countries—these requirements seem exacting, yet Latin fulfills them all. Only a few years ago, no man was deemed a gentleman and a scholar unless he had at least a nodding acquaintance with Latin. In my youth, all candidates for the French Doctorate of Letters had to write one of their theses in Latin. There is hardly any high school in our land that does not offer Latin; and the Catholic Church places a Latinist in the remotest village, and bids the humblest believer repeat magnificent Latin hymns and prayers. Even in the early nineteenth century Latin was still the official language of polyglot Hungary, and the trouble began when the Magyars attempted to force their tongue upon the minor nationalities.

I freely admit that classical Latin is too difficult, not only for the common man, but for engineers, diplomats—and professors. The Latin of the medieval hymns, however, is a different proposition. And we might very well go much farther: this is the age of conscious planning and "synthetic" products. Here Messrs. I. A. Richards and C. K. Ogden would be excellent guides. Their work in Basic is essentially logical or semantic. They apply their method to the English vocabulary; but there is nothing to preclude the possibility of a Basic Latin. All that is needed is to divorce, in Basic, the philosophical aspect from the chauvinistic.

As a matter of fact, this solution was adumbrated three centuries ago by Descartes and Leibniz. Men like Rudolf Carnap admit the possibility of a logical regularized language. The combination of thought-analysis with the most international vocabulary was carried out by the Italian mathematician Giuseppe Peano. His *Latino sine Flexione,* or *Interlingua,* based on those Latin roots which exist in English, is intelligible at first sight by any one who knows Latin, *or* English, *or* any one of the Romance languages. Without declension or elaborate conjugation, it can be made even simpler than Esperanto. As it uses the Latin words in their etymological form, without arbitrary distortion, it provides a valuable introduction to classical Latin in its majestic fullness.

Patre nostro, qui es in celos, que tuo nomine fi sanctificato. Que tuo regno adveni; que tua voluntate es facta sicut in celo et in terra. . . .

●

The contours of TOMORROW

by Stanton A. Coblentz

AMONG all the strange facts of human evolution, perhaps none is stranger than that man so seldom recognizes the road on which he travels. The Goths that invaded the Italian plains did not realize that they were ending the august empire of a thousand years; the liberal thinkers who set off the fuse of the French Revolution did not foresee the Terror, the anarchy, the continental wars; the French of our own time, somnolent behind their Maginot line, did not prevision the cataclysmic reality of *la belle France* in chains. And in the same way we of America, as we look forward beyond the most far-reaching war in history, can hardly be expected to trace the outlines of tomorrow.

Yet tomorrow is the legitimate child of today; the laws of consanguinity are no more to be discounted than among biological species. One does not have to be clairvoyant in order to make certain general yet sharply defined predictions; the future is imaged in the past and present as in a silver mirror. The astonishing fact, indeed, is not that the shape of unborn events is visible; the astonishing fact is that it is not more generally observed. In one respect, at least, I have been amazed at the failure to recognize truths that, it has long seemed to me, shine forth with crystal clarity.

There are, as I see it, two possible post-war futures—and two alone. One may, in the main, be beneficent; while the other would certainly be malignant. The latter is the one that we may follow without volition, by a mere process of drifting: the road of shoulder-shrugging indifference, of inertia, of a roseate assumption that all will somehow be for the best in the best of all possible lands. At the close of the war, it may be taken for granted, the Government will be largely in control of industry and distribution—or, to be more exact, of the war industries and distribution, which, however, will constitute 50 per cent or more of the nation's economy. Can we then slip quietly back to the industrial system—or, rather, to the free lack of system—of the years before 1941? Even to make the attempt would be to precipitate a social convulsion of the first magnitude. The tremendous dislocation in production, the record-breaking unemployment, the flooding of the labor markets with millions of newly freed soldiers and sailors, the bankruptcy of multitudes of small manufacturers and business men, would bring us—in the absence of sharp governmental control—to the verge if not actually over the verge of cataclysm. And the resultant misery and despair of the masses would provide fertile soil for a repetition of Europe's experience after the last war: the exaltation of demagogues at whom the populace would clutch as at straws in a maelstrom, and who, by means legal or illegal, parliamentary or violent, would seize leadership of the nation.

In other words, the solution would be through state control—but state control with all the authoritarianism, the ruffianism, the contempt for individual rights and freedom, the frenzy of racial and national prejudice, the brutality and the bloodshed characteristic of fascist nations. This, ironically, would be the outcome of our very effort to avoid regulation from above, the fruit of our inclination to continue drifting in the old happy-go-lucky individualistic manner! And thus, by a paradox, state control would become established through the desire to avert it; and, springing out of the

necessities of war, would vitiate the ends for which we are fighting.

But what of the second possible post-war future? Inevitably, this also would involve state control, though state control subject to wise and co-ordinated planning. Let us recognize frankly that, thanks to the war, we are pursuing a highly specialized path—a path which, like specializations in nature, cannot be reversed without severe and possibly fatal dislocations. Let us acknowledge that no great nation can long submit to our present degree of wartime supervision and then return to the careless, anarchic system of "each of for himself." "Each for himself," we have found, will not suffice as a method of waging war; "each for himself," correspondingly, will not carry us through the peace—not in a society wherein "total war" produces unprecedented maladjustments.

This means that, whether we like it or not, the Government must remain largely in command. The Government alone, obviously, can find means of employing constructively the multitudes who might become permanent social misfits; the Government alone, not being bound by the profit motive, can utilize the machine-shops and mines that might be idle. Public works projects on a scale not hitherto conceived, national control over the huge ramifications of industry must become the order of the day quite apart from any remaining need for such measures for purposes of defense against foreign foes. And this, as a peace-time system, will represent a revolutionary, a portentous change, the most profound social transformation since the Industrial Revolution—perhaps the greatest since the downfall of feudalism. It implies a complete refutation of the economic creed of centuries, a complete reorientation of Western aims and outlook, a threat to the virtues of constructive individual effort, no less than a challenge to the good old commercial principle of "snatch-and-grab." It means that whereas, in the past, the state has existed primarily as an adjunct of the individual, henceforth the individual must exist largely as an adjunct of the state.

The question, unfortunately, is not whether this goal is desirable. The question is whether it is to be reached through a mindless process of drifting, with the repressive crimson aftermath of fascist dictatorship; or whether we are boldly to seize the helm, and to guide the vessel rationally toward a liberal, democratic haven. This, it appears to me, is the crying problem of the future: whether, having won the war on the field of battle, we are to lose it on the home front by permitting ourselves to develop replicas of the very institutions we are fighting; or whether, while not attempting to deny the epoch-making modern trends, we will consciously turn them to our own purposes in order to build a free and fair tomorrow.

III

BUT are there not great and immediate perils even in the more inviting of the two possibilities? Might not state socialism turn in the same direction as fascism itself? Might it not result in an autocratic and even tyrannical supervision of the minutiae of life? Or might it not, with its innumerable corps and hierarchies of state employees, lead to a form of national petrification, a woodenness of bureaucracy that would cramp all things in its warping hold, excluding the plastic freshness of new ideas and tending to model the community on the plan of the beehive?

Frankly, we must recognize these possibilities. Furthermore, we must admit the danger that the state, in its excess of concern with mere economic functions, such as production and distribution, might tend to allow less and less room for the free exercise of creative and artistic impulses; might become so preoccupied with employment, consumption, efficiency and the like, that it would forget that economic institutions exist for man, and not man for economic institutions.

We have, indeed, the necessity to steer our course between twin threats: the threat of the centralization of authority in one despotic leader or in a clique of leaders, as in totalitarian Europe, and the threat of our gradual devitalization through the throttling accretions of petty officialdom. How we can be piloted through this narrow strait is, of course, a problem impossible to answer within the limits of a short article; my object is to present the dilemma rather than to propound a solution. I may, however, suggest that the retention of democratic processes, while the manifest corner-

stone of all our efforts, would offer both a safeguard and a possible stumbling block. On the one hand, the periodic election and retirement of the higher state officers may be a guaranty even if not an absolute protection against dictatorship; but, on the other hand, the intrusion of the element of politics, the possible elevation of corrupt schemers and demagogues to control of the vast kingdom of state industry, would provide unprecedented opportunities for nepotism and venality, for gross and costly mismanagement, inefficiency, and criminal extravagance. Even today, with the Government taking up the reins to a lesser extent under the imperative demands of wartime, we can see the terrific drive of self-centered private political blocs, as in the resistance to price control despite the overhanging menace of inflation, and in the farm lobbies that seem intent on holding the cost of living at an arbitrary height.

It is therefore indispensable that the great industrial offices of the state be placed above politics. But this very statement, self-evident as it may seem, proves upon analysis to lead toward another contradiction. To be above politics, an officer must be independent not only of elections but of political appointment, which implies that he must come into power through some sort of a merit system, perhaps after competitive examinations, as in the civil service. But this in turn means that a bureaucracy is likely to arise—a bureaucracy of "stuffed shirts" and established privilege, a bureaucracy as torpidly complacent as a gorged snake—a mere respectable graveyard amid whose dust no live, thrusting, original impulse could flourish.

It must be pointed out, on the other hand, that state socialism in America need not involve the evils so scandalously manifest in Europe. It is only because they oppose the will of a large proportion of the people that the totalitarian powers must resort to a secret police, suppression of free speech and assembly, and other anti-democratic measures. But the species of state control necessitated by events in America might have and should have the endorsement of the great majority of citizens, since it would be aimed to promote their welfare —and would represent a broad extension of the principles of the New Deal.

All this, of course, is on the assumption that dictatorial powers will not be seized by a minority, laying us open to a repetition of the disasters of Germany and Italy. And if dictatorial powers are not seized by a minority, a minority which might erect an aggressive military machine such as that of Hitler or Hirohito, we can look forward not only to greater social and economic justice within the nation, but to more harmonious relations among the nations. Not that this would necessarily mean an end to the threat of war, whose roots are in passion and prejudice and racial and national animosity no less than in economics. But, on the other hand, it might eliminate one of the basic causes of war: the avarice of private individuals in their quest of world markets, and the measuring-rod of private gain as the gauge for the flow of world commodities. The disgraceful position in which we now find ourselves—the position of a nation vitally dependent upon supplies of rubber, and cut off from that commodity because private capital did not insure a fountainhead near at home—need not be repeated under state socialism. For, with the profit motive absent, somewhat as it is and must be absent in any nation's military efforts, it would be possible for the state to plan for the satisfaction of future needs in ways involving a minimum of interference with the aims of other states. At the same time, the machinations of private firms, with their international cartels such as the ill-smelling arrangements recently brought to light between Standard Oil of New Jersey and its nazi collaborator, would be automatically ended. Perhaps we would not be headed toward a future wholly of "sweetness and light"; but we could, at least, expect a future of relative sanity.

Such, in a word, are the contours of tomorrow as they appear to me. Whether we desire it or not, whether we applaud or deplore the present trend, we are moving on a great historic current that will not pause for any man or any man's wish. But if we visualize the reality, if we clearly ascertain the direction of our progress, we may be able to guide ourselves toward a safe harbor rather than drift toward the reefs. And that is why it is all-important to keep lookouts posted as the tide bears us into the difficult days ahead.

PLANS
FOR THE FUTURE

In connection with the Labor Round Table, we open this section of reports on important proposals for post-war reconstruction and organization which are being formulated and discussed all over the world with a statement of peace objectives issued by the American Federation of Labor. In the September issue we published the plans of the British Labor party; the views of other labor groups in this country and abroad will be presented in the near future.

IX—The American Federation of Labor

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

WILLIAM GREEN, *President*

Vice Presidents:

WILLIAM L. HUTCHESON	HARRY C. BATES
MATTHEW WOLL	EDWARD J. GAINOR
JOSEPH N. WEBER	W. D. MAHON
G. M. BUGNIAZET	FELIX H. KNIGHT
GEORGE M. HARRISON	EDWARD FLORE
DANIEL J. TOBIN	HARVEY W. BROWN

W. C. BIRTHRIGHT

GEORGE MEANY, *Secretary-Treasurer*

ON December 27, 1942, William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor, appointed a Post-War Planning Committee to begin immediate preparation of a program designed to give reality to the ideals for which America is fighting. The Committee is directed to investigate and report on the following subjects: (1) a plan for labor representation in the peace conferences which will follow victory; (2) specific proposals which the labor representatives should seek to have incorporated in the peace treaty; (3) a broad program of post-war reconstruction to prevent a disastrous depression; (4) expansion of social, economic, and political security for America and the peoples of all lands. Under the chairmanship of Matthew Woll, the committee will consist of David Dubinsky, Miss Agnes Nestor, John Childs, Harvey Brown, George M. Harrison, Richard Gray, Rubin Soderstrom, and Milton P. Webster.

Defining the purpose of the committee, Mr. Green said: "We must start planning now for the emergencies that will face us when the war is over. We can't afford to wait until victory is won. Without adequate preparation and a specific program to meet that day of victory, we may find—as in the last war—that the battle was in vain. We know our objectives. We want lasting peace. We want equality between nations. We want freedom and opportunity for all nations. We want social and economic security for all peoples. These are the things labor in America is working and fighting for. These are the objectives which will spell the real victory and the permanent destruction of the forces of hate and oppression against which we are now engaged in a desperate war."

Until a report of the work of this Committee appears, the proposals of the A. F. of L. concerning post-war planning may be found in the report of the Executive Council made at the Annual Convention at Toronto on October 5. In the expectation of a long armistice, the Council foresees that it will be the task of the United States to plan aid for stricken areas:

Restoration of economic and civilian life in all the devastated countries should get under way quickly. Unless this is done on a world basis, we shall be handicapped for centuries by the low standards of backward areas. . . . Credit and monetary institutions must be restored. To save nations from mass starvation, epidemics, and frustration, they must be fed, clothed, and their homes restored as the basis for restoration of business and trade. Agriculture, mining, and manufacturing, must be organized around markets and they can best get under way unhampered by political restrictions and limitations.

The organized labor movement of this and other lands will oppose military rule after occupation. From the first, civilians must be in charge of provisional governments, and from the first there must be participation of responsible, representative local persons in decisions affecting their welfare.

In the negotiation of political terms and conditions to prevail in the post-war world, "organized labor of the United States must be fully and adequately represented in our national delegation . . . with a voice in determining the whole treaty." Moreover, in the opinion of the Council, labor should have representation in delegations from all countries. The interest of labor will be to make sure that world problems will be settled by conference instead of by war, to make sure that world trade in the future does not profit because of sub-standard labor conditions in any industry or in any country, to do their part in giving all nations equal consideration with equal opportunities for progress and pursuit of happiness, to try to harness force to constructive policies and agencies, and to eliminate balancing of powers and isolationism.

In conclusion, the Council outlines a five-point program as follows:

1. The kind of government which other countries may choose may differ widely from the institutions of the United States, as the genius and character of one nation differs from another. The important thing is that the government shall have the approval of the governed and that there shall be no type of aggression.

2. The territorial security of all nations and opportunities for peaceful change should be assured. By such machinery we hope to work toward and to develop a world community of nations.

3. We further propose that as essential for participation by labor of all countries in these world conferences and agencies, wage earners shall be guaranteed the right to membership in free unions controlled by the membership concerned. We have repeatedly witnessed the initial attack by the new despotism upon the free labor movement, because the shackling of this largest group in a democracy left other groups and interests helpless to make effective protest. We propose this basic right as essential for the world democracy for which this war is waged.

4. There must be a world agency to decide policies in which all countries are concerned, definite provisions to make decisions effective and a world court.

5. Every political, economic, and social institution must serve the freedom and the welfare of human beings. The inalienable rights of free men are the ultimate end which civilization promotes.

In expansion of the second point, the Council declares that the basis of territorial security must be laid in "regional co-operation between contiguous countries with common economic interests and, if possible, similar cultural institutions. The great centers of power that probably will emerge from the war are the United States with the Pan-American Union, the British Commonwealth (not Empire), Continental Europe, Russia, China, India, and Japan." The entire world must be the scope of peace.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

In principle, the American Federation of Labor's program can be heartily endorsed. Up to now, labor has been putting its strength behind the war effort with a willingness and success which show that it is well aware that without victory in the war, organized labor will be destroyed. Nevertheless, commendable as its concentration upon the immediate object may be, it is necessary to recognize that a greater effort must go into planning the organization to come after the war. The proposals from the Executive Council of the A. F. of L. are welcome; their ideas are sound; but the situation cries for more thinking, more foreseeing of dangers and chances, more specific answers to the problems ahead. The newly appointed Post-War Planning Committee has a job of the first importance. In this task American labor can assume a role of leadership in the labor movement of the world.

X—National Resources Planning Board (Part II)

The publication of the Beveridge Report in England has aroused new public interest in the National Resources Planning Board, the "planning arm" of the Executive Office of the President. The "American Beveridge Report," frequently mentioned recently by newspapers, refers to the forthcoming report of the Board, "Security, Work and Relief Policies," which will be transmitted to Congress early in 1943. In our November issue, we presented the major proposals of this governmental agency which had been published at that time. A new report which has been made available since then is included in this section in order to bring our summary up to date.

FREDERICK A. DELANO, *Chairman*
CHARLES E. MERRIAM, *Vice Chairman*
GEORGE F. YANTIS
HENRY S. DENNISON BEARDSLEY RUML
CHARLES W. ELIOT, *Director*

IN a technical paper prepared for the Board by Lewis L. Lorwin, issued under the title, "International Economic Development," proposals are made concerning international public works as a feature of post-war reconstruction. The suggested plan is "conceived as part of a general program of collaboration between highly developed and underdeveloped countries, and between creditor and debtor nations, in order to exploit more effectively world resources and to expand international trade. The proposal implies that such concerted effort on the part of nations will promote full employment and greater well-being everywhere, and permanently. It further assumes that such works will be organized and carried out through special international agencies."

Public works are described as being of a long-range character, financed out of public funds, and serving the general interest; international public works are essentially the same thing, except that they extend beyond national boundaries and involve two or more countries. The main findings of Mr. Lorwin's report are the following. First, international public works are discussed as a means of "stabilizing employment in general and of avoiding a post-war slump in particular. . . . The international financing of public works in countries which find it difficult or impossible to undertake such works on an appreciable scale during a depression because of lack of funds, inadequate banking facilities, or weak position in world markets, would promote movements of capital from lending to borrowing countries in such a way as to mitigate deflationary tendencies and to reinforce recovery in the stronger industrial countries."

Secondly, it is suggested that some interrelation between public works and relief be organized in Europe and in other countries after the war. A third, and most important, aspect of international public works is their possible use as a means of furthering international economic development. The importance of this aspect of the program is due to the decline of private international investment as a result of the experience of 1919-29. "It is thus claimed that there will be an increasing tendency for the Government to participate directly in promoting capital exports through specially created corporations and agencies under government direction and control. . . . Also, with this change in the form and character of foreign lending, there may be a shift in the motivation and purposes of such lending. Social needs, especially those connected with the efforts towards international peace based upon economic well-being, are likely to become as important as considerations of higher interest rates and profits."

A fourth observation is that many of the questions raised can best be examined in the light of regional conditions and problems:

> In Europe, for instance, the public works which loom up as of importance are those which may link Eastern Europe with the countries of Central and Western Europe, that is, continental roads, regional power systems, and so on. In the Western Hemisphere, inter-American public works are assuming importance both for strategic purposes and for long-range economic developments. The projects which are being financed out of public funds in Latin America include the development of raw materials, inter-American highways, and new industries. In the Far East, the developmental projects which have an international in-

terest are concerned with the economic reconstruction of China, and are closely related to the plans of the Chinese Government for the building up of a progressive economy, in large measure under government guidance. The Chinese Government looks forward to the development of new forms of public investment, including international public loans, which may make it possible for China and foreign capital to participate on equal terms in the development of the country.

The facilitation of population resettlements and land colonization schemes is a fifth reason urged by the Board's report for the adoption of this program. The experience of the plans for resettlement after the first World War, for example, in Greece, is recalled in this connection; and the experiments which are being made today in Central America are mentioned as being more likely to succeed if "some of the constructional work of a public character, such as water works, roads, land reclamation, etc., could be carried out on an international basis with international funds."

The sixth point of the report concerns machinery for carrying out such programs. The most appropriate device is the international public corporation.

On the basis of the observations outlined above, the report sketches three main lines of policy.

1. The first suggestion is for the United States proper. The American Government already spends public funds in international public projects in Latin America, Canada, the Far East, and elsewhere, through such agencies as Lend-Lease, the Export-Import Bank, the Metals Reserve Corporation, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Board of Economic Warfare, and some of the regular departments of the Government, such as the Department of Agriculture. "It would be conducive to greater efficiency in the use of funds and to more consistent policy with regard to developmental projects if these various agencies were brought together under a common direction."

2. "A second step would be to implement the recommendations made early in 1942 at the Conference of Rio de Janeiro by establishing a permanent Inter-American Resources Board and by enlarging the work of the Inter-American Development Commission." Although a large part of the developmental work may be done profitably by private American and local capital, "nevertheless considerable developmental work will have to be done either by public funds or by co-operation between private and public enterprise."

3. "The third step would be to bring together the organizations now existing or to be established in the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and Latin America, to form an International Development Authority." This Authority, which is given detailed attention in the Board's Report, should begin its activities by studying public developmental schemes in different countries and the problems connected with their financing and execution. It might then undertake to build up an international public work reserve which would cover most areas of the world.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

The excellence of Mr. Lorwin's report on International Economic Development is on a par with the previous work of the National Resources Planning Board. It combines the practical experience gained through technical study of regional development in this country with the sound and forward-looking social theory which has been expressed in the Board's earlier declaration of man's economic rights and its definition of the Nine Freedoms in the report for 1942, issued a year ago.

It is perhaps regrettable that the National Resources Planning Board will henceforth devote its energies primarily to domestic problems of post-war planning. Its long experience in surveying local and regional needs for public development projects would seem to provide an indispensable background for sound planning on an international scale. It is fortunate that so much of the Board's work has been completed already and that its findings are available for those agencies which will carry it on. Congressional sessions early in 1943 will undoubtedly consider the status of this valuable agency, and the public will serve its own interests by indicating its support of the Board's program.

BOOKS

Education and Unfinished Business

EDUCATION BETWEEN TWO WORLDS, by Alexander Meiklejohn. 303 pages. Harper; $3.00

It is a curious and moving quality of human affairs that when a given generation is called to perform a great task before which it hesitates, then no matter what its wiser members speak about or write about, their words gravitate toward that great unfinished business. The specter that haunts every profound discussion of human affairs today is the painful duty of setting up a world government to replace the national state system. We went to war to save freedom from a tyrant who offered unity; and the more loudly we talk about freedom, the more insistently the problem of unity presses for solution.

Upon the foolish, it presses only subconsciously. It becomes conscious only as a bewilderment over what we shall do to make the world habitable again even when Hitler is crushed. But upon the wise it presses consciously, if unexpectedly. In "Education Between Two Worlds," Mr. Meiklejohn did not set out to argue for world federation. He set out to discover what teachable doctrine would enable a free society of reasonable men of good will to educate its young. For Mr. Meiklejohn is far too wise to assume with contemporary liberals that educating, and therefore teaching, can be carried on with no doctrine at all. He observes that in our civilization Christianity was once that doctrine, and the Church was the organization that taught it. He observes further that it is no longer the Church but the State which does the teaching, and he thinks it therefore important to ask what doctrine it shall teach.

In order to examine the minutes of the previous meetings, as it were, Mr. Meiklejohn reviews the Christian answer to that question, given in the seventeenth century by a Czech bishop, John Amos Comenius, whom the Long Parliament almost authorized to set up England's system of public education. He also reviews John Locke, who set the tone for the more "practical" kind of education which England and America were actually to give. And he watches with Matthew Arnold the building of that cultural Tower of Babel which Locke unwittingly designed. With Arnold, he finds himself

"Wandering between two worlds, one dead,
"The other powerless to be born."

The first world is Christendom, and the second is a secular society which Mr. Meiklejohn feels must somehow be made habitable. In "The Social Contract" and "Emile" he thinks he finds it adumbrated if not wholly understood: a moral state, not Locke's policeman state which we have chosen, able to educate free men because it would have the authority without which freedom is mere license and whim. Next, he examines America's answer as to what doctrine our schools should teach, an answer supplied by John Dewey and elaborated—and too often caricatured—by his enthusiastic disciples, who still dominate American education. Patiently and gently, Mr. Meiklejohn examines, not the patent collapse of American education today, but the inherent weaknesses in Dewey's own philosophic statement. His chapters on Dewey would alone have made his book important, though his long view leads him to group them under the title, The Pragmatic Episode.

The New World which he challenges us to bring to birth is one in which the State undertakes to teach kindness and social responsibility, instead of self-interest and what will "work"; respect for reason, as against the appeal to violence. Since reason is not the prerogative of any race or class, and since he accepts Rousseau's "brotherhood of man" as a datum, he concludes that such education must be universal. And since nobody can truly teach what he does not practice, the moral State that must take over the educational task once performed by the Church, must be universal in scope, must in short be a world government. Otherwise, it must periodically appeal to violence.

Discarding Christian dogma, Mr. Meiklejohn emerges with a dogma which Christians should have little difficulty in identifying, or at least with an undemonstrable belief in the universal brotherhood of man. Discarding a universal Church as teacher, he is forced to set up a universal State to do the teaching, since any other would be doomed to teach with its tongue in its cheek. For this is a profound book on the basic issues which confront American education, and in 1942 profound books gravitate surely toward the unfinished business about which World War II is being fought.

STRINGFELLOW BARR.

An Angry Book

MAKE THIS THE LAST WAR: THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, by Michael Straight. 417 *pages. Harcourt;* $3.00

There has already been a spate of books about the post-war period—and it will increase during the coming year or two. Until the great and definitive book arrives, this one, which is written in the midst of war and is therefore frankly transitional, will have to stand as the best utterance we have had on the aims of the war and on the conditions and possibilities of the peace. It is an angry book and will make many of its readers angry, as is already attested by the unfriendly reviews it has had from the critics who don't want to be shaken out of the snug harbor of their traditional assumptions. It is a book written in a mood of revolutionary construction—a tocsin-ringing mood of impatience and urgency. It is a book that is interspersed with italics for emphasis, and does not mind the deliberate use of chorus-like repetition for effect. It is an over-accented, over-tense, over-written book—that is to say, it is the book of a young fighter who does not mind violating some of the amenities because he has to fight and he means to win.

In its essential social and philosophical premises, it falls in the same category with Harold Laski's "Where Do We Go From Here?" and E. H. Carr's "Conditions of Peace," both of which books it now supplants. That is to say, it is the book of a democratic Socialist who sees a democratic socialism on a world scale as the basic condition and the only hope for peace, and who sees peace on a world scale as the basic condition and the only hope for a democratic socialism. I might perhaps add that in this respect the book is sharper, firmer, and more militant than Mr. Carr's. And it is a welcome contrast to the tired thinking and the double-talk writing to be found in many books about the peace.

Mr. Straight's book differs from others about the war and peace in six essential and related respects. First, its scope and span are those of the world: it is neither America-centered nor Europe-centered. Second, it understands the relation between internal crisis and internal well-being, on the one hand, and world peace on the other. Third, it understands that the new lines of democratic advance reach not only into new types of over-all administrative planning in every nation, but also into new grass-roots local organizations, of which factory councils and town meetings and neighborhood organizations are the beginning. Fourth, it sees more clearly than any other book how the peace is already being shaped or mis-shaped by the conduct of the war. Fifth, it refuses to go all-out for a particular blueprint or world plan, but—for all its emphasis on planning, or perhaps because of that emphasis—it sees that growth in the future must form an organic continuity with the achievements and difficulties of the present. For that reason the central cadre of its thinking is the United Nations, which it projects from its present form into its future potentials. Sixth, it does not stress the parliamentary, the formally legal, the judicial: it recognizes that the future of the United Nations will lie with federated executive action on a world plane, using a United Nations civil service and the administrative devices of the fact-finding commission, the mixed technical commission, the combined command.

In structure the book has not wholly resolved the eternal problem of combining the analytical with the chronological. Its five parts deal successively with the basic conditions of peace, the materials and opportunities now at hand, the need for immediate action, the steps to be taken in the transition period, and the imperatives of the long-run future of the United Nations. The result is that Straight's four basic themes—the internal affirmative society, national development and liberation, federal participation on a regional basis, and world organization—have to be thrashed out in three different parts of the book. Yet this is a minor fault if it is one. The major fact is that the thinking is clear and sound, the documentation rich and specific, the quotations telling, and the writing itself full of power and passion.

If I have an essential criticism, it would be on a strain of contradiction which runs through the book, and which is probably inevitable. Mr. Straight has written in a mood that is primarily hortatory and imperative: the verbal phrases that occur most frequently are "we need to" and "we must." To be sure, he shows a deep understanding of the forces that have already blocked the progress of the war and its transformation into a genuine war for a free world: in fact, on the score of military offensive action by America he proved—writing before the North African campaign—over-pessimistic. Nevertheless, he does not offer a thorough-going analysis of the social and psychological forces which will undoubtedly continue to block a genuinely democratic victory and the organization of a democratic peace. On that theme one could write another book—a book that will probably be written a decade from now, explaining why we failed.

Mr. Straight was confronted by the problem which confronts all progressives today—that of seeking to combine militancy about the future

with an essential pessimism about the present —an inspiring optimism about possibilities with a realism about probabilities. This is the Roman wall that runs through his book, as it must run through all good writing today. It is the inherent malaise of our time, forced on us by our institutions. Yet it would have been worth while to have made the cleavage explicit, and to have offered an analysis of what the operative social forces are likely to be in the calculable future, as distinguished from what they ought to be, or need to be, or must be. However, of all the books that have thus far appeared dealing with the world that is in the breaking and the world that is in the making, this one is the most imperative reading for liberals and conservatives alike.

MAX LERNER.

Pot-Bouille dans la Debâcle

PRIMER FOR COMBAT, by Kay Boyle. xi+320 pages. Simon and Schuster; $2.50

Using the most difficult fiction form—a diary narrative—Kay Boyle has presented to us the temper and tempo of life in a small French town during those last desperate days of the signing of the armistice between France and Germany. She has done more: she has written a historical novel of the present, a book which impresses upon the mind of its readers every spasm of the last convulsions of the French Republic.

Yet this is done unpretentiously. For the narrative is carried on the current of a simple love story, so simple indeed that the entire plot is disclosed in the pathetic complaint of the floundering husband. "'I can't understand it. God knows I'll help you. I'll do what you want to help him—money, if that will do it—but I'll never understand it. A Don Juan, a cheap lady-killer, an Austrian yodeler—and you falling for it, you being taken in. . . . I don't know how far it's gone between you,' Benchley said, 'but the sight of his writing on an envelope, just the sight of it—it sickens me, it's like a physical sickness to me.' He took another drink, and he said: 'Maybe you'll get over it. Maybe when all this thing is straightened out—the war, the hysteria, the false emotions.'"

Phyl has no answer to this—and while her lover is in the Foreign Legion in Africa, she needs no answer. Miss Boyle lets her confine and confide to her diary the vague, sentimental effort to hang on to her last autumnal romance. Equally pathetic and undetermined, it differs from her husband's complaint in that it makes her an actor rather than an alien observer of the drama of France. Even though "with a woman's narrowing of experience," as she herself puts it, Phyl seems to consider the war almost incidental to her love affair, the reader quickly recognizes that it is quite the reverse, that the author has wisely, knowingly, and with the bitter irony of an anguished mind, mixed the trivial and the vital in just the right proportions to reveal the full tragedy of a people.

The story begins on June 20, 1940, the third day of the armistice. Within a few pages we are completely aware of the helpless confusion, disillusionment, and despair which progressively debase the spirit of a community. Yet the symptoms of national panic—rumor and wild talk, speculation and bewilderment—are communicated with no more excitement than the sibilant whisper of a neighborhood gossip. Here is the plight of Pontcharra which needs only to be multiplied to describe the state of the nation:

> The mayor himself was still uncertain as to what course to follow if the Germans came. Half the *conseil municipal* was for declaring the village *ville libre*, he said, while the other half was for defending it to the last man. All personal firearms had been called, and the gendarmes were no longer in military dress, as they have been since the declaration of war. But the instructions from the military were so fluctuating, the mayor said, that there was the possibility firearms would be returned to their owners again. Since some time, blockades of stone, cement, and scrap iron have been erected on the highway outside the village to impede the advance of tanks, but the mayor now says that if Pontcharra were to be declared a *ville libre* these barricades must be automatically removed. If, on the other hand, it were decided after the meeting of the *conseil* that they should fight to the last man, he could get some barbed wire from Marly, provided there were any wire left, and reinforce the boulders and the iron with it. It is not possible that a fervent spirit can be so turned on or off at will.
>
> We had coffee at the Splendide, and even St. Cyr was laughing as foolishly as a girl about the situation. One of the bridges outside the town had been spiked with dynamite last night so that it might be blown up when the Germans got that far, but this morning the mayor had decided to remove the dynamite until they knew. They are waiting for explicit orders from the prefecture, and doubtless the prefecture is waiting for explicit orders from somewhere else, just as the French army waited for explicit orders from someone or somewhere and they never came. Meanwhile, the whole structure of the nation is adrift, mastless and rudderless, and the quivering compass needle of a people's belief swings wildly from pole to pole.
>
> "We are just waiting for developments," the mayor said to St. Cyr, and it must be like this that every town and village in the country is waiting, portions of a functioning state no longer, but small scattered islands lost to all

communication and direction, waiting hour after hour for the word of reassurance or merely of authority to come. . . .

When we bought cigarettes, Madame Rosette was weeping behind the counter with rage, not grief, at what they had done to France—and "they" in this past week has come to mean not the enemy but the chiefs of the army and the government. In every shop, in every mouth, in every face there is the one thing heard, or said, or written out: "We have been betrayed; we have been betrayed; we have been betrayed."

"History will find their names out and write them down to the shame of Frenchmen forever!" the priest cried from the pulpit, and in contrast the newspapers are filled with high-flown, mollifying articles and allocutions which attempt to lay a foundation of peaceful acceptance for whatever is to come. . . . Just one week after the country's collapse, this part of the population at least is outraged by the treachery of a specific coalition, the names which form it having become as familiar as one's own.

Good as these informative passages are, they are not nearly as revelatory as the deft brief notes which in a phrase sum up the disintegration of a personality or the birth of a movement. They are the beams of a searchlight stabbing into the darkness of conquered France.

JOHAN J. SMERTENKO.

Strategy for Peace

VICTORY IS NOT ENOUGH, THE STRATEGY FOR A LASTING PEACE, by Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer. 322 *pages. Norton;* $3.00

In a series of introductory chapters, the author deals with the background of this war: the tragedy of the German democracy, the tragedy of democratic socialism, the downfall of the League, the French debacle. He then develops his own program for a future peace. Its center is a European Confederation, based upon the disarmament of all European states and consisting possibly of a number of regional federations within the framework of the wider organization. Military affairs and those economic functions that are related to military power would come under the control of the Confederation. Since the author expects resistance among the European nations to such a Confederation, he advocates American pressure to achieve it and make it all-inclusive. No military power of any appreciable strength on the Continent would be permitted to stay outside the federal organization. Similar federations would be established in other parts of the world. A future world league would then be restricted to the function of a clearing-house among the various federations.

The basic theory underlying these proposals is that no international organization ought to exist without sufficient coercive power to enforce its rulings. Since it is impossible to obtain such power for a world organization, the reconstitution of a world-wide League of Nations would create only the dangerous illusion of collective security, but not its reality. The author foresees that America, even after this war, will not be ready to accept permanent obligations outside the American sphere of interest in the Pacific. The best he hopes for is temporary American co-operation in setting up the European Confederation and guiding it through its first stages.

The main problem of a European Confederation is of course Germany. No armistice ought to be concluded with Germany, regardless of any changes in the internal regime of the country that might occur during the later stages of the war. Instead, it is recommended that Germany be occupied by American forces in such a demonstrative way that the Germans will "not be allowed to forget that they have been defeated." The rest of Europe will be "frozen" so as to prevent the reconstruction of national sovereignties on the Continent and to prepare for the minimum needs of the Confederation to be established. Plans for the partition of Germany are rejected. Austria is no longer capable of assuming the leadership of Germany; instead it might be possible to set up a Hapsburg monarchy. A communist regime for Germany is unlikely. The author advocates the full disarmament of the country to be followed by the establishment of an international administration with the assistance of a few thousand reliable anti-nazi Germans serving as advisors to the occupation administration. The re-education of the Germans for democratic ideas would permit the gradual withdrawal of the occupation forces. Americans, rather than Europeans, and preferably Americans "without any undercurrent of European consciousness in their mental make-up" would be most successful administrators of defeated Germany.

This brief résumé is far from doing justice to the wide scope and the many details presented in this book. It is in most part brilliantly and persuasively written and based upon the author's experience as journalist and League of Nations official. In his views he is profoundly eclectical. Although he considers socialism inevitable, he is convinced that the conservative forces in Europe are much stronger than most people seem to suspect. He has democratic views, but he seems reluctant to

advocate the establishment of democratic regimes on the Continent. He is more afraid of the Soviet Union than of the Hapsburgs and his historical analysis is open to serious criticism.

Indeed, the basic weakness of the book is its lack of a thorough analysis of the evolution leading to the outbreak of the war. The author seems to believe that the breakdown of German democracy was due primarily if not exclusively to the Peace Treaty and in particular to the "war guilt" clause. But he does not explain why under the Treaty of Versailles German democracy prospered until the great economic depression destroyed the social organization of the Reich. He seems to think that the future of democratic socialism lies in the pattern of the British Labor party, but he does not seem to realize that the Labor party shares the weaknesses of the Continental labor movement as was amply demonstrated during the great crisis and in the first years of Hitlerism.

Owing to this lack of a serious analysis, the author is compelled to operate with such elusive concepts as "national character," emotional traits, and psychological traditions. I do not mean to say that these things do not exist and do not have their importance. But a successful peace, it seems to me, is one based upon a correct anticipation of future developments rather than upon necessarily static assumptions of national psychology. There is little to be gained by detailed discussion of the individual suggestions of the author, some of which seem quite reasonable while others might meet serious objections. Plans for the future peace must be based upon a vision of the future of our social institutions and their political machinery. Not so much what is desirable but rather what is feasible in view of probable future developments ought to determine the plans of the peacemakers. Because only then will the peace stand the strain and pressures of the world to come.

ADOLF F. STURMTHAL.

Double-edged Propaganda

LISTEN HANS, by Dorothy Thompson. x + 292 *pages. Houghton Mifflin;* $2.50

"I believe that certain principles can be formulated which synthesize the progressive thought of the world world at present—including the thought of an unknown but not nonexistent number of Germans," writes Dorothy Thompson.

To establish these "ten principles for a people's peace," Miss Thompson presents a simple, succinct, and altogether splendid interpretation of German history. She indicates that stupendous contradiction which Hitler sought to harmonize as the Third Reich, a contradiction which was bound to fail and equally destined to wreak havoc and disaster in the failure. "Such a psychological confusion," she says of this contradiction, "in a nation as in an individual, induces a mental breakdown expressing itself in physical outbreaks. Schizophrenics are dangerous. Unable to make up their minds, they make up their wills. Unable to create their world, they imagine their world—and find reality against them. The Third Reich that is to last for a thousand years is the Reich that never was on land or sea. It is not even placed in *time.*"

She has thus put the weapon of enlightenment into the hands of those who plan an end to this war which will be neither punitive nor propitiatory. It will serve equally well to scotch the inevitable efforts of appeasers to get a "negotiated peace" and to fend off the avengers who are even now crying that there can be no peace until Germany is dismembered politically and denuded economically.

But there is another part to this book, consisting of Conversations with Hans, a "friend" in Germany to whom and through whom Miss Thompson communicates what she thinks about the German people. These conversations are really radio talks delivered over a period of several months and broadcast by short wave to Germany. They are moderate, insidious, effective. They are packed with facts about Germany which Germans themselves do not know. The leitmotif that the Fuehrer is leading Germany to ruin through the errors and miscalculations which he calls intuitions recurs again and again in these revelations.

Similarly, Miss Thompson reiterates the motif of American resources and power, playing on the fears and the appetites of a nation that has been starved both physically and spiritually. Typical of these broadcasts is the one she delivered about food on April 10, 1942: "Nothing so far is rationed," she announced, "though there is talk of rationing sugar. My own dinner tonight consists of *Kraftbrühe,* fish in aspic, beefsteak *garniert,* and chocolate cake. Incidentally, Hans, I still have my old cook." It is easy to see the psychological effect—the demoralization of a drooling mouth—on those in Germany who, with Hans, listened to this broadcast.

So she talks of rubber, of tanks, and of ships, of foreign and domestic intrigues by which the Nazis deceived the world and, most of all, the German people. She tells Hans of the Hess affair and delivers thereby a shattering blow to

the loyalty the Germans bear their Fuehrer. Throughout she strikes the same note: "Do away with this regime and save Germany." The whole is a superb piece of propaganda; but the striking characteristic of this book is that it is almost as good propaganda for our own people as for Germany.

J. J. S.

THE COMING BATTLE OF GERMANY, by William B. Ziff. xxiii + 280 pages. Duell; $2.50

THE COMMAND OF THE AIR, by Giulio Douhet. viii + 394 pages. Coward-McCann; $4.00

Readers who have followed Mr. Ziff's many articles in current magazines need not be told that he is an ardent exponent of air power as the great military agency of the future. Like Major de Seversky, he is impatient with all who will not agree that "air power must be recognized as the single weapon by which domination may be achieved, and all tactics should be directly designed around it." The book is built around the thesis that the "battle of Germany" can be won by systematic bombing administered by "a continuously replenished pool of 5,000 heavy bombers weighing up to 300 tons each, with speeds in excess of 400 miles per hour." Few airmen will follow Mr. Ziff all the way in his argument, but his case is well-presented and it is one which warrants presentation.

Enthusiasts for a separate and independent air force invariably cite the writings of the late Giulio Douhet, but until now there has been no complete edition of his classic work available in English. The present volume, ably translated by Dino Ferrari, contains the original four books, beginning with "Command of the Air" (1921) and concluding with his much-discussed "The War of 19—," which was published a few days before the author's death in 1930. The influence of this book in the history of military science has already been so great that an English edition was long overdue.

G. K.

FOOD, A WEAPON FOR VICTORY, by Bertram Fowler. 185 *pages. Little, Brown;* $1.50

This small book is by a man who realizes that we can lose the war, after winning it by armed power, unless we plan scientifically for the post-war period. The destruction of totalitarianism will leave little vestige of organized government either in the main Axis countries or in their slave states. Famine, violence, and pestilence will stalk Europe. Each concentration camp will be a pathological lesion on its body politic. The need will be urgent for farming implements, seed, fertilizer, food, clothing, and medical attention. To deny these after conquest will simply be to doom our world to chaos for, as Mr. Fowler also realizes, the city of the world is now an organic whole, and poverty, disease, or injustice in any part of it adversely affects every other part.

The author is liberal economically and politically. He understands thoroughly the recent weaknesses of free enterprise and the manner in which it has sold its birthright for monopoly, price fixing, the regimenting of competitors, and the ultimate strangling of world trade in its pathetically misguided efforts to increase its own profit. He realizes that free government must tear away the bonds with which so-called free enterprise has hobbled itself, so that both may work together for world regeneration.

T. S. H.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, by Francis Biddle. 214 *pages. Scribners;* $2.50

Attorney General Biddle's association with Justice Holmes began in 1911, when he became the great jurist's secretary; it lasted until the grand old man died in 1935, two days before his ninety-fourth birthday. Out of this long period of close friendship, Mr. Biddle has written a touching biographical memoir which will be eagerly read by all who honor the memory of one of the great figures of the Supreme Court.

Though the book is not, and was not designed to be, anything in the nature of a definitive biography, it is likely to be read by far more people than the definitive work when one is written. For one thing, Mr. Biddle's little book is written in a sensitive style which, coming from a lawyer, is a delightful surprise. Also, it is a remarkable achievement both as a character study and as a condensation of the legal, political, and economic credo which sustained Justice Holmes through fifty years on the bench. Definitely recommended.

ARISE TO CONQUER, by Ian Gleed. 223 *pages. Random;* $2.00

This is an authentic document of modern heroism, the story of the Battle of Britain seen by the author, a Wing-Commander in the R.A.F., and told in the first person as a sequence of individual impressions. Although the modern British slang makes the style somewhat confusing, the descriptions of air battles are so graphic that the reader feels he is accompanying the author in his Hawker-Hurricane.

A Check List of Forthcoming Books on International Affairs

THE JAPANESE MIND, by Gustave Eckstein. Harper. An examination of the traditions, modes, religion, and such native characteristics as figure in the motivation of the Japanese. The effects of six centuries of isolation on our enemy in the Pacific.

ONE WAR, ONE PEACE, ONE WORLD, by Wendell Willkie, Simon and Schuster. A plea for open discussion regarding the war, the peace, and the world we must make, and a report on the author's impressions on his trip to Russia, China, and the Near East.

A TIME TO ACT, by Archibald MacLeish. Houghton Mifflin. Two poems and thirteen addresses on the relation of America to a world at war and to the world which will take shape when the war is over.

GERMANY'S MASTER PLAN, by Joseph Borken and Charles A. Welsh. Duell. The story of industrial offensive, showing how Germany controlled rubber, tin, quinine, and other needed war materials up to and after December 7, 1941. The victimization of great corporations with international affiliations by German cartels.

IT IS LATER THAN YOU THINK. THE NEED FOR A MILITANT DEMOCRACY. 1943 EDITION, by Max Lerner. Viking. New material is added to this book which first appeared in 1938, enumerating the enemy's "Himalayan miscalculation" and foreseeing our ultimate solution in terms of a "world image and a world order."

SOUTHWEST PASSAGE, by John Lardner. Lippincott. The story of one man's meeting with hardship and danger, comradeship and heroism, on convoy duty in the North Atlantic during the nightmare winter of 1940 and 1941.

MIRACLES OF MILITARY MEDICINE, by Albert Q. Maisel. Duell. New medical weapons that may save as many lives as the war machines will destroy: bottled blood, the new skin-grafting machine, the sulfa drugs, toxoids that are wiping out tetanus, and mind savers.

CONFLICTS. STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY, by L. B. Namier. Macmillan. An analysis of our present situation from a historical angle, showing how events in Europe since 1815 have followed logical lines. An inquiry into the meaning of democracy and a discussion of the party system.

BATTLE FOR THE SOLOMONS. OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, by Ira Wolfert. Houghton Mifflin. A correspondent reports on what happened during the five battles of the Solomons, beginning with Guadalcanal in October—encounters which were fought in three dimensions and over an area of 250,000 square miles.

THIS TIME FOR KEEPS, by John MacCormac. Viking. An interpretation of the way of life for which we are fighting and the meaning it can have for others. Some new ways of looking at the present World War, as a continuation of the American Revolution and as a religious war.

BLIND DATE WITH MARS, by Alice-Leone Moats. Doubleday. The career of a reporter among diplomats and warriors, en route through Russia by way of Japan, China, and the Burma Road, and home by Persia, Egypt, and West Africa.

CAN WE WIN THE PEACE? by Paul Einzig. Macmillan. A detailed plan for the economic disarmament of Germany, which the author considers essential from the point of view of the security of Europe.

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—MAX LERNER

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WHO'S WHO IN THIS ISSUE

STRINGFELLOW BARR, President of St. Johns College at Annapolis, is directing an experiment in education which has re-established the classics as the basis for a progressive attitude toward life. He was formerly Professor of Modern European History at the University of Virginia and is the author of "Mazzini: Portrait of an Exile."

PAUL L. BOWEN is one of the refugees literally driven from pillar to post by the spread of nazism. Originally the editor of the *Modern World* in Vienna, *MR. BOWEN* was in Berlin when Hitler came to power. He left for Florence, later returned to Vienna, was driven from Vienna to Paris, and finally to the south of Frence where he spent some time in concentration camps before being allowed to come to this country. He is now writing scenarios in Hollywood.

The first World War inspired *WITTER BYNNER* to write his long poem "The New World"; the second has called forth another effort in the same vein. *The Sleeper* will make one of the poems in the new edition of *MR. BYNNER'S* work which will soon be published.

Known best as a poet and an editor of verse magazines, *STANTON A. COBLENTZ* has also written a number of books on social and political problems, including "The Decline of Man" and "The Answer of the Ages."

On loan from Stanford University, where he is Professor of Literature, *ALBERT GUERARD* is now working for the Office of War Information in New York. His "Short History of the International Language Movement," published about fifteen years ago, is still an authoritative survey of the general field in which his present article, *A Federal Language for a World Commonwealth,* is a new and noteworthy proposal. *DR. GUERARD'S* latest book, "The France of Tomorrow," was published recently.

The Third Front by *ALFRED KANTOROWICZ* appears very appropriately at this moment to mark the tenth anniversary of Hitler's rise to power. On January 30, 1933, Hitler became Chancellor of the Reich; now both Nazis and anti-Nazis are weighing the strength of the forces against Hitlerism within Germany. *MR. KANTOROWICZ,* formerly foreign correspondent of the *Vossische Zeitung,* was one of the first journalists to be exiled from nazi Germany. He is founder and permanent secretary of the League of German Writers-in-Exile and founder and director of the Library of Burned Books. The most important of his works are "Germany Is in Our Camp" and "The Battalion of Twenty-One Nationalities." At present, he is working on a novel, *"Der Sohn des Bürgers,"* dealing with the breakdown of German civilization; in collaboration with Howard Breslin he is also working on a series of radio plays about the outstanding European anti-fascist intellectuals, which is broadcast every week by C.B.S. Last March we published his article, *The Strategy of Anti-Nazi Propaganda.*

MAX LERNER, author of "Ideas are Weapons" and "It Is Later Than You Think," is Professor of Political Science at Williams College and contributing editor of the *New Republic.*

LIN LIN, head of the Bureau of Information of the Chinese News Service, is the author of numerous books on Chinese finance and economics. He came to the United States after a youthful career as a revolutionary leader in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's organization in Canton, received his doctor's degree at Ohio State University, and was for some time research fellow at the Brookings Institution.

GABRIELA MISTRAL is the pen name of Lucila Godoy de Alcayaga, famous Chilean poet and teacher. After a prominent teaching career in Chile and in the United States where she was Professor of Spanish History and Civilization at Middlebury College and Barnard College, she served as consul for Chile in Spain and Portugal. She is now consul in Rio de Janeiro.

The analysis of the *Collective Neurosis of Germany* by *DR. RAYMOND DE SAUSSURE,* psychiatrist and author of "Psychoanalytic Method," is in a sense a sequel to his essay, *The Psychopathology of Adolf Hitler,* which we published last June. *DR. DE SAUSSURE* was professor at the Institute of Psychoanalysis in Paris and is now teaching at the Ecole Libre des Hautes Etudes of New York.

The First Year of the United Nations is an essay incorporating the addresses made by *MICHAEL STRAIGHT* at the Conference of the World Confederation of International Groupments. It will be published in "Peace and Order in Post-War Reconstruction," the volume which will present the papers deliv-

ered at the Conference. Before becoming an editor and Washington correspondent of the *New Republic, MR. STRAIGHT* was special assistant to the National Power Policy Committee of the Department of the Interior, and an economist in the European Division of the Department of State. His book, *"Make This the Last War,"* has just been published. *MR.* STRAIGHT is now awaiting induction as an aviation cadet in the United States Air Corps.

ADOLF F. STURMTHAL, author of "Die Grosse Krise" and of the forthcoming book, "The Tragedy of European Labor," was active in the socialist and labor international movements before coming to this country. He is now Director of the Institute of Economic Education at Bard College.

GERARD SWOPE, Director and Honorary President of the General Electric Company, has long been a leading figure in public affairs in America. He was a member of the General Staff of the United States Army during the first World War and for his service as director of purchase, storage, and traffic he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal and appointed a Chevalier of the French Legion of Honor. He is the author of "Stabilization of Industry" (often referred to as "The Swope Plan") and was a member of the first National Labor Board in 1933.

MR. SWOPE notes his indebtedness in the present article to George Eveleth for aid in collecting and verifying the statistics. The following sources were used: Mulhall's Dictionary of Statistics; The Economic Almanac for 1942; Year Book of Labor Statistics—1937; League of Nations Statistical Year-Book, 1939-40; Publications of the Statistical Bureau of the German Reich; Levassuer's Tables and Estimates; and the Northern Countries in World Economy—1939.

The portrayal of the life of Russian guerrillas is an eyewitness story by a young Soviet poet, *JOSEPH UTKIN,* who as war correspondent on the staff of the official Government newspaper, *Izvestia,* observed partisan operations on the Bryansk front last summer.

CHESTER S. WILLIAMS is associated with Ferdinand Kuhn in the development of the British Division of the Office of War Information and returned recently from a ten weeks' speaking tour in Britain. For the past seven years, he has been working in the field of adult education in the United States Office of Education and is now Director of Adult and Civic Education. He is the author of many articles and pamphlets in this field and has written five books entitled, "Our Freedoms Series."

J. J. S. asks us to make a very necessary correction of a stenographic error of omission in the final paragraph of his review of "War in Our Time" by Harry B. Henderson and Herman C. Morris which we published in January. The last part of this paragraph should read: "By an inexplicable aberration from their authentic and judicious reporting, the authors have almost destroyed their credibility. For no reason at all they have dragged into their pages the quarrel of Stalinists and Trotzkyites. The extent of their partisanship may be judged by the fact that they label Doriot and Déat as Trotzkyites and climax an adulatory biographical sketch of Stalin with the statement that Trotzky was a nazi agent who 'was assassinated by one of his own followers.' Thus they have allowed this bias to mar a fascinating critical and historical document of the highest importance."

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Of the events and experiences which filled a busy month for FREE WORLD, the following are sufficiently noteworthy to pass on to our readers:

We are proud to welcome the appearance this month of the Chilean Edition of FREE WORLD and to announce the publication in the near future of a French edition in Canada.

The Office of War Information will henceforth send microfilm copies of FREE WORLD to India for use by the Indian press.

In a Washington dispatch of the United Press, *PROFESSOR SHELDON GLUECK* was mentioned as the most likely candidate for the post of consulting adviser to the International Criminal Court, soon to be established by the United Nations for the post-war trials of Axis war criminals. In discussing *DR. GLUECK'S* qualifications, the story quoted copiously from the article *Trial and Punishment of the Axis War Criminals* in our November issue in which *DR. GLUECK* presented a thorough analysis of this question.

A less happy item is the news that the *Argentina Libra,* a newspaper prominent for its support of the cause of the United Nations, was suspended on December 29 by the police in Buenos Aires, because of an article by the Socialist Deputy *AMERICO GHIOLDI* protesting against nazi infiltration in Argentine universities. *SENOR GHIOLDI* has contributed three articles to FREE WORLD, the latest of which was *Latin America and the War* in our October issue.

"There are no serious magazines to read"

Editor of the FREE WORLD
8 West 40th Street, New York

Dear Sir:

Recently I read your magazine for the first time -- the anniversary number. It impressed me greatly -- particularly the realistic grappling with aspects of the problem: how to produce and to retain the state of mind to create the post-war world we hope for.

I want to make a suggestion which may help in one small corner of the problem. I am now in the Army, and I note in the Officers' Clubs, and I believe in the enlisted men's recreation centers as well, there are no serious magazines to read. They run from Liberty, Life, Saturday Evening Post to Newsweek and Time. I wonder whether it would not be possible to introduce your magazine into, let us say, a few hundred Officers' Clubs in posts around the country, possibly in enlisted men's centers also. Also in overseas centers, which I believe are operated by the Red Cross.

Here is a group of hundreds of thousands of officers, and many times that number of enlisted men, who will sooner or later have a great influence in the post-war world, with little or no stimulus to consider the problems, or to reach or support solutions. If you could get your magazine before them it might be particularly influential, as there is no competition.

I have no idea how one goes about this, but if you can arrange it, I don't think there's any doubt that you could get contributions to defray the expense. I should, for example, be glad to make a contribution to cover distribution to a few posts.

If you decide this is a worthwhile idea, but can't accomplish it on a frontal basis or generally, it may still be possible to do it in individual cases where, for example, you would know of individual officers who might arrange it at their posts. I, for example, will investigate the situation here.

Yours,

(signed) Albert Mayer, Capt. C.E.,
Headquarters 2nd Air Force,
Fort George Wright, Washington

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